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This dissertation contributes to the field of modern Iranian sociocultural history.  
It engages in the historical analysis of the intersection of Iranian youth culture and media 
studies, presenting the implications of a Post-Network society in the context of 
contemporary Iran.  Existing scholarship on youth culture as it manifests in Post-Reform 
Iran is heavily dominated by works that privilege resistance in their investigation.  I, 
however, argue for a class-based reading of the subject, in which socioeconomic 
aspirations prevail over the intention of resistance in the characterization of Iran’s 
Millenial Generation. 
While the Reform Movement and Mohammad Khatami’s election served to 
render the post-Revolution generation as a legitimate political force, the Reformist 
President’s impotence to champion the demands of his youthful constituents throughout 
his presidential tenure triggered a pervasive sense of disillusionment among the Third 
Generation.  The subsequent political inaction that it inspired arguably abetted the 
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and initiated the Post-Reform Era, which coincided 
with the Post-Network Era in media worldwide.  During this time, the penetration of 
convenience technologies significantly impacted the formation of Iranian youth culture.  
As Iranian Millenials became increasingly dependent on mobile Internet technology, they 
 viii 
created a new media environment that helped precipitate the emergence of a commodity 
culture.  This commodity culture, along with the arrival and adaptation of Post-Network 
technologies, has led to the prevalence of certain trends among young urban Iranians. 
These trends serve as markers of socioeconomic class in today’s Iran, and are used by 
Iranian Millenials as a type of social currency to signify and validate their identification 
with their preferred class group.  Ultimately, the adaptation of Post-Network media 
practices, the pronounced political disenchantment of the Ahmadinejad era, and the 
neoliberal economic policies touted by the Islamic Republic since the early 1990s, have 
all combined to create a society in which class identity has become a definitive feature of 
Millenial Iran. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 Sometime in the fall of 2014, I was scrolling through my Instagram feed and came across 
a post that caught my eye.  It was a stencil print on wood of a man’s figure holding up a sign that 
read, “PROTEST IS BEAUTIFUL.”  Underneath the stencil print was another sign that read, 
“BEH TOKHMAM,” which is a vulgar colloquial expression in Persian that literally translates as 
“to my balls” and is used to indicate, “I don’t give a fuck.”  This post had popped up on my feed 
because a number of the Iranians whom I followed had liked it.  The image had resonated with 
them because it conveyed the general sense of apathetic aversion that contemporary young 
Iranians feel toward the idea of revolution.  It was emblematic of the post-Revolution era Iranian, 
the product of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 As a second-generation Iranian-American, I have always felt somewhat removed from 
what it means to be an Iranian of the post-Revolution era.  Like many second-generation Iranian-
Americans, my vision of the vatan1 was painted by stories and recollections of Pahlavi Iran, the 
golden age of the Diaspora’s collective nostalgia.  I also grew up romanticizing my parents’ 
generation’s involvement in the 1979 Revolution.  So, in 2009, when claims of a fraudulent 
presidential election inspired the Green Movement (a social movement primarily driven by the 
country’s youth), I imagined an opportunity to participate in a similar sort of revolutionary zeal 
(to the extent that could be expected abroad) that my parents had experienced thirty years prior.  
I became involved in the organizing efforts of the Iranian graduate students in my hometown 
during that summer, penetrating and achieving acceptance within this foreign (to me) 
community.  After the suppression of the movement, I maintained my involvement with this 
                                                
1 Homeland. 
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community, as they had become a significant part of my social network.  In doing so, I had the 
opportunity to observe a demographic of post-Revolution era Iranians. 
Through casual observation, from 2009 to 2013, I detected a growing sense of political 
disillusionment within this community, as exemplified by the aforementioned Instagram post.  
This discernment actually inspired the original research question for the present project: Why 
does Iran’s post-revolution generation have such a myopic and blasé attitude toward the idea of 
resistance and revolution?  Why does this demographic distinctly lack the revolutionary fervor 
and political passion that characterized their parental generation?  What are the defining 
characteristics of this demographic and what implications do they have for the future of Iran?  
Before embarking on my research for this project, my initial assumption was that this 
demographic is apathetic, complacent, superficial, materialistic and self-absorbed.  This 
generation, I thought, harbored a distinctly different characterization from their parental 
generation, which had embraced the revolutionary spirit of the 1970s, fomented a movement to 
topple their tyrannical dictator, and served as an inspiration and model for the oppressed and 
downtrodden people of the world.  As I pursued my research, the project evolved to become a 
study of the Iranian Millenial Generation (the post-Revolution generation) as it emerged during 
the Ahmadinejad era, through an examination of popular humor in media. 
In this work, I posit that Iranian Millenials emerged as a sociopolitical force during 
Mohammad Khatami’s presidency and the Reform Era, but that soon after experienced a 
pervasive sense of disillusionment and political impotence with the subsequent election of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, his suppression of the Green Movement and the societal ailments that 
became prominent during his administration.  Ahmadinejad’s presidency not only marked the 
beginning of the Post-Reform era in Iran, it also coincided with the inception of the Post-
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Network period in media worldwide, which was characterized by the emergence of new 
distribution methods, convenience technologies and a participatory culture.  The Third 
Generation’s embrace of Post-Network practices within the context of Post-Reform Iran reified a 
commodity culture that has facilitated the materialization of a particular set of trends and 
behaviors dictated from the upper echelons of Iranian society.  These trends function as class 
makers, which I contend, Millenial Iranians use as their primary form of self-identification.  
Ultimately, I argue that contemporary Iranian youth culture is a product of the Islamic 
Republic’s sustained neoliberal economic policy, the political disenchantment of the Millenial 
generation and the prevalence of Post-Network media practices that emerged in Post-Reform 
Iran, all of which have combined to result in a society that is increasingly defined by class 
identity. 
 
Understanding Iranian Youth Culture Through Humor and Media 
Humor, as an item of cultural consumption, has the ability to cut across socio-economic 
lines and create a sense of camaraderie among people.  As Mikhail Bakhtin astutely observed, 
the study of humor reveals an alternative worldview, a perspective that may otherwise not be 
accessible through any other form but laughter.2  In his theory of Carnivalesque, Bakhtin states 
that carnival laughter is characterized by a profound egalitarianism, in which official hierarchies 
are inverted.  Mary Douglas asserts that jokes are an attack on control with a subversive effect on 
the dominant structure of ideas.  She contends that joking provides relief from social 
classifications and hierarchies—a temporary suspension of the social structure that echoes 
                                                
2 Mikhael Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, Trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1984). 
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Bakhtin’s theory of Carnivalesque.3  Humor in this context, then, reflects the social 
consciousness of a people and their uncensored derision of authority.4 
This dissertation uses the lens of popular humor to examine Iranian youth culture as it 
developed during the Ahmadinejad administration (2005-2013).  Ahmadinejad’s presidency 
coincided with what media studies scholars have delineated as the dawn of the Post-Network 
Era.  This period is characterized by an expansion of convenience technologies that have been 
facilitated by the advent of the Internet and its revolutionizing effects on telecommunications.5  
For this project, I focused on media texts that resonated deeply with young Iranians, and which 
were circulated and spread through Post-Network conventions.  I did this, not only to illustrate 
the issues of concern and prevailing trends within Iranian youth culture, but also to demonstrate 
how the Millenial Generation created this culture through Post-Network practices. 
As Asef Bayat observes, youthfulness indicates “a particular habitus or behavioral and 
cognitive dispositions that are associated with the fact of being ‘young’.”  Bayat defines youth as 
“a distinct social location between childhood and adulthood, where the youngster in a relative 
autonomy is neither totally dependent (on adults) nor independent, and is free from being 
responsible for others.”6  While Shahram Khosravi asserts that youth should be viewed as an 
economic and social concept rather than a chronological age, Pierre Bourdieu suggested that 
perceiving youth as a social unit implicates the manipulation of young people.7  Bayat, however, 
reiterates that youth, as a social category of collective agents, is a specifically modern and urban 
                                                
3 Mary Douglas, “Jokes,” in Implicit Meanings: Selected Essays in Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1999), 146-
164. 
4 Ravinder Kaur, “The Politics of Humor in Iran,” ISIM Review 22 (2008): 46-47. 
5 Amanda Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized (New York: New York University Press, 2014). 
6 Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 116. 
7 Shahram Khosravi, Precarious Lives: Waiting and Hope in Iran (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2017), 16; Pierre Bourdieu, “Youth Is Just a Word,” in Sociology in Question, translated by Richard Nice (London: 
Sage, 1993). 
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phenomenon.8   Youth, therefore, does not refer to an age cohort but rather the phase in a 
person’s life between childhood and adulthood.  The unique social and economic circumstances 
of a society determine the form and duration of youth in each local and at each historical epoch.   
 
The Millenial Generation 
Anthropology understands generation as a category of social identity (e.g. class, ethnicity 
and gender).  Sara Lamb uses the term “generation” to refer to a group of people who were born 
within the same time period and have thus been impacted by similar historical events and 
cultural forces.9  Christopher Bollas uses the phrase “generational objects” to refer to the 
collectively lived experiences that represent a generation’s identity.10  Lived experiences of 
historical events and crises contribute to the formation of generational consciousness, which 
shapes everything from social and political behaviors, to sexuality, to language and 
communication to symbols and rituals.  While generational cycles are understood to typically 
span a period of approximately thirty years, they shorten in societies where historical events 
occur with greater frequency.  Mehran Sohrabzadeh observes that in Iran, due to such historical 
events such as the 1979 Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the Reform Era, and the Green 
Movement, the generational cycle has decreased from thirty years to ten years.11  Currently, 
Iranians born after the establishment of the Islamic Republic are categorized according to the 
decade within the Iranian calendar that they were born.12 
                                                
8 Bayat, Life as Politics, 119. 
9 Sara Lamb, “Generation in Anthropology,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Behaviors and Sciences, Vol. 
9 (Oxford: Elsevier, 2001). 
10 Christopher Bollas, Being a Character: Psychoanalysis and Self Experience (London: Routledge, 1993). 
11 Mehran Sohrabzadeh, “Moghāyes-ye zehnīyat-e nasli va beyn-e nasli dar naslhā-ye dāneshgāhi pas az enghelāb-e 
eslami,” Faslnāmeh-ye Tahghīghāt Farhangī, Vol. 2, 8 (2009): 294-363. 
12 The modern Iranian calendar (referred to as the Jalāli Calendar in Persian) is a solar, observation-based calendar.  
It begins each year on the vernal equinox as precisely determined by astronomical observations in Tehran, and 
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In the context of today’s Iran, the First Generation refers to those who came of age under 
the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.  They reaped the benefits of the 1970s oil boom, allowing 
them to witness an expansive economy and the westernization of Iranian urban life.  This 
generation experienced an Iran that strove to be in rank with the most modern countries in the 
world.  However, many in this generation were also responsible for the Islamic Revolution of 
1979.  The Second Generation came of age during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1989) and thereby 
has childhood memories of pre-revolution Iran.  This generation grew up experiencing the most 
austere years of the Islamic Republic.13  The Third Generation refers to the demographic of 
Iranians who were born right before or after the 1979 Revolution and have no recollection of 
Pahlavi Iran.  This demographic came of age at the turn of the twenty-first century and are 
essentially the product of the Islamic Republic.  
The Third Generation, or nasl-e sevom, is a term that became popularized among Iranians 
of this demographic just before the turn of the century.14  They used it as a means to describe 
themselves as the post-Revolution generation.  Since then, as Orkideh Behrouzan observes, 
generational labels have become both abundant and contested in today’s Iran; they include: 
daheh-ye shasti-hā (“of the sixties decade” referring to those born in1360s of the Iranian 
calendar, or the 1980s of the Gregorian calendar), daheh-ye haftādi-hā (“of the seventies decade” 
referring to those born in the 1370s in the Iranians calendar, or the 1990s of the Gregorian 
Calendar), nasl-e sevom (the Third Generation), khāmushi (the “quiet,” referring to the electrical 
blackouts that occurred during the missile attacks of the Iran-Iraq War), or nasl-e sūkhteh (the 
                                                                                                                                                       
typically corresponds with the 21st of March of the Gregorian calendar.  The modern Iranian calendar ties Persian 
and Islamic tradition.  Each year starts with Nowruz (the pre-Islamic Persian holiday celebrating the beginning of 
Spring and the New Year), while the names of months hail from the ancient Achaemenid era, but the start point of 
the calendar is set at 622 AD, the year of the Islamic Hijrah.  For example, this dissertation was submitted in the 
spring of 2018 (in the Gregorian calendar), which corresponds with the Iranian year 1397. 
13 Shahram Khosravi, Young and Defiant in Tehran (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 5. 
14 Khosravi, Young and Defiant in Tehran. 
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“burnt” generation).  Behrouzan contends that the boundaries between these generational 
categories are undefined and constantly changing.15  In this dissertation, I understand daheh-ye 
shasti-hā (“the decade of the sixties”) to indicate the original Third Generation.  This generation 
has no memory of pre-Revolutionary Iran, experienced the Iran-Iraq War as children and spent 
its formative years in the Post-War Era, which was characterized by a liberal market economy, 
consumer culture and later, unfettered virtual access to the outside world.  I use the term 
“Millenial Generation” or “Millenial Iranians” when referring to both the daheh-ye shasti-hā 
(those of the ‘60s decade) and the daheh-ye haftādī-hā (those of the ‘70s decade).  Similar to the 
Millenials of contemporary American society, the Iranian Millenial Generation is experiencing a 
prolonged phase of youth, due to a variety of factors, including: an extended education duration, 
protracted unemployment, delayed independence from parents and the inability to start one’s 
own family unit.16  The present work, then, seeks to examine youth culture, as espoused by Iran’s 
Millenial Generation, specifically as it emerged throughout the Ahmadinejad presidency. 
While Behrouzan was the first to theorize the distinction between the post-revolution 
generations, and Khosravi noted the difference between the 1360s and 1370s generations, the 
term daheh-ye shasti-hā has been around since the early 2000s (1380s).  It came into prominence 
when those Iranians who were born in that decade had grown up and identified themselves as 
such.  I, myself, first heard the term in 2009, when I became active in the Iranian graduate 
student community of my hometown.  I specifically recall the daheh-ye shasti themed parties 
that they would have, in which everyone would dress in the fashion of the 1360s/1980s and 
                                                
15 Orkideh Behrouzan, Prozak Diaries: Psychiatry and Generational Memory in Iran (Stanford California: Stanford 
University Press, 2016): 30. 
16 Khosravi, Precarious Lives, 74. 
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would listen/dance to nostalgic music from that time.17  Because my research examines media 
texts that appeal to Iranians of both the sixties and the seventies generations, and involves 
interviews with Iranians from both decades (albeit more so with the 1360s generation), I mostly 
use the term “Millenial Generation” throughout this study, although I do sometimes mention the 
Third Generation, particularly when referring to events of particular significance to daheh-ye 
shashtī-hā. 
  
Romanticizing Resistance: The Trends in Iranian Youth Culture Studies 
The urban life of young people in Iran has only recently begun to pique the interest of 
scholars.  In 2006, Roxanne Varzi published Warring Souls and initiated the study of post-
Revolution Iranian youth in the American academy.  Two years later, Shahram Khosravi 
published Young and Defiant in Tehran, a seminal work on the subject of the Iranian Third 
Generation, and in 2009 Pardis Mahdavi published Passionate Uprisings: Iran’s Sexual 
Revolution, a highly criticized ethnography of the prevalent sexual practices of Tehrani youth.  
Most recently, Shahram Khosravi published Precarious Lives: Waiting and Hope in Iran in 
2017, which examines Iranian youth culture as it has emerged throughout the past decade. These 
aforementioned works, however, all reflect the tendency in Iranian youth studies to identify the 
practice of certain socio-cultural trends as an indication of struggle against the state, which is a 
reflection of the current trend in social science scholarship to romanticize resistance. 
Even before the advent of youth culture studies, “resistance” was valorized in other fields 
within Iranian studies, as exemplified by Erika Friedl’s article “Sources of Female Power in 
Iran,” which was part of an anthology written in the early 1990s about women in Iran.  In this 
                                                
17 In fact, I contend that the film Nahang-e Anbar owes its immense popularity to the sense of nostalgia that it 
tapped among the 1360s generation.   
 9 
article, Friedl discusses various means through which women are able to exercise their power in 
post-Revolution Iran, and places resistance at the top of the list (which also included work, 
religion and government).  She concludes that despite its limited benefits, resistance is the single 
most used tactic of power utilized by women in the Islamic Republic.  Later, in a reflective 
article on the pitfalls of longitudinal ethnographic research, Friedl addresses her own complicity 
in perpetuating the romanticization of resistance within the study of anthropology.18  She 
contends that this occurred as part of the ultrarelativist movement in her field, in which women’s 
narratives were touted as stories of agency and empowerment.  In retrospect, Friedl refers to her 
article as “an embarrassing example of straining the idea of women’s power, in which I labored 
mightily to convince myself that women in Iran after the Revolution, although largely 
disenfranchised, had many power possibilities.”19  Friedl’s open admittance of her contribution 
to this outdated trend is highly commendable and should be applied to the field of Iranian youth 
culture studies. 
Pardis Mahdavi’s Passionate Uprisings, which Laura Secor refers to as a “thinly 
academized memoir of the Iranian party scene,”20 and which Hamid Dabashi takes jabs at for 
being an account of Mahdavi’s summer vacation experiences in Iran, is a prime example of this 
trite notion of “resistance” as the overarching theme present in a majority of academic works 
                                                
18 In “Stories of Ethnograhpic Dillema in Longitudinal Research,” Friedl elucidates how such a trend emerged in 
anthropology.  She describes herself as a product of neopositive European social science of the 1960s, in which 
there was very little appreciation for narratives as told by women.  The 1970s, however, witnessed the burgeoning of 
feminism and the inception of gender studies, thus providing social scientists with the tools to take notice of women, 
albeit through the lens of oppression.  As Friedl states, “Marxist and critical literature gave us the concepts, the 
vocabulary and the focus.  We loved stories of oppression.”  However, as Friedl describes, these “sob and sorrow” 
stories soon aroused the ire of their very subjects, who objected to these imposed representations that had been 
colored by Western feminism, colonialism, orientalism and hegemony.  Friedl credits Elizabeth Fernea (1977) for 
pioneering the movement away from ethnocentrism in anthropology, and permitting Middle Eastern women to speak 
for themselves. 
19 Erika Friedl, “Stories as Ethnographic Dilemma in Longitudinal Research,” Anthropology and Humanism, Vol. 
29, No. 1 (2004): 5-21. 
20 Laura Secor, “Stolen Kisses,” Nation, December 15, 2008, 25-29. 
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dealing with Iranian youth culture.  In Passionate Uprisings, Mahdavi claims that a self-defined 
sexual revolution has taken place in Tehran and other urban centers of Iran.  She maintains that 
trends among youth in Iran are not so much dictated by fashion or peer pressure, but actually 
have an “intellectual architecture” as well as a political stance behind them.  She observes that 
young Iranians use their bodies and their sexualities to speak out against the repressive regime, 
attacking it by creating a state of fitna (moral chaos) to undermine the regime’s moral fiber.21  
Similar to Asef Bayat’s argument in Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle 
East, Mahdavi emphasizes the politicization of quotidian life.  She argues that walking in the 
streets of Tehran in styles of dress that defy Islamic codes, or holding hands with a person to 
whom one is not married, could be viewed as a collective, nonverbal demonstration that occurs 
every day in Iran.22  Mahdavi concludes that the sexual revolution described by her informants is 
a surrogate means to express political dissent and that this creative alternative has also resulted in 
a shift in Iranian attitudes about sexuality and the body.   
What Passionate Uprisings contributes to the field of Iranian youth culture is the 
contention that a new sexual culture has emerged in Iran.  Attitudes toward virginity are indeed 
adjusting to accommodate the changes in sexual and social relations that have been enacted by 
the youth.23  Furthermore, Mahdavi’s theorization of markers of bodily revolt in public space 
deserves due merit.  Negar Mottahedeh, in her work on the 2009 election and social media, cites 
Mahdavi when referring to “the manicured nails, the threaded eyebrows, [and] the strand of hair 
that shows on the veiled forehead,” as acts of corporal and sexualized defiance.24  On the other 
hand, Nahid Siamdoust asserts that the easing up of the public atmosphere is the result of 
                                                
21 Pardis Mahdavi, Passionate Uprisings: Iran’s Sexual Revolution (California: Stanford University Press, 2009), 8. 
22 Ibid., 300. 
23 Ibid., 154. 
24 Negar Mottehadeh, #iranelection: Hashtag Solidarity and the Transformation of Online Life (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2015), 97. 
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“chronological distance from the revolution itself and from the war years.”25  Siamdoust’s 
contention, then, inspires the question of whether or not Mahdavi’s study qualifies as an 
ethnography of resistance.  Mahdavi claims that her informants refer to their actions as 
intentional resistance, asserting that Iranian youth characterize their own behaviors as part of a 
larger project to change the socio-political climate of the country, as well as traditional attitudes 
toward sex.26  While I acknowledge the emergence of a new sexual culture in today’s Iran, I am 
less inclined to view participation in this culture as an act of intentional resistance against the 
state.  My own research findings validate Siamdoust’s contention, that the relaxing of social 
strictures in Iran is more an effect of time.  In this context, Iran’s Millenial Generation’s 
exploration of sex and sexuality is not indicative of a sexual revolution or even conscious 
defiance; rather, it demonstrates behaviors typical of adolescents and young adults, exercised 
within an evolving theocratic framework. 
In Precarious Lives, Khosravi cogently argues against Mahdavi’s claim of a sexual 
revolution in Iran by comparing it to the sexual liberation movement of the West.  He notes that 
sexual liberation in the West was interwoven with other progressive movements, such as the 
anti-Vietnam War protests, class struggles, the civil rights movement and feminism.  Certainly, 
there is merit in part of Khosravi’s contention; the isolation of Iran’s sexual liberation movement 
from feminism (a movement which has not yet fully developed in Iran) is what renders the term 
“sexual revolution” inapplicable, and by extension negates the idea of sexuality as an act of 
resistance.27  In Young and Defiant in Tehran, however, Khosravi contends that the Islamic 
Regime represents a pastoral power, against which the Third Generation has developed a 
                                                
25 Nahid Siamdoust, Soundtrack of the Revolution: The Politics of Music in Iran (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2017), 2. 
26 Mahdavi, Passionate Uprisings, 182. 
27 Khosravi, Precarious Lives, 50. 
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“culture of defiance.” He claims that because the authorities in Iran suppress young people 
regardless of their socioeconomic class status, Iranian youth culture is the same throughout all 
sectors of society.28  He also asserts that Iranian youth culture varies more by generation than by 
class, contending that the hegemonic order created by the paternal generation has caused the 
homogenization of young people’s demands.29  In Precarious Lives, Khosravi builds on the 
argument that he proposed in Young and Defiant in Tehran, of an Iranian youth culture 
characterized by resistance.  He describes his latest work as “an ethnography of hope,” and 
locates this hope not only in cinema, music and graffiti, but also in what he defines as various 
acts of defiance, such as new urban practices/visibilities, social movements and political 
manifestations. 
The prevalent trend in Iranian youth culture studies, therefore, continues to be a 
romanticization of resistance.  Zuzanna Olszewska writes a brilliant and insightful article about 
this trend and refers to Khosravi, Varzi and Mahdavi.  She states, “These and other accounts 
published around this time seem to have in common a strong tendency to focus on social 
phenomena that are interpreted as acts of resistance and rebellion against the political 
establishment and the moral order it espouses,” pointing to the fact that a scholar’s interpretation 
is based on his or her judgment, and therefore is not necessarily an axiom.30  Olszewska also 
notes that this trend extends to other fields in Iranian studies, citing Hamid Dabashi’s historical 
survey, Iran: A People Interrupted, in which he states, “To me the story of modern Iran is one of 
defiance and rebellion against tyranny and globalized colonialism.”31  Olszewska’s referral to the 
                                                
28 Khosravi, Young and Defiant in Tehran, 4. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Zuzanna Olszewska, “Classy Kids and Down-at-Heel Intellectuals: Status Aspirations and Blind Spots in the 
Contemporary Ethnography of Iran,” Iranian Studies 46, no. 6 (2013): 841-862. 
31 Hamid Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted (New York: The New Press, 2007), 7. 
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most well known scholars in the field as examples of what she argues against demonstrates the 
salience of this trend. 
Norma Claire Moruzzi also finds fault in the ethnographic works that glorify resistance.  
In “Paradise Lost, Gone Shopping,” Moruzzi specifically takes issue with Khosravi’s Young and 
Defiant in Tehran.  She notes that the resistance trend is part of the prevailing strategy for 
commentary on contemporary Iranian youth and women, in which a binary is presented with the 
1979 Revolution as the historical breaking point.32  In this review, Moruzzi contends that the 
Western-style shopping behavior of young Iranians and their defiance of traditional culture 
norms, which Khosravi contends are a form of resistance, should actually be taken as evidence of 
a new Iranian Identity.  Moruzzi rightly criticizes Khosravi’s ethnography for its dearth of 
women’s voices, and asks whether the “defiant” culture that prevails in urban shopping centers is 
truly more democratic than that which occurs in the traditional bazaar.  In “Out of the Frying 
Pan, Into the Fire,” Moruzzi expands on this issue.  She observes that despite looser adherence to 
the Islamic strictures imposed on Iranian society and a decline of traditional patriarchy, Iranian 
women continue to endure a very blatant gender discrimination, which exposes them to a new 
form of sexual violence.  In her analysis of competing and overlapping discourses on sexuality in 
today’s Iran, Moruzzi asserts that changes in lifestyle, language and dress are not necessarily 
areas of collective or individual resistance, referring to the claim that participation in the all-
night Hussein Parties constitute as such.  She concludes that liberated attitudes toward social 
freedom, which are interpreted by Khosravi and Mahdavi as indications of resistance, in tandem 
with the masculinist conceptions of social morality that prevail in Iranian society, have in fact 
contributed to the perpetuation of women’s disenfranchisement in Iran.  Moruzzi asserts that 
while Iranian youth are frustrated and fed up with the implications of their parents’ Revolution, 
                                                
32 Norma Claire Moruzzi, “Paradise Lost, Gone Shopping,”The Politics of Youth (MERIP 245), Vol. 37 (2007). 
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and have thus embraced new behaviors and trends as a means to free themselves from its moral 
and political objectives, they have not yet to successfully dismantled the traditional gender 
inequalities that continue to persist in modern forms.  Moruzzi’s argument, then, does not 
correlate the current trends among Iranian youth with a resistance movement, but rather as a 
means to assert an identity independent from that of the previous generation. 
Olszewska, on the other hand, argues against the trend of privileging “resistance” to an 
oppressive state as a theoretical framework, in favor of a class-based reading.33  Contrary to 
Khosravi, who claims that Iranian youth culture varies more by generation than by class, 
Olszewska argues that cultural practices are correlated to class.  She points to working-class 
Iranian girls’ mimicry of upper class fashions as an example of aspiration toward upward 
mobility, rather than an avowed defiance of the state’s imposed norms of modesty.34  The 
concept of class has always played a role in modern Iranian culture, as Olszewska demonstrates 
by discussing the significance of class as reflected in the Persian language, stating: 
Something desirable because it is beautiful, fashionable, elegant and redolent of wealth 
and good taste is described with the adjective bā-kelās, literally “with class” or “classy,” 
a gloss which carries the same dual meaning in English.  An action through which one 
may be perceived as being of high status, or in the negative sense, “showing off” a 
particular high-status attribute is called kelās gozāshtan, literally “putting [on] class.”  
Conversely, it is an insult, a marker of undesirability and inferiority to call someone 
dehāti—literally a “peasant” or a “bumpkin” or “rustic.”35 
 
My own findings reiterate the significance of class in contemporary Iranian society, as upward 
socio-economic mobility is mentioned as the primary incentive for many of the trends prevalent 
among the Third Generation.  Following Olszewska, Moruzzi and Friedl, then, I situate my work 
in opposition to the emphasis on resistance that has so far dominated studies of Iranian youth, 
                                                
33 Olszewska, “Classy Kids and Down-at-Heel Intellectuals.” 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 850. 
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and contend that since the Reform Era until the contemporary period, Iranian youth culture has 
increasingly become defined by its aspirations of social mobility.   
In her article, also entitled “Passionate Uprisings,” Mahdavi touches on the matter of 
class mimicry as discussed by Olszewska.  She notes that historically, social movements in Iran 
have started within particular groups and classes and have trickled down to the rest of society.  
She identifies the young “nonreligious middle class” of Iran’s major urban centers as one such 
group, thereby justifying her focus on this sector.  She makes brief mention of this fact when 
describing how this demographic is both of interest and feared by the Islamic State, referring to 
Rafsanjani’s recruitment of young, middle-class Iranians to help run his 2005 presidential 
campaign.  I distinctly remember my grandmother describing how she would see young girls 
with Rafsanjani’s name written across their faces, scurrying about the streets of Tehran during 
the 2005 presidential election period.  My inclusion of this memory demonstrates the 
autobiographical bent that Olszewska observes in Iranian studies, a subject that is thoroughly 
unpacked by Amy Motlagh in her article. 
In “Autobiography in the Writings of the Iranian Diaspora,” Motlagh observes that it has 
become common for scholars of Iranian studies to situate their personal story within the greater 
context of the historical conflict between the United States and Iran.  She asserts that the line 
between scholarly writing and memoir has increasingly become blurred in the works produced 
by Iranian-American scholars in the previous decade.36 As an example, she refers to Mahdavi, 
who is a child of Iranian immigrants who came to the United States on the eve of the revolution.  
Motlagh also acknowledges that, despite the barrage of vitriol spewed at Azar Nafisi (author of 
Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books) regarding her collaboration with neoconservative 
                                                
36 Amy Motlagh, “Autobiography and Authority in the Writings of the Iranian Diaspora,” Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 31, no 2 (2011): 412. 
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warmongers, elitist academics (e.g. Dabashi) are equally guilty of establishing their authority 
through the mechanism of memoir.  For example, she observes that Dabashi begins his Iran: A 
People Interrupted by recounting his childhood in Ahvaz, thereby positioning himself as an 
authentic Iranian and flexing his authority, both as an academic and a native of Iran.  Motlagh 
also mentions another staunch critic of Nafisi, Fatemeh Keshavarz, who like Dabashi utilizes the 
same technique that she castigates.  She notes how Keshavarz reassures her readers that she is in 
close and frequent contact with Iran and can therefore speak to the situation of the country with 
greater authority.37   Motlagh concludes that diasporic intellectuals are inclined to intensify, and 
therefore privilege, their personal experience of the home country at the expense of the 
subjectivity of those whom they represent. 
Drawing on Motlagh’s article, I strive to distance my work from that of such scholars as 
Mahdavi, who interweave their personal experiences into their work under the guise of 
participant observation.  I also wish to distance myself from scholars such as Dabashi and 
Keshavarz, who use their authenticity as native Iranians to bolster their authority, only to take 
down those whom they deem unqualified to make academic assertions about Iran.  Certainly 
there are advantages to hailing from the country in which and about which one conducts 
research, but there is a fine line between using it to present relevant information and using it to 
tout oneself as an inviolable expert.  In my work, I try to find a balance between Motlagh’s 
criticism of “native” based authority and the advantages that my Iranian heritage affords me, 
which I will explain in the following section. 
  
                                                
37 Ibid, 416. 
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Methodology 
This project originally began as a work looking at humor in contemporary Iranian pop 
culture.  I was specifically interested in media texts that were popular among the post-Revolution 
generation.  At some point my adviser discerned that my interest was not so much humor in 
media, but rather the people to whom it appealed.  He suggested that I include interviews about 
the media texts that I had analyzed.  I completed the IRB process and received permission to 
conduct interviews with 10-12 Iranians, outside of Iran.  During my first interview, my questions 
about the media text that I had chosen to discuss gave way to a plethora of information about life 
in Iran in the post-Reform period.  From there, my project transformed into a study of Iranian 
youth culture, guided by examples of humor in contemporary Iranian media.  For my original 
project idea, I had proposed to look at humor in three different types of media: social media, 
television and film.  Based on the popularity of a particular Internet animation, “Postmodern 
Beggars” (which I will examine thoroughly in Chapter Three), I had decided to use Sooriland 
cartoons as the social media text that I would analyze for this work.  For the chapter looking at 
television I had chosen Mehran Modiri’s Shūkhī Kardam, which at the time of my research was 
very popular among the cohort of young Iranians that I was a part of.  Oftentimes at gatherings, 
someone would pull out their cellphone to show a particular Shūkhī Kardam clip that they had 
found amusing.  Simultaneously, many clips of the show were posted and shared by Iranians 
within my social media network, so that I began to associate it with the type of humor that 
resonated with the post-Revolution generation of Iranians.  For my film chapter, I had intended 
to use the comedy Nahang-e Anbar (Sperm Whale), which came out in 2015 and again enjoyed 
great popularity among the demographic of interest, as I observed through the comments made 
about the film within my network (both online, and in person). 
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The addition of interviews, however, guided my work (and interest!) toward oral history.  
In retrospect, had I known that this change in direction would occur, I would have arranged for 
more interviews with a larger sample size.  Even so, my thorough and in-depth interviews with 
my eleven informants revealed unique information about the youth culture of middle to upper 
class, educated Iranians from various urban centers in Iran (which in itself is significant, as the 
majority of Iranian youth culture studies tend to be Tehrancentric) and how that culture has 
evolved since the turn of the twenty-first century.   
In consideration of my limited time and permitted sample size, I carefully chose a diverse 
set of interviewees from various urban locales and socioeconomic standings in Iran to inform this 
study of Iranian youth culture.  My study is limited to the urban youth culture that prevails 
among educated, middle to upper class Iranians, because, as I contend, this is the demographic 
that will shape Iran’s political, social and cultural future.  My evidence for this project is not 
based on participant observation, but rather on the oral histories that I derived from interviewing 
my informants.  My informants are Millenial Generation Iranians who have recently come to the 
United States, within the last eight years, either as permanent residents or graduate students.  
My status as a second-generation Iranian-American allowed me to engage with my 
informants on a deeper, more intimate level than someone whom they would deem a khāreji 
(foreigner/not Iranian).  At the same time, I am also someone whom they do not consider one of 
their own, and so they felt more comfortable and at ease to speak confidently about their 
thoughts, opinions and experiences.  This is specifically due to my unique position as a second 
generation Iranian-American.  My fluent Persian conversational skills inspired more intimacy 
and therefore encouraged the divulgence of information.  My status as an “outsider” rendered me 
as a nonjudgmental figure; my informants felt that they could share information with me that 
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they would not so readily reveal to their own peers.  One comment that was made to me by 
several of my informants (as well as other Iranians who were not interviewed for this project, but 
are of the demographic under examination) is that I am easy to talk to because they can use 
Persian to convey their precise sentiments, without fear of judgment or possible repercussions 
within the Iranian community.  This is an advantage that I have as a scholar of Iranian youth 
culture, and it is reinforced by my ability to relate to my informants based on our shared 
generational status, or our “youthfulness.”38  These qualities permit me to conduct research in a 
more effective manner and produce more accurate results than scholars such as Khosravi, who, 
based on his age and native status, may not inspire complete confidence in his informants.  
However, Khosravi compensates for this shortcoming with a greater number of interviews than I 
was able to obtain within my designated time frame. 
I reached out to most of my informants on social media (either through Facebook or 
Instagram) and asked if I could interview them for this project.  While one of the informants is a 
close friend, the rest are acquaintances that I had met within the Iranian student community.  
Two of my informants were friends of people whom I had interviewed; after they heard about 
their friends’ interviews with me, they asked if they could be interviewed as well and included in 
the study.  I met with my informants in very casual settings.  The couples invited me over to their 
homes for tea and fruit/dessert (as per the dictates of Persian culture), while I met the rest of my 
informants at venues of their choice.  This was typically a coffee shop, although one informant 
asked to meet for happy hour at the university bar.  Interviews lasted anywhere from one to three 
                                                
38 As a young, single, Iranian-American woman, close in age to my informants, I boasted an analogous position with 
Mahdavi.  In her article, “Passionate uprisings: Young people, sexuality and politics in post-revolutionary Iran,” she 
mentions similar advantages, stating, “Some felt that because I was from oon taraf-e āb (the other side of the water) 
that I was not likely to judge them and would be less apt to “tattletale” or tell someone who might know them.  
Others were fascinated by me, feeling that my status as an Iranian0American was something that allowed me deeper 
insight and this fascination proved to be mutually beneficial.” 
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hours per sitting.  Those with whom I had shorter interviews, I met with twice.  I conducted the 
interviews in Persian and asked that my informants also respond in Persian (as some would try to 
speak in English at first).  I recorded approximately twenty hours of interviews, which, I myself 
translated and transcribed (simultaneously).  As anyone who has done this can attest, it is an 
incredibly slow and painstaking process.  One hour of Persian interview would take me 
approximately eight to ten hours to translate and transcribe. 
As this work examines contemporary youth culture in Iran, I limited my interviews to the 
Millenial Generation (as defined above).  I am aware that inclusion of interviews with the 
parental generation would have been a valuable addition to this work, but I was confined by both 
time and IRB authorization for this project.  I do, however, intend to expand the scope of this 
work to include a greater sample size and generational variety, as a post-doctoral project, if given 
the opportunity. 
 
Cast of Characters 
 As I mentioned above, I had received IRB permission to interview 10-12 Iranians.  
Therefore, I was very selective regarding the people whom I sought to interview for this project.  
I tried to put together a diverse sample of educated, middle to upper class Iranians that would 
represent a nuanced, yet accurate cross-section of the Third Generation.  I conducted interviews 
with eleven informants, six men and five women, hailing from three large metropolitan areas and 
two smaller cities, from the north to south of Iran.  Brief biographies of my informants follow, 
although I changed their names for the sake of maintaining their anonymity. 
 Hadi is a thirty-five year old man who was born in Isfahan and raised in Shahr-e Kord 
(approximately one hundred kilometers from Isfahan) by what he describes as a middle class and 
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“ordinary” family.  In 2000, Hadi’s family moved to Tehran, but he remained in his hometown to 
attend Isfahan University of Technology, where he studied computer engineering from 2000-
2006, for his undergraduate degree.  After completing his mandatory military service in 2009, he 
attended Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran for a master’s degree in computer science.  In 
2012, Hadi and his wife moved to the United States, both to pursue their doctoral degrees.  Hadi 
earned his PhD in 2018 and currently works for the Ford Motor Company. 
 Mostafa is a twenty-seven year old man from North Tehran (the Ajūdānīeh neighborhood 
in the Niāvarān district).  He describes his family as upper class; his father is a major 
stockholder.  Mostafa attended Amir Kabir University (which he describes as “the most 
politically active university in Iran”) from 2008 to 2013, and obtained his undergraduate degree 
in civil engineering.  In 2014, he came to the United States to continue his graduate education at 
a university in California.  After his first year abroad, he returned to Iran to marry his fiancée, 
Hannah, and brought her back to the United States.  Currently Mostafa is a graduate student in 
the department of Hydrology at a university in the American Southwest. 
 Hannah is also from an “upper class” family, hailing from the affluent Zafarānīeh 
neighborhood in North Tehran.  Her father was a prominent factory owner until the Ahmadinejad 
administration.  She attended the Islamic Azad University of Tehran, where she studied drawing.  
Hannah and Mostafa met through mutual friends when Hannah was in her last year of high 
school.  Currently, she is twenty-six years old and is a student at the local culinary institute. 
 Sohrab is an artist in his early forties and hails from Ahvaz.  He moved to Tehran at the 
age of eighteen to attend university and graduated with a Bachelor of Art degree in photography.  
After completing his military service, Sohrab continued his education and earned a master’s 
degree in photography.  While living in Iran, Sohrab worked as a professional photographer and 
 22 
cinematic artist, specializing in filmmaking and set design.  He also worked for a documentary-
based television program called Hezār rāh-e narafteh, which focused on the psychology of 
Iranian families.  Sohrab came to the United States in 2011, accompanying his wife, Sepideh, 
who had been accepted to a doctoral program. 
 Sepideh is in her late thirties and comes from what she describes as a “very traditional” 
middle class family in Tehran.  She studied Teaching English as a Second Language for her 
undergraduate degree at the Islamic Azad University, and received her master’s degree in the 
same field at al-Zahra University (Iran’s only comprehensive all women’s university).  Currently 
she is a PhD candidate in the college of education, at a university in the Southwestern United 
States. 
 Vashti is a thirty-year-old PhD candidate, studying geophysics at a university in the 
American Southwest.  She was born in Tehran to what she describes as a middle class family, 
but moved to Isfahan in her youth.  She spent the majority of her life in Iran, including her 
university years, in Isfahan and calls it her hometown.  Vashti attended Isfahan University of 
Technology, where she earned her bachelor’s degree in 2009 and her master’s degree in 2011, 
both in the field of mining engineering.  She then came to the United States in 2012 to pursue her 
doctoral degree. 
 Similarly, Pooneh was born in Tehran, but moved to Isfahan with her family at a young 
age.  She moved back to the capital, however, to pursue her education at the University of 
Tehran, where she studied Persian literature.  She earned her Bachelor’s degree in 2006 and her 
master’s degree in 2009.  In 2009, Pooneh came to the United States on a student visa, but 
became an American citizen through her marriage to an Iranian immigrant (which ended in 
divorce).  Currently she is a PhD candidate in Middle Eastern and North African Studies, 
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specializing in medieval Persian literature and teaches Persian at a university in the Midwestern 
United States. 
 Sara is a twenty-four year old graduate architecture student at a university in the 
American Southwest.  She comes from a middle class family and was born and raised in Shiraz, 
where she attended the University of Shiraz for her undergraduate degree in architecture.  Sara 
adamantly described herself as a young woman from the “seventies generation,” of post-
Revolution Iranian youth (as opposed to the “sixties generation”). 
 Hamid is a twenty-nine year old recent graduate of a university in the Southwestern 
United States.  He was born and raised in Hamadan, and hails from a middle class family.  In 
2007, he moved to the capital to attend the University of Tehran for his undergraduate degree 
and obtained his bachelor’s degree in mineral processing and mining engineering.  Hamid came 
to the United States in 2015 to pursue his doctoral education, but opted to master out of his 
program in 2017.  He accepted a job offer and is currently working as an engineer for a mine in 
Southern Arizona. 
 Omid is a thirty-four year old man, born and raised in Tehran and from a middle-class 
family.  He attended Semnan University for both his undergraduate and graduate degrees in 
mechanical engineering.  Semnan is a province east of Tehran, and is approximately a two-hour 
drive from the capital.  During his undergraduate studies, Omid lived in Semnan, but moved 
back to the capital following his graduation.  After a year of working, Omid resumed his 
education at Semnan University, but commuted from Tehran throughout the duration of his 
master’s program.  In 2010, Omid came to the United States to pursue his doctoral studies and 
graduated with his PhD in mechanical engineering in 2018.  Despite having a middle class 
background, Omid describes the majority of his friends and social network in Iran as “upper 
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class.”  He attributes this to the fact that his local high school was one of the best in the region, to 
which many affluent families would send their children.  Furthermore, Omid’s parents both 
worked for IranAir, his mother boasting a managerial position.  This put him in a unique 
situation, according to Omid, in that he was exposed to people who were frequent travelers and 
therefore had a more “open” mindset.  For this reason, Omid describes his upbringing as 
somewhat unconventional and not very characteristic of the typical middle class Tehrani family. 
 Hamrah is a thirty-three year old man of a middle class background.  He was born in 
Ahvaz, where he lived until the age of twelve and at which point he moved with his family to 
Tehran.  After a couple of years, Hamrah’s family moved to Karaj (a suburb of Tehran).  After 
graduating high school, Hamrah moved back to Tehran, where he attended a trade school and 
studied Internet technology.  At the age of twenty-two, Hamrah moved to Italy to pursue his 
bachelor’s degree abroad.  There, he studied communications and multimedia at Ferrara 
University, while running a corner store.  At the age of thirty, Hamrah returned to Iran to spend a 
year of leisure with his friends and family back “home” before immigrating to the United States. 
 
The Making of the Millenial Generation: A Background History  
The earliest years of the Islamic Republic experienced an economic crisis, which 
precipitated the collapse of capitalism in the country and the rise of the petty bourgeoisie in 
traditional occupations.39  In 1976 the middle class was incredibly small, as it consisted of only 
477,000 Iranians or 5.7% of the employed work force.40  After the Revolution, the incipient 
theocracy strove to establish an Islamic (and therefore supposedly just) economic system, in 
                                                
39 Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad, Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2006), 87. 
40 Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad, “The Rise and Fall of Iranian Classes in the Post-Revolutionary Decades,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 44:3 (2008), 377-396. 
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which profit-making, foreign investment and loans were discouraged, while widespread 
antagonist social expressions against wealth hindered capitalist relations of production.41  This 
resulted in the expansion of petty commodity economic activity, and the de-proletarianization of 
labor, which was reflected in the decreased size of the working class and a remarkable expansion 
of petty bourgeois and service activities in the urban and rural economies.  State employment 
expanded, particularly in the country’s military and paramilitary forces.  Between 1976-1986, 
more than 1.1 million people were added to the political functionaries of the state; over 800,000 
joined the military (the Revolutionary Guards) and paramilitary (Komiteh and Basij) forces.  
While the disruption in capitalist relations of production disenfranchised a substantial portion of 
the working class, some found employment in petty commodity production, while others joined 
the newly established organs of state coercion, which became prevalent during this period of 
domestic political instability and war with Iraq.42  In the mid 1980s, the saturation of the global 
oil market and the war with Iraq placed Iran under severe financial duress.  Thus, when Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani took office of in 1989, he instituted a policy of reconstruction.  
During Rafsanjani’s presidential tenure (1989-1997) Iran adopted an economic liberalization 
strategy that strove to reinvigorate capitalist means of production.43  This liberalization strategy 
once again promoted a trickle-down economic policy, encouraged profit-making ventures and 
wooed foreign investments.44  The 1990s, therefore, witnessed the gradual return of the petty 
bourgeoisie in non-traditional sectors and modern capitalists, which resulted in the expansion of 
the Iranian middle class. 
                                                
41 Ibid., 382. 
42 Ibid., 384. 
43 Nomani and Behdad, Class and Labor in Iran, 196. 
44 Ibid., 197-197. 
 26 
 The populist, revolutionary Islamic state also pursued an aggressive education expansion 
policy, which involved building schools in impoverished and rural areas, and enforcing gender-
segregation of primary and secondary schools.  These policies resulted in near universal literacy 
rates among both girls and boys,45 and have ultimately produced a Millenial Generation that is 
generally more literate and educated than their parents.  As such, this demographic is one that 
has the expectation of appropriate and corresponding employment opportunities and upward 
socioeconomic mobility.  However, the already saturated state bureaucracy and a lackadaisical 
private sector have been unable to absorb the university diploma wielding youth bulge, a 
combined result of the Islamic Republic’s early investment in education and its pro-natal 
policies.46   
Iran’s population rose from thirty-three million in 1976 to almost eighty million in 2016.  
Before the Revolution, the Shah’s government advocated family planning and having fewer 
children.  In 1967, the Pahlavi government launched its first official population policy, and in 
1970 it proclaimed an aim of reducing population growth to one percent within twenty years.  In 
1973, first trimester abortions were legalized, and the Ministry of Public Health promoted and 
distributed contraceptives through a network of family planning clinics.47  After the Revolution, 
the clerical government deemed birth control, abortions and preventative measures un-Islamic 
and banned contraceptives and abortions, which also became a means to produce more soldiers 
for the Iran-Iraq War.  By the mid 1980s, the population growth rate in Iran had reached four 
percent.  After the end of the Iran-Iraq war and Khomeini’s death in 1989, then-president 
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Rafsanjani instituted a family planning initiative to once again lower the population.  During 
Rafsanjani’s presidency, consultation and services for contraceptive methods were offered 
throughout country, and the only condom factory in the Middle East was built in Iran.48  
Regardless of these Reconstruction Era measures, nearly twenty-two million (21,954,053) 
Iranians were born during the 1980s (1360s), thus comprising twenty-three percent of the current 
population.49   Behrouzan reports a much higher figure, claiming that the children of the 1980s 
comprise three-quarters of Iran’s population today.50  
The dearth of opportunities to achieve goals and the subsequent failure to meet one’s own 
expectations and those of society is the hallmark of neoliberal capitalism.51  Iranian Millenials 
are therefore caught in limbo, as the state touts the ideals of neoliberalism, while hindering a 
functional civil society.  Failed economic expectations are only one factor that characterizes and 
has contributed to the formation of Iran’s Millenial Generation.  The other salient feature of this 
demographic is its relationship with media and technology. 
 
Post-Revolution Iranian Media and the Millenial Generation 
Mehdi Semati breaks down post-revolutionary Iranian media into four distinct phases: 1) 
The War Years 2) The Reconstruction Era 3) the Reform Era 4) the Post-Reform Era.52  The first 
period begins with the establishment of the Islamic Republic and continues until the end of the 
war with Iraq.  The War Years were marked by revolutionary fervor, ideological governance and 
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mass mobilization to support the war effort.  This period corresponds with the 1360s; Iranians 
born in this decade often describe themselves as Children of the War and are the original Third 
Generation.  The following period is the Reconstruction Era, which began with the end of the 
war and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini.  During this period, then president Rafsanjani initiated 
a program of post-war reconstruction aimed at reforming the theocracy into a rational governing 
system, fostering economic reform and ending Iran’s international isolation.53  It was during the 
Reconstruction Era (1989-1997) that the media became a space in which alternative perspectives 
on politics, Islam and Islamic governance would be voiced.  The next period was the Reform 
Era, which took place between 1997-2005 and was initiated by the election of Mohammad 
Khatami to the presidency.  Khatami’s platform rested on civil society and social reform, which 
translated as a greater openness for the media.  The daheyeh haftādīhā were born in the 1370s, a 
decade which straddles the latter half of the Reconstruction Era and Khatami’s first presidential 
term.  The last period delineated by Semati is the Post-Reform Era, which began with the 
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and continues to the present day.  This period coincides with 
what media scholar Amanda Lotz has posited as the Post-Network Era.   
In The Television Will Be Revolutionized, Lotz defines the Post-Network Era as the 
period during which new convenience technologies and distribution methods emerged and 
expanded, liberating viewers from the dictates of network television, while increasing 
dependence on Internet technology.  During this period, people no longer had to watch the 
television shows that networks aired at particular times.  DVD sets, along with Internet-powered 
VOD (Video on Demand) services, online streaming and bit torrents allowed viewers to pick 
shows to watch at their own leisure.  
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In Iran, Post-Network practices and technologies have fostered a generation of “media 
agnostics,” whose formative years were marked by access to new communication technologies 
such as satellite television, cellphones and the Internet.54  This demographic largely ignores IRIB 
(Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) productions and instead focuses its attention on 
alternative media sources.  New communication technologies provided the Millenial Generation 
with unfettered digital access to the outside world and facilitated a transnational flow of 
information, resulting in a technologically savvy population that is capable of virtually accessing 
and engaging with youth cultures around the world.55  “Media agnosticism” not only 
characterized the Millenial Generation during the Ahmadinejad era, it also granted young 
Iranians with a unique power to act as a force of change within their society. As Henry Jenkins 
observes in Spreadable Media, the shift across media industries from communication to 
engagement-based models (the hallmark of the Post-Network Era) not only encouraged the 
expansion of media platforms, but more importantly it has functioned to highlight the significant 
role that audience participation plays in the creation of cultural value. 
While increased dependence on handheld Internet technology is a global trend, it was 
during the Iranian Green Movement that it became associated with active resistance.  The Iranian 
Green Movement was a political movement that arose with the declaration of Ahmadinejad as 
winner of the 2009 presidential election.  During the Green Movement, Iranians took to the 
streets to protest the election results and demand the removal of Ahmadinejad from office.56  The 
Green Movement protests were the largest in the Iran since the 1979 Revolution and thus 
comprise a major event in the history of the Islamic Republic.  At the same time, the hashtag 
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#iranelection was the first long-trending international hashtag in Twitter’s history.57  Twitter, 
itself, played a key role in the organization of Green Movement protests, and after the 2009 
uprising, it became clear that social media is a powerful tool.  Post-Network Era practices and 
technologies, then, rendered the Millenial Generation a demographic of “media agnostics,” who 
used their Internet and technological savvy to initiate and perpetuate the 2009 Green Movement.  
The Green Movement was therefore a Post-Network manifestation of the collective, Post-Reform 
frustration, anger, and disillusionment of Millenial Iranians.  
 
A Post-Network, Post-Reform Commodity Culture 
There is no denying that there have been instances in which Iran’s Millenial Generation 
has utilized media technology in active resistance against the state.  But the question remains: 
does this indicate a culture of resistance/defiance/revolution?  Certainly, Iranian society has 
opened up since the 1979 Revolution, and the youth are consistently pushing the limits set by the 
regime to maintain the Islamic façade of the country.  But this situation is not unique to Iran, as 
youth everywhere are at the forefront of socio-cultural change.  As the demographic that eats the 
fruit of their parents’ revolution, the Millenial Generation will naturally push for a more 
progressive and open society.  To claim that this generation is consciously engaging in a 
“revolution” against the state, however, evokes the role of intent in resistance.  Does a particular 
action in defiance of the state necessarily indicate resistance, if it is an act inspired by the trends 
that are popular amongst one’s peers?  My contention is that it does not.  For this reason, my 
study does not look at Iranian youth culture through the lens of resistance.  Instead, I focus on the 
trends that have evolved as Millenial Iranians engaged with the society, politics and culture of 
contemporary Iran.  I do so by examining particular media texts that have an almost universal 
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appeal to Iranian youth; they provide ample information about the socio-cultural trends that are 
prevalent in Millenial Iran.  I utilized examples of these texts to springboard into in-depth 
conversations with a number of Millenial Iranians, particularly focusing on the socio-cultural 
shifts that have occurred throughout and as a result of Ahmadinejad’s presidency.  
Global shifts in the use of technology are certainly reflected in the habits of Iran’s 
Millenial Generation. As my project reveals, the emergence of the Post-Network Era had a 
reverberating effect in Iran.  I contend that the changes in media distribution methods, along with 
the resulting expectations of convenience and mobility that took place during the Ahmadinejad 
Era significantly impacted the formation of Iranian youth culture.  I apply Jenkins’s theory of 
spreadability to demonstrate how Millenial Iranians actually create cultural value through their 
engagement with and circulation of particular media texts.  I then argue that the significance of 
new media technologies, specifically social media, lies in its role in the creation of contemporary 
culture.  This is in direct opposition to the trend of privileging resistance in scholarship, which is 
reflected in works that laud the revolutionary power of new media technologies as potential tools 
for democratization. I further push back against this trend by rebutting the notion of an Iranian 
youth demographic characterized by a culture of defiance; instead, I point to the preponderance 
of commodity culture within contemporary Iranian society.  I propose that an imagined concept 
of the Western World (khārej) prevails, which the Millenial Generation collectively strives to 
emulate, and I contend that it is this fanciful perception that drives many of the trends set by the 
urban elite.  These trends, then, become markers of class and serve as a type of social currency 
that Millenial Iranians use to move in and out of various class groups.  Ultimately, I argue that 
the normalization of convenience technologies, the adaptation of Post-Network media practices, 
the neoliberal economic policies of the Ahmadinejad administration and the sociopolitical 
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disenchantment of Iranian youth have all combined to create a circumstance in which class 
identity has become the definitive feature of Millenial Iran. 
This dissertation has the goal of examining the socio-cultural context out of which Iran’s 
urban, educated, middle to upper class Millenial Generation has emerged.  I utilize media texts 
that were and continue to be exceedingly popular among Iranian youth in conjunction with a 
series of in-depth interviews to arrive at a conclusion regarding the characteristics of this 
demographic.  The implications of my findings regarding the evolution of contemporary Iranian 
culture and society serves as a case study for the reconfiguration of social hierarchies in 
accommodation of a youth generation that is learning to leverage its technological literacy 
against traditional institutions of patriarchy.  I argue, however, that Iranian youth culture is not 
defined by intentional political resistance, but rather the by class identity, in correlation with the 
globalizing effects of Internet technology within the restricted space of a repressive theocracy. 
I derive the evidence for this dissertation from two specific sources that were and 
continue to be relevant to the Iran’s Millenial Generation: Mehran Modiri’s television series 
Shūkhī Kardam, which was not aired on IRIB but was instead distributed according to the new 
methods of the Post-Network Era, and Sooriland animations, that were first posted and circulated 
on Facebook and YouTube, but have since migrated over to Instagram and Telegram.  I couple 
these texts with information that I gathered from eleven informants to produce this historical 
analysis of Millenial Iran, beginning with Khatami’s reform movement and ending with 
Rouhani’s election to a second term. 
Chapter one sets up the premise of the dissertation, by explaining why the original Third 
Generation became so disillusioned.  It delineates how this demographic went from feeling a 
sense of great hope with the election of Khatami in 1997, to a state of disenchantment by the end 
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of Ahmadinejad’s second term.  It was throughout this duration, however, that young Iranians 
became emboldened to realize their potential power as a socio-cultural and political force.  
Chapter two describes how the Post-Network Era manifested in Iran and how it tied into the 
anxieties of the Millenial Generation.  Within this Post-Network framework, I present a critique 
of Iranian state television (IRIB) that serves to demonstrate the reason behind the collective 
disillusionment of Millenial Iranians, which continued to burgeon throughout the duration of the 
Ahmadinejad administration.  Chapter three posits the Millenial Generation as the primary force 
behind the inauguration of the Post-Network Era in Iran.  The participatory culture that evolved 
during the Green Movement within this demographic facilitated a new Iranian media 
environment.  Through their embrace of Post-Network media practices and technologies, 
Millenial Iranians effectively precipitated the materialization of a commodity culture, which was 
reified by the neoliberal economic policies of the Ahmadinejad administration.  Chapter four 
looks at how this commodity culture has manifested within trends that prevail among young 
Iranians today.  This chapter uses media analysis and oral history to arrive at a definitive 
characterization of Millenial Iran.  The project concludes with a brief commentary on the 
implications of this historical study of Iranian youth culture, for the present time and the future, 
particularly in light of the most recent spate of protests to occur in January of 2018. 
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From Hope to Hopelessness: Khatami to Ahmadinejad 
 
 
In 1997, there was a seismic shift in the Iranian political scene.  Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, who was finishing his second consecutive term as president, could not run for a third 
term according to the Islamic Republic’s constitution.  The conservative candidate was the well-
known speaker of the Majles, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, who not only had been active in Iran’s 
national politics since the Revolution, but also boasted the backing of the majority of the 
establishment.  His opponent, the mild-mannered former Minister of Culture, Hojjat al-Islam 
Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, had been permitted to run by the Guardian Council with the 
assumption that he would lose. Instead, Khatami won a landslide victory with seventy percent of 
the vote, in which eighty percent of the eligible population (as opposed to the mere fifty percent 
that had participated in the last election) voted.  Khatami won based on a platform of democracy, 
civil society, human rights and citizenship.58 
 Khatami’s campaign had great appeal to Iran’s Third Generation because he was a 
maverick; he readily admitted that the greater world outside of Iran is cosmopolitan and 
culturally diverse.  This positioned him to be open to new ideas, particularly regarding Iran’s 
limited outlets for social activity and entertainment.59  Khatami’s call for reform acknowledged 
the Third Generation’s desire for greater freedoms, while simultaneously maintaining loyalty to 
the Islamic Republic and its theocratic system of government.    
 In this chapter, I position Khatami’s presidency as the precipitate point for the 
materialization of Millenial as a legitimate force within Iranian society.  Khatami’s Reformist 
agenda and policies worked two fold, exposing this generation to the forces of globalization, 
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while relaxing the impositions of moral strictures upon Iranian society.  It was during Khatami’s 
first term, for example, that the Internet became prevalent in Iran.  However, the fast pace at 
which Iranian society was heading toward world integration (and away from the ideals of the 
Revolution) gave cause for concern to the conservative and traditionalist factions of the state.  
They engineered a counter-attack, first through a heavy-handed repression of Reformist organs 
and agents, and then through the creation of a neoconservative movement, whose front man was 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Ahmadinejad based his presidential platform in opposition to the 
Reformist ideals of religious democracy and citizenship, positioning himself against the voter 
contingency that had brought Khatami to power.  His emphasis on social and economic justice 
appealed less to the already disillusioned urban Third Generation and more to the lower socio-
economic classes, who were not particularly concerned with the definition of civil society or 
individual liberties.  In the wake of the disenchanted apathy of a large contingent of Khatami’s 
supporters who had witnessed their champion fail to follow through on his promises of reform, 
the right wing mobilized and was successful in bringing Ahmadinejad to office in 2005.  His re-
election in 2009, however, once again galvanized Millenial Iranians into action, as this 
demographic spearheaded the Green Movement.  And while this uprising was initiated by claims 
of a fraudulent election, it was a social movement that reflected the Millenial Generation’s anger 
and frustration with both the state and society.  In this chapter, I contend that Khatami’s election, 
presidency and endeavor to pull Iran out of its cultural isolation, served to embolden young 
Iranians to realize their potential power and to strive to initiate socio-cultural change in twenty-
first century Iran. 
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Khatami: A New Hope 
Khatami’s election to the presidency in 1997 ushered in a euphoric sense of optimism 
among the Third Generation, a reverie that was inspired by the Reform Movement.  The idea of 
reform allowed for improvement within the existing political framework.  Mehran Kamrava 
asserts that Khatami’s platform was actually based on a broader intellectual trend that attempted 
to reconcile Islam with democracy.60  Ebrahim Yazdi claims that Khatami’s 1997 election was 
an act of protest by Iranian society, an indication that Iranians were committed to the velāyat-e 
faqih political system, but also wanted change and improvement of their lives and the condition 
of the country.61  Similarly, Ray Takeyh argues that the rise of the reform movement was a 
response to the ruling elites’ imposition of stringent strictures that supposedly reflected the ideals 
of the Islamic Revolution of 1979.62  This discontented demographic felt progressively more 
alienated by the government’s rigidity and rhetoric.  The Third Generation, which made up a 
substantial portion of the alienated public, were wooed by Khatami’s platform of inclusion, as he 
stated, “Rather than estranging them, we must involve the youth in the policies and economic 
affairs of the country.”63  Khatami’s ability to push the reform agenda forward and associate 
himself with the hopes and desires of the Iranian people was a key component to his success.  
I asked Sohrab if he remembered what sense he had during the Khatami era.  He 
responded: 
I remember that the spirit of hope had become very high.  My own studies had finished 
and I was working on my master’s thesis project, but also because my work, my 
professional work in the field of art, had begun to pick up and become more serious.  I 
could see the passion and enthusiasm of the youth.  Hope. I could sense that perfectly.  It 
was the only time period that I felt [this], and it had a reason. 
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Sohrab’s statement reflects how Khatami’s first election imbued the Third Generation with a 
sense of hope and optimism.  He also hints at how this hope positively affected his work as an 
artist.  Hadi represents the excited youth whom Sohrab mentioned.  I asked him how he felt 
during the Khatami era and he stated: 
’76 (1376/1997) was the first time that I could vote and we were really excited that 
Khatami was running.  I remember when Khatami was elected, I would ask my dad, 
“When will I see him on television?  When will he become president?”  It was very 
exciting knowing that we had had a role in the election of someone. 
 
Hadi’s statement demonstrates the enthusiasm felt by the Third Generation as a significant 
contingent in the election of Khatami, as well as for the change that they believed he would bring 
to Iranian society.  
The Second of Khordad Movement was named so after Khatami’s presidential victory, 
which took place on the second day of the Iranian month, Khordad (May 23, 1997).  This 
reformist movement had a number of clear goals to overhaul the Islamic Republic, including 
modernization of the Islamic Republic’s strictures, the rationalization of the state’s bureaucracy 
and the institution of a more accountable and responsive system of government.  Essentially, this 
movement sought to bring Iran in line with the so-called modern states and systems of 
government predominant in the contemporary world. 
The 1997 presidential election was remarkable because it was the first time in the history 
of the Islamic Republic that the Iranian people’s demands overruled the preferences of the ruling 
elite.  The clerical oligarchy had rallied behind conservative hardliner Nateq Nuri as the 
candidate of choice.  Khatami’s overwhelming victory demonstrated how an increased literacy, 
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urbanization and women’s participation in the workforce functioned to change the electorate to 
one that reflected a more informed and involved citizenry.64  
As president, Khatami appointed Ataollah Mohajerani as the new Minister of Culture, a 
move that incensed the conservative hardliners.65  Previously, as Rafsanjani’s vice president, 
Mohajerani had enraged the right wing with his suggestion to resume relations with the United 
States.  As the new Minister of Culture, Mohajerani demonstrated a commitment to relaxing the 
censorship laws that governed all forms of cultural expression, including theater, books and most 
importantly, newspapers.66  One of Khatami’s most significant achievements, as president, was 
his modernization and liberalization of the media. The press’s vital role as the most effective 
means of mobilizing public opinion during Khatami’s presidency has been well documented; it is 
also the defining characteristic of the Reform era.  Under Mohajerani, in 1998 alone, eight 
hundred and eighty new publications were established, which boasted a readership of twelve 
million Iranians.67  Sohrab discussed this phenomenon: 
You could see the theory of democracy in the newspapers … And the first colored 
newspapers were published during the Khatami period.  This was very important.  Not 
that they were in color, this wasn’t important, but when you make publications more 
attractive, all publishers are forced to change their format.  This was the only time that I, 
myself, would read newspapers, like one or two newspapers everyday.  Why?  Because it 
wasn’t just the daily news.  In the middle of the newspaper there were articles about 
politics, arts and society.  They’re not daily articles, they had been written previously, 
like a day or two before.  I read these articles with great eagerness because they were 
about very useful subjects, a complement to the daily news that is common among all 
newspapers.  This is why I had a good feeling.  I felt like some things were happening in 
the country.  
 
Sohrab’s statement illustrates the change that Khatami’s liberalization of the media produced.   
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Newspapers were not the only thing that received a splash of color.  After the 1979 
Revolution, black became the unofficial color of the Islamic Republic.  According to the 
authorities, black was the most somber color, and therefore the preferred color for clothing, 
particularly veiling.  After over twenty years of a society marked by funereal garb, psychiatrists 
began to express concern about the alarming rate of depression in Iran, especially among Iranian 
women.  In the summer of 2000, the Ministry of Education announced that elementary school 
girls would be permitted to wear more colorful uniforms, as a means to maintain the mental 
health of students, encourage a spirit of hopefulness and ultimately create a happier atmosphere 
for the future generation.68 
Sohrab also commented on what Khatami’s presidency indicated for the field of arts and 
culture, as opposed to how it was addressed in the news media.  He stated: 
If you want to walk in the opposite direction of the Islamic Republic, your movements 
will be slow because they keep putting up barriers in your way … But Khatami did just 
that for the people, for a number of reasons.  One was the debate over the freedom of 
books.  He came and said that they wouldn’t censor books [any longer], although a series 
of guidelines and principles had to be observed.  It was even like this in the [art] galleries.  
Like in a gallery of paintings, for example, if you wanted to exhibit a series, you would 
take it there and say, “I want to showcase these fifty paintings or photographs.”  Before 
you could do this, the gallery owner had to take a picture of each one of the pieces and 
send them to the Islamic Guidance Administration.  The Islamic Guidance 
Administration would then say that you could only exhibit these twenty 
[paintings/photographs] on the wall.  Khatami came and got rid of all of this.  He said 
that each person may use his own judgment.  If you want to undertake the expense of 
publishing a book, and later, someone stands in your way, you sustain that loss.  The 
producer takes the loss for having put down the money to print the book.  He also told the 
gallery owners, “With your understanding of the Islamic Republic and the limitations that 
exist, you may choose what you like.”  And they weren’t very rigid at all.  I remember 
portraits of nudes.  The gallery owners would put these portraits in another room, a 
private room, and would exhibit them there.  What I’m saying is that there was some 
relative freedom.   
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As an artist in the field, Sohrab’s statement testifies not only to the welcomed effects of 
Khatami’s policies on the arts community, but also the hope that it engendered within this 
demographic. 
 Khatami’s election thus gave his proponents an unparalleled optimism and fortitude, 
inspired by the hope for change.  Liberalization of the press and a relaxed censorship of the arts 
were among the manifestations of this change, which occurred immediately after Khatami’s 
election to the presidency.  However, the Reformist preoccupations with civil society and the 
press resulted in their neglect of the tedious, but also more important task of creating a grassroots 
infrastructure.69  Khatami was even quoted saying, “Unfortunately it is not up to the government 
to establish parties; the people must do that themselves.”70  Another obvious shortcoming of the 
reform movement was a distinct neglect of the economic situation.  Intellectual debates over the 
parameters of civil society were inconsequential to the average Iranian, who was far more 
concerned about the country’s economic situation and had voted for the Reformist government 
with the hope that it would address this particular problem.  The Reformists, however, failed to 
woo either the labor force or the middle class with their continued insistence on defining an 
Iranian civil society, thus limiting their national appeal.71  The inability to build a sustainable 
base of support among those Iranians, who had been so instrumental in Khatami’s first election, 
was ultimately the downfall of the Reformist movement. 
The summer of 1999 witnessed the most significant blow to the Reform Movement and 
one of the greatest travesties in the history of the Islamic Republic.  That summer, conservative 
members of the parliament adamantly worked to block Khatami’s attempts to liberalize Iran’s 
                                                
69 Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 190. 
70 Ali Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 2000), 141. 
71 Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution,196. 
 41 
political and social systems.  The Guardian Council vetoed the majority of Khatami’s reform 
bills, under the pretext that they violated the sharia and the constitution.  Meanwhile, the 
judiciary embarked upon the “great newspaper massacre” in which more than sixty publications 
were banned.72  This was a significant blow because the Reformist Press was the hallmark of 
Khatami’s presidency. 
When the Reformist newspaper Salam was shut down on July 7, 1999, the students at the 
University of Tehran, representing a substantial portion of Khatami’s voting contingency, 
responded by staging a demonstration.  What began as a peaceful rally turned into a bloody 
massacre, when hundreds of riot police raided the university dormitory on July 8, 1999.  That 
evening, approximately four hundred plainclothes paramilitaries cascaded on the university 
dorm.  Student reports stated that the uniformed police stood idly by while the paramilitary 
forces kicked down doors, thrashed their batons through the halls, grabbed female students by 
their hair, set fire to the rooms and actually threw students out of the third story balcony.  A 
number of students sustained broken bones from the fall, while one reportedly lay paralyzed on 
the ground.  Hospital records also included admittance of students with bullet wounds, indicating 
the use of firearms.  At least one student was killed in the attack on the university dorm. 73   The 
raid incited six days of rioting and protests throughout the country, during which three other 
people were killed and more than two hundred people were injured.74  In the aftermath of the 
incidents, more than seventy students had disappeared, an estimated 1200-1400 people were 
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detained and the whereabouts and condition of five students still remain unknown according the 
Human Rights Watch.75   
Instead of advocating on behalf of his support base, Khatami responded by issuing a 
statement that the actions of the students threatened the foundation of the Republic and urged the 
rioters to go home.  He was the first to utilize the term arāzel owbāsh76 in reference to the 
country’s youth, specifically those who had incited the student protests.  Ultimately, the 
University Dormitories Tragedy marked the beginning of the rift between Khatami and the Third 
Generation.  It was after this point that slogans of “Death to despotism,” “Freedom of thought, 
always, always!” and ultimately “Khatami must go” were heard in demonstrations for the first 
time.77  Meanwhile, students who had turned to their champion with chants of “Khatami, where 
are you?” were confronted with a seemingly weak and incapable leader who urged them all to be 
tolerant and return to their homes.   
Thus, Khatami’s youthful supporters became disillusioned with the Reformist president 
for his excessive caution in the face of their most dire battle.  Consequently the Third Generation 
lost faith in the power of the Reform Movement.  Takeyh contends that these protests were a 
reflection of Third Generation hopes for an accountable and democratic government being 
squashed by the theocratic state.78  Meanwhile, the cracks within the reform movement widened 
into chasms between those who called for patience in the implementation of reforms and those 
demanding more assertiveness from Khatami. 
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Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei further alienated the Third Generation by stating, 
“Legal violence is good.  It is necessary,” when asked about the violent repression of the student 
uprising.79  Khatami’s inability and unwillingness to stand up for his proponents characterized 
the remainder of his presidency.  Each time Khatami deferred from condemning the shutdown of 
a Reformist newspaper, the suppression of a rally, the disruption of a political meeting, and the 
arrest of an activist under false charges, beyond simply expressing his condolences, he exposed 
the Reformists’ impotence to initiate the change that they had promised to the Third Generation.   
Khatami’s own passive demeanor, which advocated a gradual and evolutionary approach, only 
served to diminish his popularity among his youthful supporters, many of whom called for 
immediate action.   
Essentially, the 1999 student riots initiated the divorce of the Third Generation from 
Khatami and his Reformist Movement.  The University Dormitory Tragedy and its aftermath 
marked the point when the issue of young people became highly politicized in Iran, but it also 
served to demonstrate how the ideals of reform constituted a serious threat to the survival of the 
theocracy.  It was for this reason that the right wing strongly urged and encouraged the quashing 
of the student protests and quickly mobilized to do whatever it could to emasculate and subvert 
the Khatami government.80  The 2000 parliamentary election was thus critical for both reformist 
and conservative factions of the government.  In this election, eighty-three percent of the eligible 
electorate participated in voting for 290 seats in the parliament.  Reformers won approximately 
                                                
79 Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), May 12, 2000. 
80 Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 193. 
 44 
three quarters of the total votes, with 170 seats.81  At this point, however, the pervasive sense of 
disillusionment had already taken hold of the Third Generation.   
Sepideh discussed the sense of disenchantment that her generation experienced after the 
student protests and Khatami’s inability to protect his original constituents.  She stated: 
During the Khatami era, they had made up this joke that Khatami is all talk, no action.  
Back then, his opposition would antagonize him because he wouldn’t do anything; now 
we know that the Leader had a lot of power over him.  The Leader wouldn’t allow it.  But 
the joke that they had made about him (Khatami) is that he’s all talk.  The people were 
hopeful, but the fact is that they didn’t allow him to do anything. 
 
Sepideh’s statement is interesting because it suggests hindsight, that her generation’s criticism of 
Khatami was not justified.  Her blaming Khamenei in 2017 for Khatami’s failures to meet her 
generation’s hopeful expectations reifies the miasmic disillusionment suffered by the Third 
Generation during the Khatami era, but also suggests an exculpation of the Reformist president 
in light of his successor.  It also demonstrates a realization of the faults extant in the velāyat-e 
faqih government, which undermined reform of the system. 
In 2001, Khatami ran for a second term in the presidential election and won a so-called 
“hollow victory,” against independent candidate Ahmad Tavakkoli.  Khatami ran as the only 
moderate candidate, although with markedly less enthusiasm than his first campaign run.  He 
was still able to win a landslide victory, getting over eighty percent of the vote, although thirty-
three percent of the electorate did not participate (as opposed to the eighteen percent who did not 
vote in the previous presidential election).  Despite a lower voter turnout, Khatami received 21.7 
million votes, surpassing the twenty million votes that had won him the presidency in 1997.82   
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The re-election of Khatami galvanized the Reform Movement to a degree, demonstrating 
that the vast majority of voting Iranians not only believed in the electoral system, but were still 
hopeful and optimistic with regard to reform.  During his second term, Khatami pushed for 
constitutional amendments that sought to redefine the power of the various unelected institutions 
in the country, essentially striving to limit the potency of the Guardian Council.  In 2003 he 
submitted two bills to the Majlis, which aimed to curtail the powers of the conservative 
hardliners by stripping the Guardian Council of its right to screen candidates for public office 
and to enable the president to challenge the judiciary.  The bills also sought to assert the position 
of the president as the second most powerful state figure, after the supreme leader.83  Yet 
ultimately, the bills were rebuffed and Khatami was forced to withdraw them. 
Khatami’s reformist policies did, however, inspire a crescendo of intellectual and artistic 
ingenuity.  This was facilitated by the advent of the Internet into Iran.  While Khatami’s first 
presidential term witnessed the heyday of the press, it was during his second term that Internet-
use among Iranians became a notable phenomenon.  In 1996, a mere two thousand Iranians 
reported using the Internet.  That number rose to approximately five thousand by the beginning 
of Khatami’s first term.  The following year, the number of Iranian Internet users had surged to 
22,000, a 440% increase.  By the year 2000, there were 130,000 reported Internet users in Iran, 
and by 2003 that number had exploded to over 1.3 million.84  Widespread access to the Internet 
exposed Iran to the forces of globalization, essentially functioning to end the country’s cultural 
isolation from the rest of the world.  The reverberating effects of extensive access to the Internet 
initiated a sociocultural transformation of contemporary Iran.  For this reason, the war over 
censorship of cultural expressions extended over into the realm of the World Wide Web.  
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Conservative forces were exceptionally concerned with the increased popularity of the Internet, 
particularly because they feared its use would lead to engagement with “enemies of the regime,” 
and that it would serve as a medium through which the country’s Islamic values could be 
jeopardized.85  The Third Generation, however, pushed for continued access to the information 
highway.  Hadi describes the effects he experienced from access to the Internet as an 
undergraduate student at IUT.  He stated: 
I attended university during the Khatami era and I graduated during Ahmadinejad.  The 
atmosphere was certainly freer, but I can’t say what percentage of this open atmosphere 
was due to Khatami himself and his administration.  I went (to school) during a time that 
was marked by the appearance of computers and the Internet and social media.  Well 
[access to] this made society more open.  You can’t separate this fact from these things.  
Another factor is that I was going to high school until then and I was under the 
supervision of my family.  But now I was at the university.  My parents were in Tehran 
and I had come to Isfahan.  I became independent and I was having new experiences.  
Each one of these factors categorically had an effect on my view of the atmosphere as 
being more open. 
 
Despite an obvious attempt to remain impartial, Hadi’s statement indicates how Khatami’s 
policies functioned to open up Iranian society to the forces of globalization.  This resulted in a 
loosening of the social strictures that had been imposed on Iranian society since the 
establishment of the Islamic state.  Hadi’s mention of the vital role that access to computers, the 
Internet and social media played in creating a more open society suggests that Khatami’s 
policies, by facilitating access to the outside world, ultimately engendered a sociocultural shift, 
twenty years later.  This renders Khatami’s impact particularly significant, specifically 
considering the direction that Khamenei was leading the country before the onset of the Reform 
Movement. 
In 1992, after the end of the decade-long “Holy Defense,” Khamenei launched a 
campaign against “Western cultural invasion” (tahājom-e farhangi-ye gharb).  This defense was 
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to be applied to all aspects of Iranian society and was modeled after Khomeini’s original crusade 
against the pervasive culture of the West.  In that same year, Khatami resigned as the Minister of 
Culture, a post that he had retained for an entire decade and in which he had actually facilitated 
the “cultural opening” of the country.  For this reason, many consider Khamenei’s Defense 
Against Cultural Invasion a retaliatory measure.  Early during Khatami’s first term, the Supreme 
Leader had mentioned his concern for the country’s youth several times, specifically regarding 
their inclination toward Western culture.  He had expressly voiced the apprehension that the 
children of the revolution would develop a dependence on it—a dependence, which, if not 
broken, would eventually consume the Islamic State.86  Khamenei lamented that the post-
Revolution generation was too susceptible to the depravity of “MTV Culture,” which they were 
exposed to via illegal satellite television, as well as a tendency to romanticize Pahlavi era Iran, 
based on their parents’ recollection of the “Good old days” before the revolution.  These two 
trends, he warned, would be the driving force behind the secularization of Iranian society. 87  
Khatami’s policies, however, allowed for these two trends to flourish, and released the proverbial 
floodgates, permitting an unprecedented exposure to the world, unfettered access to information 
and the emboldening of the youth to initiate the sociocultural shifts that would later become 
perceptible during the Ahmadinejad era and beyond. 
 What was particularly remarkable about Khatami’s presidency with regard to the Third 
Generation is that it permitted this demographic to come to its own, so to speak.  Despite their 
disenchantment, the Third Generation had become a force to be reckoned, as they demonstrated 
through their contribution in the election of Khatami, their involvement in the Reform 
movement, the 1999 student uprising and finally in their criticism of their failed champion.  
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While there had been a significant Reformist presence in the various state institutions during 
Khatami’s presidency, however, the conservative right wing had been able to maintain power 
through its control of the armed forces, the media, the judiciary and the economic organizations 
(bonyāds).  The dynamism engendered by the Reform Movement reflected Iranian society’s 
desire for change.  Khatami, however, was unable to bring about the type of change that his 
constituents, specifically the Third Generation, had hoped for.  Khatami’s student supporters 
were disappointed by his unwillingness to come to their aid during the summer of 1999, and 
even more so by his public endorsement of the establishment against which they were rebelling, 
and as a result, slipped into a collective sociopolitical disillusionment.  At the same time, lower 
and middle class Iranians, who had endured the greatest economic strain during Khatami’s 
presidency, came to fore. 
  
Ahmadinejad: The Villagers Strike Back 
Throughout the 1990s and during Khatami’s two presidential terms, the social milieu of 
the country was ripe for change.  There was a nationwide feeling of innovative hope, as the 
clerical reformers sought to reconcile democracy with religion, while young Iranians began to 
distance themselves from the culture of martyrdom and spiritual devotion that had characterized 
the Islamic Republic from its establishment. There was a particular demographic, however, that 
did not share this hopeful sentiment so distinctive of the young Iranians who had placed their 
faith in Khatami and the Reform Movement.  This demographic was the War Generation, which 
consisted of the pious men who had served on the frontlines of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.  
The War Generation (or the Second Generation) was marked by as their revolutionary zeal and 
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commitment to Khomeini’s original mission.88  These reactionaries formed the core of the 
Iranian neoconservative movement, which essentially called for a return to the roots of the 
revolution.  While Iran’s political climate seemed to be shifting from government reform to 
economic development, it was actually a combination of the public’s disenchantment with the 
political process and the neoconservatives’ manipulative propagation that won them mass appeal.   
The electorate was changing to reflect the apathy and disillusion felt by a substantial 
portion of Iranians.  Middle and upper class voters from large urban areas simply did not 
participate in the 2005 presidential election with the same zeal and enthusiasm as they had in 
1997 or even in 2001.  In 2005, the Reformist camp threw their support behind Mostafa Moin 
and once again built a platform on the liberalization of the theocracy from within.  Yet, after 
eight years of Khatami and no sustainable amelioration of society, their promises of reform fell 
on deaf ears.  The majority of voters in the 2005 election were, therefore, not the optimistic 
youth or the moderate middle class, but rather those Iranians who were be wooed by the promise 
of relief from economic adversity. 
 As a presidential candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presented himself as a humble 
public servant who ran on a platform of “put[ting] Iran’s petroleum income on peoples’ table.”89  
In the run-off election with Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad appeared to be a modest man devoted to 
Iran and Iranians; it was for this reason that he won the election with a victory of sixty-four 
percent of the vote.90  Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was the Islamic Republic’s first neoconservative 
candidate and president.   
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Iran’s neoconservatives are a largely non-clerical force dominated by security actors.  
They are ideologically Islamist, revolutionary in character and populist in their application of 
policy.  Iranian neoconservatives view the cultural foundation upon which the Islamic Republic 
was established as the only remaining relic from the 1979 Islamic Revolution and are therefore 
dedicated to its preservation.  The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Sepah is the 
bedrock of the conservative movement’s survival and resurgence.  It has had increasing influence 
in Iran’s foreign policy, strategy and economy since 1997, and has been awarded a growing 
degree of power by Khamenei.  Even before the election of Ahmadinejad, for example, former 
Sepah commander, Ezatollah Zarghami, was named head of the IRIB91 in 2004, a post that he 
maintained throughout Ahmadinejad’s two presidential terms.92   
In the 2000s, military officers began to dominate the entrepreneurial realm in Iran.  The 
IRGC has become a multibillion-dollar empire, controlling over a third of Iran’s economy.93  
Sohrab described how this phenomenon was linked to Ahmadinejad’s presidency.  He claimed 
that during this particular time period, the IRGC assumed control of thirty to forty percent of 
Iran’s economy, through shares and companies in the oil industry, manufacturing industry, tech 
industry, etc.  Sepideh alleged that the extent of the IRGC’s reach into Iran’s economy was not 
public knowledge.  Sohrab explained: 
They have pretty names.  Like Apadana.  You wouldn’t know.  [Apadana] is a name from 
ancient times.  They would choose pretty names that are chic, so that you couldn’t guess.  
You would have to somehow know that it belonged to Sepah … Like there was this thing 
called the Padīdeh Company (Sherkat-e Padideh), that suddenly boomed.  They called it 
Padīdeh-ye Shāndiz.  It was a company in Mashhad.  It started as a restaurant. Once I was 
in Kish and I went to the other side of the island and saw a great big luxury building that 
looked like a castle.  I asked, “What’s this?”  They told me that this is the new Shāndīz 
Restaurant in Kish.  Then, Ahmadinejad came and inaugurated the building at the ribbon-
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cutting ceremony.  Like the president of the country came to inaugurate a chelo kebab 
restaurant!  Like cut the ribbon!  There must have been something in his interest, but like 
I said, they’re clever. 
 
Sohrab’s statement not only suggests a degree of corruption characterizing the Ahmadinejad 
presidency (which will be further examined in the next chapter), but also conveys a general 
distrust of that administration.   
Sepideh then described how the IRGC’s economic reach affected her own family during 
the Ahmadinejad presidency.  She recounted that her brother and his wife had both lost their jobs 
at MAPNA because the IRGC had bought the company and had replaced them with their own 
engineers.  She stated, “[T]he people whom they didn’t like, those who were not ‘revolutionary’ 
enough in their own words, they would dismiss them.”  Similar to her husband, Sepideh’s 
speculative account indicates the deep level of distrust and resentment harbored by the Third 
Generation against Ahmadinejad.  Sepideh and Sohrab’s claim of the IRGC’s heightened 
economic activity during Ahmadinejad’s presidency is substantiated by the documented example 
of the Mobin Trust Company.  In 2009, the Mobin Trust Company, which is another front for the 
IRGC, bought fifty-one percent of the shares of the Iran Telecommunications Company.  After 
this transaction, state police launched a new unit dubbed the “Internet Police,” which was 
specifically founded to surveil the online activities of Iranian citizens.94   
 Such claims are further bolstered by Ahmadinejad’s employment history.  During the 
early days of the Islamic Republic, he worked in the “internal security” department of the IRGC 
and gained a reputation for his “strong personality” and his interrogation skills.  Later in the 
1980s, he worked at Evin, the notorious detention center designated for political dissidents.  Evin 
is the site of egregious human rights violations, where thousands of Iranian political prisoners 
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have been detained, tortured and executed, even before the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic.95  Ultimately, during his tenure with the IRGC, Ahmadinejad was promoted to the post 
of senior commander of the Elite Qods96 Force.97  Ahmadinejad’s extensive experience with the 
Revolutionary Guard not only insured the president’s backing of IRGC economic overtures, but 
also rendered him the neoconservative candidate of choice. 
 Ahmadinejad’s political career began in 2003, when he was appointed mayor of Tehran 
by the city’s municipal council.  As mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad worked to reverse the 
progressive policies instituted by previous moderate and reformist mayors, and to emphasize the 
revolutionary ideals of religious piousness and martyrdom.  He ordered the revamping of cultural 
centers into prayer halls and even suggested the re-internment of martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War 
throughout the major squares of the capital.98  Fortunately this inane proposition did not receive 
enough support to be implemented. 
 Part of the reason that Ahmadinejad won the presidency in 2005 was due a general 
boycott of the elections by the voting bloc that had previously brought the Reformists to power.  
These voters collectively boycotted the election to protest the Reformists’ inability to implement 
the individual and political freedoms that they had promised during their campaign.  The urban 
youth remained unimpressed by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the candidate backed by the 
Reformers, and refused to vote for him in the run-off election.99  Vashti reflected on how the 
Third Generation, particularly university students, were disappointed with Khatami leading up to 
the 2005 election.  This election was a run-off (two part) election, in which the Third Generation 
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was divided in its support for Mostafa Moein and Hashemi Rafsanjani.  Vashti claims that this 
was the mistake of the Reformers.  They had too many candidates and not enough dissuasion, 
she said, while the conservatives were collectively united behind Ahmadinejad.  
Ahmadinejad’s simple lifestyle, humble background and emphasis on economic justice 
for the poor, garnered him a solid support base that had not been previously mobilized.  He ran 
on a platform of Islamic morality, social justice, fairness, integrity and modesty; values, which 
he claimed were in accordance with the core principles of the Islamic Revolution.100  Vashti 
described how her university cohort was dismissive of the possibility of an Ahmadinejad 
presidency, simply based on his attire; she noted that her generation seemed to be more 
concerned with his physical appearance than with his credentials and qualifications.  Ultimately 
it was the social contingencies that felt adversely affected by the reformist policies of Khatami 
that mobilized to elect Ahmadinejad in 2005.  Sohrab suggested this while commenting on 
Ahmadinejad’s appearance as well.  He stated: 
In the election (of Ahmadinejad), I remember one of the things that they would always 
say to the people: that because he has such an indigent appearance, he is of the people.  
That he’s not looking to fill his pockets, or that he hasn’t sewn bags for the people around 
him to increase their wealth.  Therefore, many people from the lower classes really 
trusted him and voted for him.  
 
The difference between the two descriptions again exemplifies how prominent class is within 
Iran’s sociocultural context.  Vashti describes how urban, middle-class, Millenial Iranians looked 
down on Ahmadinejad based on his dehati appearance, which they thought rendered him 
unqualified.  Sohrab, on the other hand, described how Ahmadinejad’s appearance appealed to 
the lower classes, that related to the candidate based on his mannerisms and attire.  This 
demographic of traditionalist, urban masses, was driven by a fear of Khatami’s reforms.  They 
believed that Khatami had attempted to coopt the regime and place power in the hands of the 
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liberal, intellectual and secular elements of society, and thus voiced their support for 
Ahmadinejad and the neoconservative movement accordingly.  
While Khatami’s youthful supporters had been primarily intellectuals, academics, and 
generally characterized as “moderates,” Ahmadinejad’s followers were more traditional, 
religious and oriented toward preserving the ideals of the Islamic Revolution.  Emad Afroogh, 
the Head of the Majlis Commission for Cultural Affairs morosely referred to the formation of 
Ahmadinejad’s administration as the death of intellectualism in Iran.101  Essentially this was an 
era during which the intellectual elite began to dwindle and disappear.  Conservatives touted the 
ideal of the intellectual as a westoxified moral degenerate, thus creating a chasm between the 
liberal moderates and the mostazafin102.  Neoconservatives perpetuated the claim that the issue of 
civil society, democracy, economic reform, women’s rights and human rights (which were the 
primary concern of the Reformists) were inconsequential to the downtrodden.  The mostazafin, 
they asserted, would be better served by a government promising social justice and economic 
development; in this scheme, intellectuals advocating for Western civil society would become 
obsolete.103 
The “Death of Intellectualism” signaled an era in which respect for basic human rights, 
especially freedom of expression and assembly, diminished drastically, while more and more 
newspapers became banned.  The educated members of the middle and upper classes, and 
especially the intelligentsia, felt a sense of regression.  Sohrab stated, “In all fields, whether 
political, artistic, social or economic, everything changed.  As we said, everything collapsed.”  
He explained why he felt so disillusioned: 
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For us, who are educated and could distinguish between good and bad, this, in particular, 
created [a sense of] hopelessness among us.  We would read and see that the guy was 
talking nonsense.  Especially with regard to the arts.  Khatami was someone who really 
cared about culture.  He had, at some point, been the Cultural and Islamic guidance 
minister, and many people were satisfied with him.  Many, as in those of us who were in 
the arts, were happy even when he was Minister [of Culture].  Naturally someone whose 
primary concern is culture during the time of his ministry, will continue this policy when 
he becomes president.  He won’t just put it aside.  Ahmadinejad, as we say, didn’t know 
two cents worth of culture.  He wouldn’t even talk about it; everything had become the 
economy.  That they want to do this or that for the poor.  And he also had the fortune of 
the sanctions really destroying the economy; but this was due to his own imprudence and 
tactless lack of planning.  The sanctions caused Iran’s economy to worsen day by day …  
but Ahmadinejad’s weaknesses was the debate around culture.  Like he didn’t have any 
cultural programs.  None.  If you go search his record in the presidential archive to see 
what programs and dictates he made about the arts, there is nothing.  My problem with 
Ahmadinejad supporters was just that—if you don’t tend to culture, then the economy 
and the politics will not be fixed either.  For this reason, Khatami’s positive point was 
that he wanted to “change” people culturally.   
 
Sohrab’s statement demonstrates how the two candidates were the champions of two rather 
diverse demographics.  Khatami was perceived to want to initiate cultural change and therefore 
appealed to those sectors of society who were in favor of such a shift.  Ahmadinejad, on the other 
hand, curried favor with the mostazafin through demagoguery.  For an artist like Sohrab, the 
difference between the two administrations was vast, as the respective policies on art and culture 
directly affected him. 
While Khatami’s 1997 and 2001 presidential victories reflected Iranian voters’ desire for 
reform and international integration, Ahmadinejad’s win in 2005 demonstrated a shift in concern 
for social and economic justice.  Although, as Vashti stated, many previous supporters of the 
Reform Movement did not participate in this election or vote for Ahmadinejad in order to spite 
Rafsanjani. Regardless, Ahmadinejad’s presidency ushered in an era marked by populist 
revolutionary rhetoric, messianism, censorship, political isolation, economic instability and a 
mass exodus of the brightest and most educated young Iranians. 
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In terms of economic policy, the Iranian Neoconservatives were not much different from 
the Reformists or the traditional conservatives.  All three groups were essentially free marketers 
with deep ties to Iran’s commercial centers of power.  What specifically characterized the 
Neoconservatives was their staunch commitment to maintaining the religious and cultural values 
of the Islamic state.  The Islamic Republic is incumbent upon maintaining the memory of the 
1979 Revolution.  As the cultural fundamentals of the Islamic State are the only remnants of the 
Revolution that can be kept alive, they are vehemently protected by advocates of the regime.104  
The Neoconservative Movement distinguished itself from traditional conservatism by touting a 
reformist-inspired political agenda that emphasized a need for reform and uprooting corruption.  
However, by prioritizing economic justice, the Neoconservatives were able to appeal to the 
demographic disillusioned by the failure of the Second of Khordad Movement, as well as the 
traditional right, which remained unimpressed by the Reformists’ inability to initiate progress 
within realm of civil society and secular rights.105  The Neoconservatives, thus, presented 
themselves as the new alternative to the impotent Reform Movement, and ultimately facilitated 
the victory of Ahmadinejad in 2005 and arguably in 2009. 
 
The 2009 Election and The Green Movement 
The 2009 presidential election had been the most widely participated-in presidential 
election since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Much of the Millenial 
Generation rallied behind the two moderate candidates: Mehdi Karroubi and Mirhossein 
Mousavi.  Mostafa claimed that most of the students that attended Sharif University, the 
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University of Tehran and Amir Kabir were Karroubi supporters.106  He alleged that this was due 
to Karroubi’s associates, who were prominent figures of the Reform Movement (such as 
Karbaschi) and that this had a greater appeal to university students than did Mousavi’s 
entourage.  According to Mostafa, this was specifically because Karroubi talked about citizens’ 
and students’ rights at a time when no other candidate mentioned the matter.  Among the 
students of Amir Kabir, Karroubi was deemed the most articulate and eloquent candidate, he 
said, which served as another factor contributing to his popularity among university students.  
 Other Millenial Iranians voted for Mousavi.  Vashti described how she was certain that 
Mousavi would win based on the massive presence of his proponents in the public sphere.  She 
asserted that the streets (of Isfahan) were devoid of Ahmadinejad supporters, stating: 
We were certain he (Mousavi) would win.  My sisters and I would go out into the streets 
and honk our horn.  You couldn’t see one Ahmadinejad supporter.  They were out there, 
but they were few and far in between.  And they wouldn’t come out. 
 
However, on June 13, 2009, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of the 2009 
Iranian presidential election, merely one day after the election took place.  Vashti described the 
consternation that she felt when she heard the news: 
In the beginning we were in shock.  Then, the people went out into the streets the next 
day to protest.  But I understand perfectly; they were angry.  Because we had all believed 
that we had won.  Now I don’t know how much of it was fraud, or how much of it was 
our own limited perspective that everyone around us had.  Like in our department we 
only knew two people [who were Ahmadinejad supporters].  All of our professors were 
Mousavi supporters.  All of the students were Mousavi supporters.  So we thought, 
“That’s it!  Everyone is voting for Mousavi.”   
 
Vashti’s comment is interesting because it recalls some of the analysis that came out of the 2016 
American presidential election—particularly with regard to Facebook.  After the election of 
Donald Trump and the overwhelming display of disbelief from the liberal left, several articles 
came out revealing how Facebook specifically caters to our political views and abets a false 
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sense of security about the actual political climate of the country.  Social media, particularly 
Facebook, however, was not as prevalent in Iran before the 2009 election.  It was this election, in 
fact, that led to a full-fledged embrace of social media by the Third Generation.  Vashti’s 
commentary indirectly questions the significance afforded to social media in its ability to affect 
political outcomes, although this is not to say that social media did not play an important role in 
the mobilization of the Green Movement. 
In light of the highly dissatisfied demographic of young voters who specifically 
participated in this election to ensure a one-term presidency for Ahmadinejad, the conservative 
hardliner’s supposed landslide victory was cause for contention. A substantial number of 
Iranians alleged that the election was fraudulent, a claim that ultimately inspired the 2009 Green 
Movement.  While the Green Wave initially began as a protest against Ahmadinejad’s declared 
re-election over his widely popular political contender, Mirhossein Mousavi, the uprising quickly 
transformed into a social movement, in which Iranians expressed dissatisfaction with the status 
quo and voiced a desire for change, particularly regarding their civil rights and liberties. In 
retrospect, however, many of those same Millenial Iranians who had been active in the uprising, 
admit that Ahmadinejad had a more powerful base than they had thought, as Vashti did.  Hadi 
was one such person, as he stated: 
I would have interactions with people who were close to me; they would say things in 
agreement with Ahmadinejad and for me it was shocking; like how was it even possible 
for such an idea to exist?  But now, when I look back, I can see my own blind spot.  Like, 
my maternal grandmother is an old lady who lives in the village.  She voted for Khatami; 
like I wrote in her ballot for her.  She was never political.  But when Ahmadinejad was 
running, my grandmother, who is an eighty-year old woman, said she would only vote for 
Ahmadinejad, even in ’88. 
 
Perhaps Hadi had been swayed by the rumors claiming that the Green Movement protests 
were isolated incidents and were primarily the antics of upper-class Tehrani youth.  However, 
 59 
countrywide acts of protests organized and disseminated through social media, would indicate 
otherwise.  On July 21, 2009, the government shut down mobile networks, anticipating a protest 
in commemoration of 30 Tir (July 21, 1952).107  As Time magazine reported, “Protests appear to 
be taking other forms apart from street actions; on Tuesday, for example, thousands of 
disgruntled Tehranis tried to bring down the electrical grid at 9 p.m. by simultaneously turning 
on household appliances, like irons, water heaters, and toasters.”108  Essentially, this was a 
collective action in which Iranians simultaneously used high-voltage appliances to create a 
blackout.  There were reports of blackouts in Tehran, Karaj and Qazvin.109  There was also the 
“plug-in” campaign, organized to short-circuit Ahmadinejad’s first post-election television 
appearance, the campaign to falsely report protest locations to the police, the lights-on in cars 
campaign110, the flash mobs that took place on Jāde-ye Chālūs111 and the “Green Skies” 
campaign, in which Iranians released green balloons touting photographs of those who had died 
in the Green Movement protests.112  These acts of protest, demonstrating opposition against 
Ahmadinejad, were primarily undertaken by tech-savvy Millenial Iranians.   
Despite the prevalent allegations of fraud among his peers, Hadi was adamant that 
Ahmadinejad had won because he had been effective during his first term, claiming that the 
                                                
107 On this date (July 21, 1952), Iranians protested the Shah’s appointment of Qavam Saltaneh over nationalist hero, 
Mohammad Mossadegh, as Prime Minister of the country through large public demonstrations. 
108 “Amid Crackdown, Iranians Try a Shocking Protest,” Time, July 22, 2009, accessed September 18, 2017, 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1912112,00.html.  
109 Robert Mackey, “July 20: Updates on the Protests in Iran,” The Lede: Blogging the News with Robert Mackey in 
The New York Times, July 21, 2009, https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/latest-updates-on-the-protests-in-
iran/?mcubz=0.  
110 Persiankiwi, Twitter post, June 23, 2009, 3:06 a.m., Accessed September 18, 2017, 
https://twitter.com/persiankiwi/status/2292737838. And, “Shiraz, Iran, June 21, 2009 Car Protesters,” YouTube, 
June 22, 2009, Accessed September 18, 2017, http://bit.ly/1buGXHP.  
111 The famous road which leads to the Caspian Sea; “Iran in August 01 2009—[Chalous Rd] Parts 1-4,” YouTube, 
August 1, 2009, Accessed September 18, 2017, http://bit.ly/1QxDh8B and http://bit.ly/1zba8Lo and 
http://bit.ly/1J1OGsb. 
112 “Green Movement Balloon,” YouTube, June 26, 2009, Accessed September 18, 2017, http://bit.ly/1PIcHbD.  
“[Green Balloons with Images of Our Beloved Departed],” YouTube, June 23, 2010, accessed September 18, 2017, 
http://bit.ly/1E9PWby. “July 4: Bring out the balloons,” Standing With Free Iran, July 2, 2009, accessed September 
18, 2017, http://bit.ly/1JtPCsA.  
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president had actually taken money to the villages and small towns, as he had promised to do.  
Hadi admitted that he was not a member of that social sector, but that his grandmother was, and 
she was happy with the attention that her village had received during Ahmadinejad’s first term.  
Even supporters of the Green Movement were aware of Ahmadinejad’s appeal.  Sepideh, 
who had been a proponent of Mousavi at that time, discussed how money was directly utilized to 
sway the election results, using her family as an example.  She recounted how her uncle and his 
wife were staunch supporters of Ahmadinejad, specifically because they had received 600,000 
tomans as a subsidy from his re-election campaign.  They had used that money to pay an overdue 
bill, and had then voted for Ahmadinejad.  Sepideh recalled that after the election, the campaign 
had taken the money back, claiming a banking error.  Sohrab also contended that they 
(Ahmadinejad’s campaign) had “bought the people” by giving out 500,000 tomans to each 
household.  He claimed that Ahmadinejad had done this in many villages and it was for this 
reason that he was able to win the election.  He stated: 
The people in Tehran all thought that their votes had been stolen.  “How could Mousavi 
not get votes?” they asked, even though Ahmadinejad had gone to all of the villages and 
bought their votes.  Some people even said that the uprisings were meaningless, because 
his unpopularity wasn’t to the extent to think that Ahmadinejad couldn’t get any votes.  
He had gotten them.  Of course there was some fraud, but not to the extent that they 
replaced the votes. 
 
Hannah also mentioned how Ahmadinejad was able to use money to win votes outside of 
Tehran, but she believed that the handouts were not enough to entice Tehranis to vote for him.  
She stated: 
Tehranis mostly voted for Mousavi or Karroubi.  Like Ahmadinejad went up and said 
that he will give a forty-five thousand-toman subsidy.  When you say that in Tehran, 
they’ll laugh in your face and say that forty-five thousand is barely enough to pay for a 
dinner out.  But when you go to the provinces, where there are no expenses because 
everything is so cheap, that forty-five thousand toman sounds like quite a lot of money. 
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Mostafa disagreed that Tehran was united behind the moderate candidates.  He asserted that the 
suburbs of Tehran were, in fact, primarily proponents of Ahmadinejad, even among Millenial 
Iranians.  He stated: 
You shouldn’t just say Tehran.  Tehran is also Karaj and Sāve.  Even the youth.  A lot of 
my friends voted for Ahmadinejad.  Many of them voted based on belief, because they 
said Ahmadinejad was a simple man.  There were a series of people who voted for 
Ahmadinejad to spite the state.  I know some. 
 
Mostafa’s statement echoes what Vashti had said regarding the 2005 election, that some people 
voted for Ahmadinejad out of spite.  Overall, the general consensus seems to be that 
Ahmadinejad was able to buy his re-election, either through the money that he had invested in 
the villages and small towns during his previous term, or the subsidies and handouts that his 
campaign had offered his supporters to ensure his re-election. 
 My informants were all aware of the appeal that Ahmadinejad had among certain sectors 
of society and that his victory was due to their voting power.  In 2017, their frustrations seemed 
more directed at this voting contingency than the state.  This is an important factor to note when 
thinking about the culture of Millenial Iranians, although the state was the primary target in the 
2009 uprisings that followed the election. 
 
The Green Movement and the Birth of Citizen Journalism 
In the days that followed the election, Iranian activists organized protests using Twitter to 
announce the time and place of gatherings.  The heavy restrictions on the freedom of press 
within the Islamic Republic and a series of glitches and missteps hindered journalists from 
reporting on the crisis and provided the opportunity for the phenomenon of citizen journalism to 
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arise.113  Citizen journalism is defined as a wide-range of web-based applications in which 
everyday social media users engage in journalistic practices.  The hashtag #CNNfail, along with 
#iranelection, for example, was used by Twitter subscribers to call attention to CNN’s failure in 
reporting the 2009 summer uprising in Iran.114  In lieu of reporting the Green Movement, CNN 
circulated the same stories about a grandmother in Nevada running a meth lab, the complaints 
that had arisen regarding the phasing out of analog television, and the bankruptcy of Six Flags 
amusement park.115  CNN’s failure to report a revolt in a country of major consequence to 
American foreign policy compelled people to take matters into their own hands and compensate 
for the neglect they received from major western news media outlets.  The trend began when 
Iranian police confiscated ABC News Correspondent Jim Sciutto’s camera and some of his 
footage.  Scuitto used his cell phone to film the Green Movement protests, as well as the violent 
state response, and posted the films onto Twitter.116 
Within a week of the uprising, hundreds of amateur videos were filmed by protestors and 
bystanders on their mobile devices and uploaded onto Twitter, Facebook and YouTube.  The 
2009 Green Movement was essentially the first populist revolt to utilize social media on a global 
scale.  One particular video suddenly brought the worldwide spotlight onto Iran; on June 20, 
2009, a video was uploaded onto YouTube that depicted the graphic death of Neda Agha Soltan.  
While the summer of 2009 witnessed at least four thousand detentions and 110 civilian casualties 
due to the Iranian state’s crackdown, Neda Agha Soltan’s death stands out because it was one 
that was actually captured on film and uploaded onto YouTube; her death was probably “the 
                                                
113 I first encountered the term “citizen-journalist” (sharvand khabarnegār) during my interviews; a number of my 
informants mentioned the term while discussing the Green Movement.  Negar Mottahedeh theorized the concept in 
her book #iranelection: Hashtag Solidarity and the Transformation of Online Life, which I read after conducting my 
interviews, thus reiterating the information that I had gathered. 
114 Mottahedeh, #iranelection, 9. 
115 Ibid., 9. 
116 Ibid. 
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most widely witnessed death in human history.”117  While standing in the street with her music 
teacher, the twenty-six year old Neda Agha Soltan was shot in her chest.  This resulted in a very 
quick but graphic death.  The video reveals the fallen young woman bleeding out of her eyes, 
nose and mouth, blood oozing over her entire face before she stopped breathing and died on 
camera.  This perturbingly graphic video went viral, to such an extent that even American 
president, Barack Obama, saw it and expressed grief over the young life that was lost.118  The 
fact that Neda Agha Soltan died at the age of twenty-six resonated with the Iranian Third 
Generation; she became a martyr for this generation of Iranians, who viewed her death as a 
representation of their plight, particularly in light of the state’s response to the uprising.  
While citizen journalism via viral videos can provide visibility, it is actually the legal 
media that provide “the larger narrative with ideological investments.”119  Mehdi Semati and 
Robert Allen Brookey claim that the Iranian case is instructive in that it presents an experience 
that combines an autocratic regime with a robust digital media environment.  They assert that 
because the Iranian state has a monopoly on broadcasting, cell phones and blogs provide Iranians 
with alternative forums of expressions.120  Digital media, then, presents Iranians with a medium 
through which to contest and criticize the media hegemony of the government, specifically 
through the circulation of images, songs, jokes and poems via texting sources.  Despite the fact 
that Neda Agha Soltan’s death validated the power of citizen journalism by bringing worldwide 
attention to the tragedy, Semati and Brookey claim that it was the traditional media that provided 
                                                
117 Krista Mahr, “The Top 10 Everything of 2009,” Time, December 8, 2009, Accessed September 18, 2017, 
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the narrative that contextualized her story and thus propagated the hegemonic discourse of the 
ruling elites.121 
 
Conclusion: A Fraudulent Election? 
In hindsight many of the participants of the Green Movement now assert that the election 
was not fraudulent, at least not to the extent that Mousavi had actually won.  All of my 
informants agreed that Ahmadinejad had a stronger support base than what they had previously 
anticipated.  Mostafa was very vehement about this, stating: 
There was no fraud.  Do not make this mistake.  Because during the election of ’88, you 
had to look at the other cities, not just Tehran.  The second time around the people came 
out again.  Our problem was that the people who were participating in the Green 
Movement would look at the people around them.  Iran isn’t the people around you.  You 
have to go to provinces.  My friends were from the provinces.  All of them said that their 
families voted for Ahmadinejad.  I’m not saying that Ahmadinejad won categorically—it 
should have been a two-round election.  But Ahmadinejad’s vote was higher than the 
others.  The state just wanted to end the elections, so Ahmadinejad was brought up.  The 
state didn’t want to take any risks. 
 
Sohrab also reiterated that the 2009 election was not completely fraudulent, but rather was 
“engineered.”  In Iranian elections, each candidate has a representative present at the ballot box 
on Election Day.  Sohrab mentioned how during the 2009 election, he had heard that some of 
Mousavi’s representatives were either not issued their I.D. cards (which they were required to 
have in order to perform their representative duties), or that they were not issued their cards on 
time, and were therefore unable to observe at the voting stations.  Sepideh added that this 
“election engineering” also involved voter suppression.  She recalled how she had to go to three 
different voting stations before finding one that had ballots.  Sohrab explained, “They would ‘run 
out’ in places where they knew Mousavi would get more votes, like in the north of the city for 
                                                
121 Ibid., 139. 
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example.  This was the fraud.”  Vashti reiterated this point, emphasizing that violations took 
place rather than outright fraud.  She asserted: 
Fraud, as in they changed the result of the election completely? I’ve come to the 
conclusion that in ’88 it was not like this.  They did not put Ahmadinejad in place of 
Mousavi.  There was fraud in that they made [the number of] Ahmadinejad’s votes 
higher, to prove that he was the most popular candidate and to ensure a powerful 
government.  And at the very most, so that it wouldn’t lead to a run-off election.  Fraud to 
this extent … but I’m almost certain that it wasn’t like Mousavi won and Ahmadinejad 
lost and that they just switched the two.  But there were so many violations and there was 
so much more entrenchment (jebhe gīrī) from Voice and Vision, and from the Guardian 
Council that should have supervised the election …  and from the Leader, he shouldn’t 
have said anything … there was so much of that, that the people had a right to protest.  
And these protests became so widespread that a couple million people were out in the 
streets.  And they (the state) brutally suppressed it.  Well, what I want to say is that they 
had the right to protest, but if you ask me, they (the state) did not outright change the 
election results. 
 
Whether these supposed violations resulted in a fraudulent outcome in the 2009 Iranian 
presidential election is up for debate.  What is certain, however, is that the Green Movement was 
the historical climax for Millenial Iranians, as it was a social movement bred, fostered and 
carried out by this generation.  The Green Movement was a manifestation of the prolific 
expansion of social media among Iranian youth, the rage that this demographic felt regarding the 
suppression of the few civil liberties and individual freedoms that they had gained during the 
Khatami era and a new form of political organization.  It represented the intersection of the Post-
Network, Post-Reform era, characterized by a particular relationship between the Millenial 
Generation and media, which will be further examined in the following chapter. 
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The Post-Network, Post-Reform Era: The Ahmadinejad Years 
 
Television is both a mode of technology and a tool for cultural storytelling.  From its 
inception and throughout the second half of the twentieth century, television has maintained its 
role as the purveyor of mass media and creator of culture.  Beginning in the twenty-first century, 
however, television has become an increasingly delineate and individualized experience.  In The 
Television Will Be Revolutionized, Amanda Lotz describes this as a consequence of the 
emergence of the Post-Network era.  She observes that the expansion of new convenience 
technologies and distribution methods have liberated viewers, providing them with greater 
control over their entertainment experience.  However, freedom from the dictates of network 
television has fostered a growing reliance on a range of devices that demand an increasing 
amount of attention and financial resources. 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, adroitness with mobile Internet technology is a 
prominent characteristic of Iran’s Millenial Generation.  Lotz observes that the penetration of 
convenience technologies accounts for one of the most distinct shifts between 2005 and 2013, a 
period which coincided with Ahmadinejad’s two-term presidency.  I contend that the changes in 
media distribution trends, along with the resulting expectations of convenience and mobility, 
have significantly impacted the formation of Iranian youth culture and identity, rendering the 
Ahmadinejad era a unique and critical time period.   
The distribution of Mehran Modiri’s Shūkhī Kardam is one example of the new post-
network methods.  In this chapter, I use this show as a text to examine the more prominent 
anxieties and tensions extant during the Ahmadinejad period.  I contend that the show’s method 
of distribution allowed for a less timid and therefore more accurate critique of Iranian society.  I 
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conclude that the issues broached on the show point to the underlying reasons for the pervasive 
sense of disillusionment that defined Millenial Iranians during the Ahmadinejad era.  
 
Iran and the Post-Network Era 
Mehran Modiri is the most prolific and famous comedian in contemporary Iran.  He is 
one of the first television celebrities of the Islamic Republic and is credited for reintroducing 
comedy as an accepted phenomenon in post-Revolution Iranian television. Modiri made his 
television comedy directorial debut in 1993 with Parvāz-e 57 (Flight 57), but it was his 2002 
Pāvarchin (Tiptoes) that propelled him to his status as the country’s premier comedian.  Modiri 
has successfully maintained this position by directing, producing and acting in comedy shows for 
over twenty years.  In 2009, Newsweek magazine named him the twentieth most powerful person 
in Iran.  This list was headed by supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and indicated the degree of 
Modiri’s clout and significance in contemporary Iranian public discourse.  The social satirist has 
not only survived, but has thrived in Iran’s entertainment business; his television comedies rule 
Iran’s airwaves, “with audiences so big that broadcast executives don’t balk at his lampoons of 
Iranian life.”122  In March of 2014, Modiri released Shūkhī Kardam.  Unlike his previous comedy 
series that followed a storyline, Shūkhī Kardam is an itemized show.  It consists of twenty-four 
episodes, focusing on eleven subjects (lying, marriage, violence, addiction, economy, health, 
Nowruz,123 fashion, revenge, criticism and literacy).  Each subject matter is examined in two 
episodes, through a variety of comedy sketches, with the last two episodes dedicated to the 
show’s finale. 
                                                
122 Newsweek Staff,  “The 20 Most Powerful People in Iran,” Newsweek, May 22, 2009, www.newsweek.com/20-
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123 The Persian New Year. 
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One particular Shūkhī Kardam sketch delineates perfectly the reason for the program’s 
popularity, while justifying its method of distribution.  In this sketch, three state television 
representatives are depicted trying to put together the Nowruz broadcast schedule. Their 
hackneyed program mocks IRIB’s limited ability to entertain the public.  For the Nowruz 
countdown, the representatives decide that one channel will air a variety show featuring celebrity 
guests (despite the fact that the only celebrity available is Behnoush Bakhtiari124), one station 
will broadcast from Behesht-e Zahra cemetery, “so that the memory of martyrs can be 
reawakened within the public mind,” and the rest of the channels will broadcast news of the 
Sudanese massacre.  For the thirteen days of Nowruz, the programing team states that they can 
chose from a grand total of five comedy series, 47-48 game shows, approximately one hundred 
public reports and 240 foreign cinematic films. They also discuss not being able to find anything 
from Iranian cinema suitable to screen and thus must resort to broadcasting the comedy film 
Ekhrājīhā thirteen times, with an encore each day, making for a total of twenty-six screenings.  
Desperate for more material, the director asks whether they can air the Scrooge cartoon, but his 
aid advises against this, stating that the Scrooge cartoon is more appropriate for the Christmas 
season.  The director then ends the meeting by congratulating his team for coming up with an 
“exciting and joy-inducing” Nowruz television program schedule for the IRIB channels and 
offers his employees bananas.125 
This sketch ridicules the programming, or rather lack of programming, offered by Iranian 
state television.  It mocks IRIB and criticizes it for being boring and repetitive. The sketch 
comments on the limitations of the programming offered by Iranian state television; it disparages 
IRIB for its monotony and irrelevance, particularly during the Nowruz season.  This is 
                                                
124 Behnoush Bakhtiari is a comedic actress who is known for always playing roles that are considered loos 
(spoiled) by Iranians, and is therefore not a favorite of the people. 
125 Modiri, “Nowruz,” Episode 11, Shūkhī Kardam. 
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significant because Shūkhī Kardam was not aired on IRIB, but was instead distributed through 
the Iranian Home Entertainment Network on DVDs.  
The direct sale of full seasons of shows on DVDs initiated the evolution of media 
distribution trends.  By 2010, new technologies had rendered television deliverable through the 
Internet. In the United States, DVD sales were quickly overshadowed by Video on Demand 
(VOD), followed by broadband delivered streaming services, the latter of which functioned to 
dismantle the cultural power of networks as the gate keepers and agenda setters of mass media.  
As Internet deliverable television was not yet an option during the Ahmadinejad period, DVD 
distribution was as the primary method through which Iranians were able to watch programming 
independent of state television.126  At that time, IRIB programming was considered trite, 
repetitive and boring, and therefore a subject worthy of ridicule.  The above sketch demonstrates 
why DVD distributed programs, such as Modiri’s Shūkhī Kardam, enjoyed such popularity and 
success. 
Iranian audiences of IRIB and satellite television watch what Lotz has defined as linear 
content.  Linear content is what people watch when they watch “what is on.”  The motivation for 
linear viewing is not necessarily watching for particular content, but rather a desire for 
companionship, distraction or entertainment.127  Twentieth century broadcasting normalized 
linear content flow, as networks determined the times during which specific content would be 
                                                
126 According to my informants, VOD services are still not yet available in Iran.  There are, however, satellite 
channels that air one movie back to back for a number of days, with each channel timetabled to start the movie 
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My informants report that with 4G Internet (which is not very prevalent in Iran due to its high cost), a movie will 
take approximately four hours to download, but without 4G it will take closer to twelve hours.  In Iran, Internet 
service is cheaper during the evening hours, with some providers even offering free service from two a.m. to seven 
a.m.  For this reason, Third Generation Iranians seeking prized content will arrange their download schedules to take 
place overnight and later watch what they have downloaded at their own convenience. 
127 Amanda Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 11. 
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aired.  Prized content, on the other hand, refers to programing that people specifically seek out.  
The Post-Network era in television, as proposed by Lotz, is defined by the shift to nonlinear 
viewing of prized content.  Specifically, the generation that has been acculturated with a range of 
communication technologies from a young age facilitated the transition to the Post-Network Era.  
Thus, generational differences are a significant component in this shift, as an understanding of 
television defined by binaries such as cable and broadcast, or television and computer, are 
inconsequential to those born before 1980.128   
Lotz’s argument may be applied to Iran’s Third Generation, who by definition were born 
after 1980, and exhibit a technological fluency that differentiates them from previous 
generations.  Upon the introduction of smartphones to the country, young Iranians were quick to 
adapt the devices into their everyday lives, and have since become accustomed to using multiple 
technologies to access information, find entertainment and communicate with one another.  This 
“media agnosticism,” as Lotz describes it, not only characterizes Millenial Iranians during the 
Ahmadinejad period, but also positions this demographic as the impetus for societal change. 
 
Lying Media 
 The declaration of Ahmadinejad’s presidential victory in June 2009 provoked the 
presence of hundreds of thousands of protestors in the streets of Tehran and other major Iranian 
cities.  State radio and television not only refused to report the social movement, but also ran 
sitcoms and miniseries as means of distracting an already agitated public.  IRIB’s unwillingness 
to report the discrepancies in the election results and the massive protest movement that was 
taking place, gave rise to the phenomenon of citizen journalism (discussed in the previous 
chapter) as non-press related Iranians tweeted and uploaded videos, images and statuses of the 
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uprising onto social media platforms.  On June 18, 2009, one of the most prolific and reliable 
Twitter sources reporting the uprising, @persiankiwi, tweeted the following at Iranian state 
media:  
IRIB.ir - How is it possible that 2million people march in your country and you say 
NOTHING? #iranelection 3:48 AM – 18 Jun 2009 
 
Several days later, in one of the Green Movement demonstrations, a protestor marched toward 
the IRIB building holding an actual television box over his head.  Amidst the signs of “Where is 
my vote?” the television box stood out, with the slogan “Lying Media” printed on both sides of 
the carton.129  This demonstration prop and @persiankiwi’s tweet both convey one of the most 
prevalent sentiments among the protesting public.  It was for this reason that Mehran Modiri’s 
Shūkhī Kardam was particularly popular among Iranians, for it tapped into a nerve that had been 
exposed four years prior. 
Each episode of Shūkhī Kardam includes a satirical news segment that ridicules the lies 
that are propagated by the government-run news broadcast media.  In the first newscast sketch of 
the series, the anchorman, who is played by Modiri himself, reports a number of satirical stories 
that present the exact opposite situation of the country during the Ahmadinejad period.130  For 
example, Modiri reports that the government council has declared a National Air Pollution Day 
and has requested that citizens participate in polluting the air by taking out and driving their 
personal vehicles.  He then states that Tehran has the cleanest air in the world, after the 
(fictional) deserted island of Booty Marmareh and continues that scientists believe extended 
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exposure to excessive amounts of clean air and a lack of natural salts (such as lead and sulfur) 
will result in difficult to treat health problems.   
In actuality, Iran’s pollution problem is a decades-old issue, and has steadily increased in 
recent years, claiming lives and damaging healthy lungs. According to a Mehr News report, on 
average, one person dies every two hours of pollution-related causes in Tehran.131  The latest 
statistics from the World Health Organization (WHO) report that four out of the ten most-
polluted cities of the world are in Iran, with Ahwaz, in southern Iran, topping the list.  Tehran 
was ranked 82nd out of 1,099 world cities evaluated for air pollution, a situation that many 
pollution experts say has worsened since the publication of the WHO report in early 2015.132 
 This news segment also takes a punch at the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.  When 
anchorwoman Bonavid, played by Elika Abdolrazaghi, presents the international news, she 
states, “Once again a ship bearing Australian refugees and heading toward Iran through the port 
of Dubai, drowned in the cerulean waters of the Persian Gulf.”133  “For years,” she continues, 
“Iran refused entry to Australian, Canadian and Swiss refugees.”134  She then reports about the 
latest wave of Westoxification that has swept over Europe and the resulting demonstrations that 
have taken place in European capitals, as protestors “expressed their anger and aversion to the 
advancement of European culture and civilization.”135 
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 This obvious parody of the relationship between Iran and the West simultaneously takes a 
jab at state media for propagating lies about the state of the Western world.  Historically, Iranian 
refugees have attempted to obtain asylum in countries such as Australia, Canada and 
Switzerland.  Interestingly, the United States is not mentioned, possibly because it is not among 
the Western countries that more readily admits asylum to Iranian refugees. Furthermore, 
Europeans are obviously not protesting the advancement of their own culture and civilization.  
By reporting the opposite of the actual situation in Iran, this satirical news segment mocks and 
ridicules the Islamic Republic’s well-established policy of denouncing the West.  The phrases, 
“Death to the West,” and “Death to Europe,” which are derivations of the now banal, “Death to 
America,” ridicule the vituperation against the West that has historically characterized the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.   
While each Shūkhī Kardam episode includes a satirical news segment, this particular 
news segment is significant because it sets the tone for the entire show.  Essentially, this news 
segment implies that Iran’s government-run media disseminates blatant lies to the people. It 
mocks the Iranian state’s news agency, IRIB, and sarcastically criticizes the false reports and 
propaganda that it broadcasts to the Iranian public.  Modiri circumvented a direct critique of the 
government by referring to lying as “creativity,” but he, in fact, posited that the Iranian news 
media twists the truth and reports events in such a way that Iran is always presented in a 
favorable light.  However indirect his critique may have been, it is evident to his audience that 
Modiri is in fact ridiculing the lies that are propagated by the Iranian state’s official news media. 
I asked Pooneh what she thought about the news segment of Shūkhī Kardam.  She 
responded that she really liked it.  I asked her why and she stated: 
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 I liked it because it shows the ridiculousness and fakeness of Iran’s news perfectly.  It 
shows exactly the problem.  They report all of the bad news of the world, so that you can 
feel fortunate about your situation in Iran.  It was very funny.  
 
Pooneh’s comment suggests that the show appealed to Iranians because it catered to their 
tendency to question the truthfulness of state news.  Vashti agreed with Pooneh regarding the 
hilarity of the Shūkhī Kardam news segment.  I asked her what she found particularly interesting 
about the sketch, and she stated, “The news in Iran is just like that; it has an orientation like Fox 
News.  Like everything in Iran is great, sunshine and rainbows.”  Both Pooneh and Vashti 
mentioned that IRIB reports news selectively, exaggerating situations of turbulence and turmoil 
in the Western world, while emphasizing Iran’s supposed stability. 
Of note is the financial segment of the satirical newscast; it reports that the Central Bank 
of Iran has agreed to grant a loan to the World Bank, which if granted, would rescue the Euro 
from bankruptcy. The report ends with the announcement that the Iranian rial has reached the 
equivalent of $14,000 USD, an increase of two dollars since the previous day. This particular 
segment brings attention to Iran’s deplorable economic state during the Ahmadinejad period and 
the state media’s refusal to acknowledge it, by presenting false reports of the country’s economic 
prowess. In 2012, the Iranian rial experienced a sudden depreciation, when it dropped to eighty 
percent of its value within the year. It has remained relatively steady since its major drop six 
years ago, never recovering back to its pre-2012 value and is currently 42,012.5 rials to the 
dollar.   
  
Ahmadinejad Economics 
Iran’s economic situation rapidly deteriorated during Ahmadinejad’s first term.  Foreign 
investors did not trust his economic policies and were further put off by his appointment of 
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previously unheard of ministers, who boasted little to no economic and political management 
experience.  These investors turned toward neighboring Arab countries, a move which resulted in 
a stock market crash and an overall loss of confidence in the Iranian national banking system.136  
Mostafa recalled how after Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election, his father lost half of his wealth, as his 
stocks crashed in one day.  He stated: 
I will never forget the first year.  My dad is a stockholder, big stocks.  When he 
(Ahmadinejad) was elected, my dad hit myself in the head.  He was watching television 
and he said, “Ey vāy!  I’m done for!”  About half of his wealth was lost.  In one day the 
stock crashed. 
 
Hannah described how Ahmadinejad’s election affected her family, specifically because her 
father was a factory owner.  She stated: 
The first time that Ahmadinejad became president, within two to three months we 
became totally bankrupt.  Everything we had, we had to sell. The producers in Iran hit the 
ground hard during the Ahmadinejad period. 
 
Sohrab, who worked for a private company that produced advertisements (including pictures, 
films and graphic animations) for factory products, described how work in his field slowly began 
to dwindle during Ahmadinejad’s presidency: 
When Ahmadinejad came, it affected almost all of the factories.  It wasn’t very obvious 
at first, but at the end, it became apparent where the stink of this whole mess was coming 
from.  Our work, as commercial artists, slowed down.  I remember the guys in the 
company, during the second [Ahmadinejad] term, would just play video games in the 
office because there was no work.  Because the economy was had been defeated (shekast 
khord).  
 
Sohrab’s comment indicates a commonly held belief that Iran’s dire economic situation was due 
to Ahmadinejad’s gross incompetence and mismanagement. For example, when appointing his 
cabinet, Ahmadinejad named four nominees for the minister of oil position, who like himself, 
lacked professional and administrative experience, but had deep, historic ties to the IRGC. Iran 
holds ten percent of the world’s oil reserves and is the second largest OPEC producer of crude 
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oil after Saudi Arabia.  It exports two-thirds of the four million barrels it pumps per day, 
primarily to Japan, China and other Asian countries.  Iran procures fifty percent of its revenue 
and the majority of its foreign currency earnings from these oil sales.137  As an oil exporting 
country, along with its natural gas reserves, Iran is of great significance in the global scheme; 
thus the Iranian oil ministry is a particularly powerful post. After much parliamentary debate and 
public speculation regarding Ahmadinejad’s judgment, the Majlis approved Kazem Vaziri 
Hamaneh for the post; Hamaneh served as oil minister from 2005 to 2007.138 
Sohrab compared the situation to the previous administration, stating that in the 
beginning of the Khatami period there was stability.  Khatami’s associates and those whom he 
appointed to his cabinet were progressive and thinking of the future, he said.  Sohrab asserted 
that Khatami’s appointees were experts in their fields, citing Karbaschi as an example.  
However, during the Ahmadinejad period, it was exactly the opposite, he stated, in that “they 
brought in every person who had nothing to do with these posts, and named them ministers and 
lawyers.”  Sepideh reiterated this, recalling that one of Ahmadinejad’s campaign slogans was 
that only competent people worthy of their positions would receive government posts.  “But it 
was exactly the opposite,” she recalled, “People who had nothing to do with these ministries 
were appointed.”   
Continuing his platform of populism, Ahmadinejad signed an anti-corruption “pact” with 
his ministers, which was essentially a commitment to forgo all private economic activity, as well 
as against privileging family members with any sort of financial benefit.139  He also ordered 
public banks, whose books were full of non-performing loans, to provide generous loans to the 
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ordinary citizens of the country, thereby endearing himself to the lower-middle classes.140  Hadi 
described how he was not as severely impacted by Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, but that he 
could sense a change.  He stated: 
I had an ordinary family.  My father was self-employed.  My mother was a homemaker.  
We had a very ordinary situation, a middle class family.  There wasn’t really a direct 
effect on our lives, in the way that everything would fall apart. 
 
 Ahmadinejad’s second term ushered in a period of severe economic instability.  By the 
end of his first term, official data from Iran’s Central Bank reported an inflation rate of twenty-
nine percent, while independent sources placed that number at slightly over forty percent.141 In 
the late 2000s, international sanctions began to tighten, reaching their apex in the fall of 2013.  
International embargos and sanctions affected employment, travel restrictions, monetary 
transactions and the price of basic commodities.  In 2013, for example, Iranian meat prices 
soared by sixty percent.  The Iranian Central Bank reported figures that showed the cost of food 
had risen by four hundred percent over the last seven years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency.  Food 
prices increased because the regime did not allow importers to exchange foreign currency at the 
official rate, forcing them to trade at the market exchange rate, which was three and a half times 
higher.142   
Foreign investments continued to diminish drastically, and Ahmadinejad’s re-election 
sparked tremendous capital flight.  In 2009, the equivalent of approximately $300 billion left the 
country.143  By the end of Ahmadinejad’s presidential tenure, the rial had become devalued by 
more than one hundred percent against hard currencies.  The dire economic mismanagement that 
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had defined Ahmadinejad’s two presidential terms left the financial state of country in ruins.  It 
resulted in skyrocket inflation and massive unemployment, of which the Iranian Third 
Generation bared the greatest brunt. 
  
Ahmadinejad and the Precarious Millenial Generation 
Under Ahmadinejad, the Millenial Generation suffered unemployment at a rate twice that 
of the general unemployed population of Iran.  The protracted unemployment and 
underemployment endured by young Iranians has encouraged a continued and prolonged reliance 
on their parents.  Young Iranians are financially unable to move out and start an independent life.  
This condition has perpetuated delayed marriage among the demographic, and has ultimately 
resulted in slowing down the maturation of Millenial Iranians.  The percentage of men between 
the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine that still live at home and are financially dependent on 
their parents has increased substantially.  In 1984, fifty percent of young Iranian men fell into 
this category.  By the middle of Ahmadinejad’s first term, seventy-five percent of young Iranian 
men had not yet moved into an independent domicile and continued to be financially dependent 
on their parents.144 
Modiri astutely satirizes the economic predicament suffered by Millenial Iranians in a 
Shūkhī Kardam sketch involving a father and a son.  The sketch begins with the son sitting at the 
kitchen table, entering work data into his computer.  His father interrupts him to show him his 
cousin’s wedding invitation and uses it as a springboard to broach the topic of marriage.  The 
father, while belittling his son, simultaneously demands that he “get a wife.”  The son responds, 
“Father, if Mehrdad has gotten married it is because grandfather left him an inheritance.  I don’t 
                                                
144 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani and Daniel Engel, “Youth Exclusion in Iran: The State of Education, Employment and 
Family Formation,” (Virginia: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics, 2007), 
7. 
 79 
have the means.”  The father replies, “My dear, you just go forward with it and everything will 
fall into place,” a statement that points to the aloof attitude of the parental generation regarding 
the youth generation’s financial woes.  The son attempts to reason with his father, outlining how 
he does not have the means to go forward with this particular step in life.  He says, “My dear 
father, I go to work from six in the morning until eight at night.  I get six hundred thousand 
tomans a month, and that’s with a master’s degree.  How am I supposed to take my wife’s hand 
and bring her home?”145  The father dismisses his son’s response with a click of his tongue, and 
says that the problem is not the six hundred thousand tomans, but rather that he is afraid to get 
married.  The son reiterates that he does not have the financial means to get married and that his 
priority now is to work so as to accumulate money, but his father remains steadfast in his 
assertion that his son is actually afraid of marriage, claiming that when he married his wife, he 
only made fifteen hundred tomans a month.  The son again tries to reason with his father and 
states that in the past the situation was probably such that fifteen hundred tomans was enough to 
start a family with.  He reiterates that after working for seven years, he has only just now been 
able to afford to buy a Pride (car) with his a monthly salary of six hundred thousand tomans.  
Relentless, the father says that with fifteen hundred tomans, he was able to buy a house, get a 
wife and take her on a honeymoon, and again calls his son a coward.  The son becomes 
increasingly frustrated, repeating that he has to work in order to save money, while the father 
nonchalantly keeps goading his son that he is too scared to get married.  The son finally lets out a 
frustrated scream and throws himself out of the window.  The sketch ends with the father 
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mumbling to himself, “Look at how he jumps … did we jump like that in our day?  I think we 
jumped a bit better.  Yes.”146   
This sketch delineates not only the difficult financial situation that Millenial Iranians 
endured during the Ahmadinejad period, it also points to the aloofness of their parental 
generation regarding their hardship.  Despite boasting a graduate degree and working fourteen 
hours per day, the son’s monthly salary amounted to the equivalent of less than two hundred 
dollars.  Furthermore, the father’s insistence on his son getting a wife, despite his son’s reasoning 
that he does not make enough money to take that step, points to tensions between the Third 
Generation and the prevailing patriarchy.  Through this sketch, Modiri indirectly conveys 
criticism of Ahmadinejad’s management of the economy, while expressing empathy with Iran’s 
Millenials.  When Ahmadinejad left office, thirty-one to forty percent of Iranians lived under the 
poverty line, ten percent of which lived in extreme poverty and were essentially deprived access 
to basic human needs.147  
 During the Ahmadinejad administration, Iran’s economy was only capable of employing 
less than a third of the country’s university graduates.148 After the state crack down on the Green 
Movement in 2009, an estimated forty five thousand Iranians fled the country and sought asylum 
abroad.149  The World Bank reported a net emigration of three hundred thousand people from 
Iran during Ahmadinejad’s second term.  Meanwhile, in 2011, PBS Frontline reported that an 
estimated two hundred thousand university graduates emigrate Iran each year.150 
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The following Shūkhī Kardam sketch satirizes the plight of these young, educated 
Iranians who see little hope for a brighter future if they stay in Iran.  The sketch begins with a 
young man packing his suitcase in preparation to escape abroad.  Confronted by his father, the 
young man tells him that he has found a reliable smuggler to take him overseas.  His father 
responds that he is a coward for running away and says, “Be a man!  Live in your own 
country!”151  The son replies, “Dear father, what should I do here?  I’m either on Facebook or 
I’m asleep or I’m idle.  I’ll go over there and continue my education.”152  The father responds 
that he should be a man and pursue his education in his own country.  The son replies that he has 
not been allowed into the university for the last three semesters.  His father replies, “Who said 
life is just about studying?!  Be a man!  Marry in your own country!  Start a family in your own 
country!”153  Similar to the above sketch, the father insists that his son gets married, while the 
son protests that he has no job, no money, no house and therefore no means to support a wife.  
His father’s solution is that the son “should be a man,” which translates as finding a job, making 
money and working in his own country.  The son responds that he has been searching for work 
for three years and that there are either no jobs, or if there are, they require party, or their salary 
is just too low to support a family.  The father retorts, “Well who said life is just work?!  I will 
work and pay your expenses!  You have fun!  Enjoy life!  But be a man! Enjoy life here, in your 
own country!”154  The son asks his father what he is supposed to enjoy, considering the lack of 
entertainment options available in Iran.  Angrily, his father retorts, “If you can’t do anything, 
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then be a man and die like a man!  At least die in your own country!”155  The frustrated son 
acquiesces and tells his father that he will die in Iran, but reminds him that his death will cost 
fifty million tomans (the cost of the Sevom, Haftom and Chehelom), plus another thirty million 
for the one-year anniversary, amounting to a total of eighty million tomans.  At this point the 
demeanor of the father changes, and he asks if the smuggler is reliable and if his son has packed 
enough warm clothes.  He then says, “Well, be a man … if you’re going to go abroad, go from 
the side (illegally) … if you’re going to leave your country, then at least sneak out.”156 
 Not only does this sketch demonstrate the blatant patriarchy that pervades contemporary 
Iranian culture, it also shows how this patriarchy functions to undermine and hinder Millenial 
Iranians.  The young man’s desire to go abroad in order to become a productive member of 
society is quashed by his father, who denounces his son for being a coward.  Virility is equated 
with patriotism, and so, according to the dominant patriarchal culture represented by the father, 
the son’s abandonment of his homeland indicates a loss of his manhood.  As masculinity is the 
most revered characteristic in patriarchal culture, the father refuses to allow his son to make this 
sacrifice, suggesting that he continue his education, start a family and work in his own country.  
Then, when presented with the fact that none of these traditional means of asserting adult 
manhood are feasible for the son, the father exasperatedly offers to pay his son’s expenses, as 
long as he stays within the country.  The son reminds the father that the state imposed restrictions 
on Iranian society have made for an environment devoid of options for leisure.  Finally the father 
tells his son that if he cannot do anything, then at the very least, he should die like a man, in his 
own country.  The son replies he will acquiesce so long as the father has set aside the eighty 
million tomans for his funeral and mourning ceremony expenses.  It is only at this point that the 
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father suddenly changes his mind and supports his son’s departure.  The father’s willingness to 
pay his son’s expenses due to a lack of employment opportunities again points to a floundering 
economy that is maintained by cultural patriarchy.  The father’s insistence that his son can only 
be a man by staying in Iran highlights how this cultural patriarchy also serves to cripple the 
Third Generation and holds it in a position of impotence. 
 
Pārty Bāzī: Corruption in the Ahmadinejad Era 
Robert Putnam defines social capital as the conglomerate of mutual trust, reciprocity, 
cooperation and participation.  He contends that social capital is a requisite for the political 
participation and transparency necessary to ensure a functioning democracy.  Putnam asserts that 
social capital is determined by the existence of particular philanthropic behaviors and practices 
within a society.  These practices include: trust in other people, willingness to aid fellow citizens, 
participation in volunteer work and the giving of alms.  In a recent survey aimed at assessing the 
rank of one hundred forty countries, based on their measure of social capital, Iran ranked 
120th.157 
Before the 1979 Revolution, one of the main grievances against the Pahlavi regime was 
nepotism; the Shah, his family, and a small circle of his “friends” and supporters (approximately 
a few hundred families) controlled the vast resources of the state. The 1979 Revolution brought 
the hope that nepotism would be largely diminished if not completely uprooted in Iran.  
Khomeini, himself, was supposedly very strict about not allowing any members of his family to 
utilize state power as a means to enrich themselves.158 After Khomeini died in 1989, the right 
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wing gradually took control of all important state organs, and nepotism once again become 
rampant. 
In terms of nepotism within the ranks of the current Islamic regime, one family has been 
particularly prominent.  The Larijani family consists of five brothers; these five brothers occupy 
five key posts within Iran's political system. Between them, they dominate two of the top three 
institutions in the country, the parliament and the judiciary. The most influential of the brothers 
is Ali Larijani, who serves as the Speaker of the Majles.  Ali Larijani forged a very close 
relationship with Ayatollah Khamenei during the time that he served in the IRGC.  He has 
remained a close confidante of Khamenei since the latter served as the clerical supervisor of the 
IRGC, as president of the Republic in the 1980s and finally as the current Supreme Leader of 
Iran. 
All together, the Larijani family yields an incredible amount of power in their hands.  
Sadegh Larijani serves as the chief of the judiciary, while Mohammad Javad (Ardeshir) Larijani 
has been an important conservative ideologue, serving as deputy for international affairs for 
Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi (Sadegh Larijani's predecessor).  During 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Mohammad Bagher Larijani served as the deputy minister of health 
and as the Chancellor of Medical Sciences at Tehran University, but he resigned from this post in 
December of 2012.  In 2013 Dr. Larijani was appointed the President of the Medical Policy 
Council at the Islamic Azad University and in 2015 he was appointed Deputy Minister of 
Medical Education of the state.  The last brother, Fazel Larijani has served in the diplomatic 
corps as the Iranian cultural attaché in Ottawa Canada.  There is also Ahmad Tavakkoli, whose 
mother is the maternal aunt of the Larijanis.  Tavakkoli is an influential right-wing deputy in the 
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Majles and head of the parliament’s research center. He is also a two time presidential candidate 
and served as the Minister of Labor in the 1980s.  While it is not uncommon to see political 
figures maneuver family members into key positions in Iran, the Larijanis are exceptional due to 
their numbers and far-reaching control.   
Iran is thus considered a highly corrupt state among international watchdog groups.  In 
2016, Transparency International, a prominent civil organization dedicated to fighting 
corruption, ranked Iran 131st in their Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of 176 nations.159 A 
major factor affecting the CPI is transparency, or lack thereof. Lack of transparency provides 
civil servants with opportunities to entertain the advantages of their position and win bribes, and 
is thus a major contributing factor to corruption.  A prominent example of this during the 
Ahmadinejad period was the case of Abbas Palizdar, who was a member of the Inquiry and 
Review Committee that the Seventh Majles formed in order to review the performance of the 
judiciary. During a speech in June 2008, at Bu-Ali Sina University in Hamadan, Palizdar 
revealed that the Committee had uncovered one hundred and twenty three cases of corruption, 
including at least forty-two cases involving leading right-wing clerics and officials.  These 
clerics and high-ranking officials included Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, a member of both the 
Guardian Council160 and the Assembly of Experts,161 Ayatollah Mohammad Emami Kashani, 
another member of the Guardian Council, Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, former Speaker of the Majles 
and special adviser to Khamenei, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Fallahian, 
the former Minister of Intelligence, and Mohsen Rafighdoust, a former commander of the IRGC, 
among many others.  Corruption during the Ahmadinejad period was thereby primarily 
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perpetuated by the rich and the powerful right-wing members of the government, who have 
historically retained a staunch opposition to reform.  Indeed it was during the Ahmadinejad 
administration that the largest embezzlement scandals in Iranian history took place, which 
involved the peculation of several billion dollars.   
Throughout the past twenty years, the Iranian state has embraced a policy of 
neoliberalism, specifically though the valorization of individual entrepreneurs, the privatization 
of markets over rights and the abatement of government sponsored social service programs.  
Rafsanjani, who served as the third president of the theocracy from 1989-2007, initiated 
reconstruction efforts and liberalization policies that were followed by the vast expansion of 
bureaucracy and the rise of rentier capitalism.  In such a system, the beneficiaries of nepotism 
and cronyism received economic rent and consequently, a very small minority of the population 
came to hold the vast concentration of the country’s wealth. Income distribution became highly 
uneven and inequality widened, while the burden of corruption fell heavily on the poor because 
they could not afford to pay bribes and did not have a party (the term used to refer to inside 
connections in Iran). 
Unemployment affects the Millenial Generation at twice the rate it does the rest of Iran’s 
population.  Approximately forty percent of university-educated Millenial Iranians are 
unemployed, amounting to nearly six million jobless young Iranians.162 Finding regular 
employment in contemporary Iran almost always requires an inside connection or a party.  This 
is satirically depicted in a Shūkhī Kardam sketch that parodies a typical job interview in today’s 
Iran.   
In this sketch, an incredibly qualified applicant is interviewing for a job. He studied 
industrial and mining engineering at Sorbonne University, his dissertation has been translated 
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into seven languages, a production line in Germany has taken up his prototype, he speaks seven 
languages (and is therefore valuable from the international business standpoint) and is willing to 
work for a lower salary or even forgo his salary for a while, as long as he is given the 
opportunity to work.  The interviewee, however, has one fault: he was not referred to the 
company by anyone; rather, he applied for the job based on an ad he saw in the newspaper. After 
the interviewer realizes this, he sends the applicant out and dismissively tells him that the 
company will be in touch. The next applicant comes in with a letter and places it on interviewer’s 
desk. The interviewer reads the letter, lights up and warmly welcomes the interviewee, who was 
referred to by Mr. Karimi (his party). This applicant is portrayed as stupid, lazy and unqualified. 
He boasts no specialty, no interests and even says that he cannot get up in time to be at work by 
eight thirty in the morning.  He does, however, reiterate that he was referred by Mr. Karimi.  The 
interviewer reassures the applicant that he is well aware of this and hires him on the spot.163  This 
exaggerated scenario of pārty bāzi is based on the reality that inside connections are a necessary 
component to success and upward mobility in contemporary Iranian society. The expectation of 
and participation in such a system of corruption, however, evinces a dysfunctional citizenship, as 
it demonstrates the dearth of citizen rights within a society.  This is one of the underlying reasons 
for the disillusionment sensed by Millenial Iranians during the Ahmadinejad era.  The highly 
qualified applicant without a pārty represents the plight of this demographic. 
 
Mocking the Morality Police 
The Islamic Republic utilizes patriarchal heterosexuality to control the Iranian public, and 
does so through both formal and informal policing of public morality.  Informal policing is 
typically undertaken by those referred to as Hezbollahi or those with Hezbollahi sympathies.  In 
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the post-revolutionary context a hezbollahi is someone who zealously supports the Islamic 
Republic.  The word hezbollah means “Party of God” and its current connotations derive from 
the revolutionary period, when a loose knit grass roots network of people, usually connected 
through mosques, identified themselves as hezbollahis.  These people were (and continue to be) 
committed to maintaining the ideals of the Islamic revolution, specifically striving to uphold the 
religious, rather than the republican, aspects of the “Islamic Republic.”164 
During the Ahmadinejad era and today, formal policing of public morality was done 
through the Gasht-e Ershād, which translates as “guidance patrol.”   Gasht-e Ershād is a police 
force that is supported by the Basij militia and is tasked with implementing the Islamic state’s 
interpretation of appropriate public conduct.  It is a major civil institution, comprised of 
thousands of men and women who work to enforce a particular vision of Islamic morality and 
dress code in the Iranian public sphere.  While there have been various forms of the “morality 
police” since the 1979 revolution, Gasht-e Ershaād was formed under Ahmadinejad in 2007, 
during a government crackdown on an increase of Iranians wearing “un-Islamic dress.”  The 
Gasht-e Ershād has a wide range of powers to enforce Iran’s Islamic code of public conduct, 
including chastising and admonishing offenders, imposing fines and even arresting people for 
failing to adhere to their modesty standards.  Men are occasionally stopped for sporting 
outlandish hairstyles and more recently, due to the rise of hipster fashion trends, for having 
beards that supposedly resemble that of jihadists.  But Gasht-e Ershaād primarily targets women, 
specifically to ensure the observance of proper hijab, which requires women to cover their hair 
and bodies and discourages the use of cosmetics. 
Every Shūkhī Kardam episode features a Prisoner and Warden sketch that is tailored to 
the subject matter of the episode.  The sketch depicts a conversation between a heavy-set, sweet-
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talking, and charismatic prisoner  (played by Mehran Ghafourian), and a stern, unseen warden 
(voiced by Modiri), who has no patience for the prisoner’s adulations.  In the very first Prisoner-
Warden sketch, featured in the “Creativity” episode (discussed earlier in the chapter), the 
prisoner is brought in from his cell to the warden’s office because he has had a number of 
complaints lodged against him.  The warden states that several families and security forces have 
complained that the prisoner, through impersonation, extorted money from them.  The prisoner 
responds, “Sir, look where misapprehension leads to.  I was sporting a green ensemble with 
black boots.  I went to the park and there I saw some incredibly disturbing scenes.  I mean they 
really made my heart ache.  The boys and girls then gathered around me and said, ‘Sir, please 
don’t be upset, we are all cousins’.”  The warden replies, “And you took money from them?” To 
which the prisoner responds, “They insisted!   I didn’t even want any money.  My heart was 
aching; I did it because it was my duty to do so.”165 
 This sketch satirizes the role of the morality police by implying that the prisoner dressed 
up as a member of Gasht-e Ershād and accepted bribes from the couples that he spotted in the 
park.  Due to the personal freedom restrictions in Iran, unmarried couples seek spaces in which 
they can express their emotions to one another without the controlling patriarchal gaze of the 
state.  The park is one such space in which the youth have been able to negotiate a designated 
place for themselves.  For this reason, however, the park is also specifically policed for 
“immoral” behavior among young Iranians, particularly indications of romance between young, 
unmarried couples.  Public display of affection between unmarried people is considered illegal in 
Iran and can be subject to punishment.  Promiscuous pairs may be taken back to police stations, 
where they endure whatever punishment is deemed appropriate for their offense.  Typically they 
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are subject to a fine, often paid for by their parents, who are summoned to the station to collect 
their children.  However, as the current Islamic state engenders corruption in all realms of 
Iranian society (as discussed in the previous section), young Iranians who are intercepted for 
partaking in immoral conduct (e.g. romantic gestures, or even just cavorting in mixed-gender 
company) will offer a bribe to the morality police to avoid being taken in.   
Prior to the making and distribution of Shūkhī Kardam, a film came out based on the 
same premise as the Prisoner and Warden sketch described above.  Gasht-e Ershād was a 2012 
comedy film directed by Saeed Soheili, which depicted three urban working-class men who 
impersonate a morality police crew as a scheme to make money.  The film was released during 
the Nowruz season of 2012.  Despite having had the approval of the Ministry of Culture and 
winning an award at the Fajr Movie Festival, the film was attacked by hardliner clerics and was 
eventually pulled off the screen.  Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, a member of the Assembly of 
Experts, referred to the film as “immoral” and “obscene”.  Ansār-e Hezbollah, a paramilitary 
group, protested outside of the Ministry of Culture building with banners that read, “Families of 
the Martyrs, we are ashamed,” and demanded that the screening of the movie be suspended 
within forty-eight hours.  The Islamic Propagation Organization’s Art Center also refused to 
screen the film in all of its sixty-two cinemas.  Gasht-e Ershād was thus only shown in fifteen 
movie theaters throughout the country and for a brief period of thirty-one days before it was 
banned entirely.  Even so, it managed to become a box-office hit and became one of the highest 
grossing films of 1391 (2012-2013).166  Alex Shams claims that the film’s success was due to its 
underlying mockery of the morality police, which tacitly questioned the legitimacy of the 
institution.  The film suggests that the morality police have ulterior motives.  Such an implication 
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has great appeal among Iran’s middle-class youth, who form a substantial portion of Iran’s 
movie going population.167 Similarly, the Shūkhī Kardam sketch about the morality police 
imposter taking bribes from the youth only reiterates this sentiment.  The growing sense of 
Gasht-e Ershād’s illegitimate exercise of power is a major contributing factor to the sense of 
disillusionment felt by young Iranians. 
Vashti talked about how the morality police was much more ominous during 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency.  She commented that summer was the “Gasht-e Ershād season,” 
because Iranian women loosen up their hijabs during the warmer months.  She then clarified: 
Their manteaux become more open and they push back their headscarves.  I mean it’s not 
actually seasonal, but they (the Gasht-e Ershād) don’t have the same amount of activity 
all year long.  You can look long term between the different administrations and see how 
their activity has fluctuated.  Like during Ahmadinejad’s presidency … they suddenly 
became very active, despite what he had said during his campaign. 
 
Vashti is referring to an interview that took place during Ahmadinejad’s first campaign run in 
2005.  In an interview, Ahmadinejad had rhetorically asked, “Is our country’s biggest problem 
really the hair of our youths?”168  Vashti recalled that this statement became one of 
Ahmadinejad’s slogans throughout his campaign, but “When he became president, we had the 
most active Gasht-e Ershād yet,” she said.  Vashti then commented on the evolution of the 
Gasht-e Ershaād between administrations.  She recalled how during the Ahmadinejad period, 
“the women in the black chadors” (khāharān-e zeinab, or Zeinab Sisters) would suddenly appear 
in the street as a block.  She recalled that their interactions with Iranian youth were often very 
violent, both verbally and physically.  These interactions were filmed by bystanders on their 
phones and posted onto social media sites, which in turn inspired a substantial public outrage and 
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ultimately initiated a change in procedure.  She described the Gasht-e Ershād’s amended 
approach, stating: 
They have changed their tone so that it sounds more kind, but even that still gives us the 
creeps, in such a way that the meat falls off your bones.  Now they talk to you.  Often 
times there’s a mullah and he’ll talk to you; he’ll ‘guide’ you, and then you sign 
something, you give ta’hod (commitment) that you’ll never do it again. 
 
In his ethnography of the Third Generation, Khosravi applies Foucault’s notion of pastoral power 
to explain the power dynamics and hierarchies that uphold the Iranian social structure.  He 
asserts that pastoral power is a supplement to discipline-oriented power, imposed by patriarchal 
institutions, such as the state, religion, parents and teachers.  In the context of contemporary Iran, 
pastoral power seeks to moralize the corporeal bodies of young people, citing a concern for their 
welfare and seeking to ensure their salvation.  As Ayatollah Bojnourdi, a former member of the 
Supreme Judicial Council, had declared, “Penalty in Islam is correction rather than 
punishment.”169   
Vashti’s description of the shift in the morality police’s approach thus confirms 
Khosravi’s assertion regarding the Islamic state’s use of pastoral power.  I asked Vashti if 
signing a ta’hod gives a person a record, or a file of sorts.  She responded: 
 It’s supposed to give you this feeling, but it’s not like you actually have a file …  They 
mostly just want to scare you with this sense [of fear].  The Gasht-e Ershād suddenly 
become active at times, about things they didn’t have a problem with before …  then, two 
weeks later, they don’t care again.  That’s the problem … it’s something very fluid, 
unstructured … it’s not like they say your manteaux has to be a particular number of 
centimeters long, or your make up should be a certain way.  If they want to give you a 
hard time, they will. 
 
Vashti’s comment indicates the arbitrary nature of the power and discipline enforced by the 
morality police.  Pooneh reiterated this subjectivity, recalling an incident in which the Gasht-e 
Ershād detained her cousin due to the color of her headscarf.  “It was yellow,” she stated, “And 
                                                
169 Khosravi, Young and Defiant in Tehran, 27.  IRNA, November 29, 1995. 
 93 
her shoes were yellow.  And her purse was yellow.  It was just too happy, so they got her for 
that.”  Pooneh also mentioned the difference in behavior of the Gasht-e Ershād between 
Rouhani’s administration and Ahmadinejad’s.  She described how despite their presence at most 
stop lights in Iran currently, the Gasht-e Ershād only gives out warnings to girls sporting the 
style of manteaux currently in fashion (open and unbuttoned, like a robe) stating, “They aren’t 
mean to people … nor do they force them into the vans.  That sort of thing happened four or five 
years ago, during the Ahmadinejad period.  Then, there would be fights, as we would see in the 
videos … but it’s gotten better with Rouhani.”  Vashti and Pooneh’s comments indicate that the 
Gasht-e Ershād interacted with Third Generation Iranians in a harsher and more arbitrary 
manner during the Ahmadinejad administration.  This contributed significantly to the overall 
sense of frustration and discontent that characterized Millenial Iranians throughout this time 
period. 
 
University Stories 
Approximately 1.2 million Iranian applicants take the Konkur170 each year, of which only 
fifteen percent are admitted to universities and institutions of higher education.171  This exam, 
taken by graduating high school seniors is a ranking system that determines what majors are 
available to students and which government funded institutions they may attend.  The number of 
slots at each institution is limited because they are at federally funded universities, where the 
Iranian government pays for student tuitions.  During the Ahmadinejad era, Iran’s economy was 
only capable of employing approximately twenty-seven percent of the country’s university 
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graduates, while the rest remained unemployed or severely underemployed.172  University 
graduates fortunate enough to have secured a job, typically only made the equivalent of five 
hundred dollars a month in Ahmadinejad’s Iran.173  Lack of employment options, in conjunction 
with severely limited social freedom, therefore, encouraged the flight of Iran’s educated elite. 
According to official statistics, nearly two hundred thousand university graduates emigrate Iran 
per year, seeking a better life and more opportunity abroad.  This has resulted in a phenomenon 
called farār-e maghzhā (literally, “the escape of the brains” or brain drain).  In recent years, 
hundreds of thousands of Iranians have left the country seeking jobs and higher salaries. 
According to Iran’s National Elites Foundation (a government-run organization that supports 
academically gifted and high-achieving students), at least forty percent of the highest performing 
students with undergraduate degrees in science and engineering leave Iran to pursue advanced 
degrees abroad.174  The IMF has reported that between 150,000 and 180,000 students emigrate 
from Iran each year.175  During the 2012-2013 academic year, 8700 Iranian students came to 
study in the United States, a twenty-five percent increase from the previous year.  Furthermore, 
nearly ninety percent of Iranian doctoral students remain in the United States after they 
graduate.176   
A mass exodus of Iran’s brightest minds thus characterized the Ahmadinejad period.  
Shūkhī Kardam included a sketch that ridicules the Ahmadinejad administration’s response to the 
brain drain.  The sketch depicts a talk show host interviewing a fictional character, Professor 
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Kafibeyg, who boasts the bombastic title: Deputy Director of the Headquarters for Laying Out 
the Groundwork for the Return of the Immigrant Geniuses to the Whole of the Country.  In this 
hilariously acute satirical piece, the professor describes the economic incentives that will be 
offered to entice Iranian geniuses to return to their home country.  He states: 
 Fortunately, my colleagues at the various ministries and the private sector have 
considered a very valuable support and commendation package.  First of all, the base 
salary for these magnanimous people begins at 800,000 tomans and that, with one 
hundred and fifty hours of overtime, actually amounts to 965,000 tomans.  Subsidies are 
paid into their accounts before everyone else.  The fuel card that we have in mind for 
them allots three hundred liters of gasoline for those who have a bachelor’s degree and 
four hundred liters for those who have a PhD.  Most importantly, in the private sector, the 
commodity basket that has been envisioned for them has two extra boxes of macaroni, a 
bigger hunk of cheese, a fifty-thousand toman gift card and the privilege of not having to 
wait in line to pay for excess baggage at the airport.177 
 
This satirical offer of sub-par incentives delivers a sharp jab at the Islamic state for its 
lackadaisical efforts to reverse the brain drain.  When the host asks the professor what has been 
considered in terms of employment, lodging, insurance and the like for the returning 
intelligentsia, the professor responds, “That will all fall into place on its own.  As they said in the 
past, ‘Money for three things will always be (divinely) supplied: the money for a wedding, the 
money for having children and the money to return our geniuses back home’.”178  This vague 
response, which invokes the interference of a greater power, again satirizes the Iranian state’s 
inability to stop the brain drain and mocks the faith in kismet that characterizes the theocracy 
(and greater Iranian society).  The sketch thereby posits an impotent administration incapable of 
providing enough incentive to stop the egression of the country’s intellectual resources. 
The Ahmadinejad administration spent less than two and a half percent of the country’s 
gross domestic product on science and technology research. This lack of investment in science, 
along with the emphasis on religious ideology in higher education, has driven and continues to 
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drive Iran’s brightest minds into the arms of the “imperial” west.179  Students have increasingly 
left Iran because they sought an environment where they could blossom and grow intellectually.  
Young Iranians with greater intellectual capacity specifically felt hindered by the academic 
limitations that they encountered during the Ahmadinejad era and therefore sought out 
educational and employment opportunities abroad.  
Sepideh described how Ahmadinejad’s election affected her university atmosphere.  She 
stated: 
I remember when Ahmadinejad was elected; I had just started my master’s degree.  They 
changed the dean of our school.  Ms. Rahnavard (Mousavi’s wife) was the head of our 
department.  They replaced her and then everything changed, starting with our hijab.  
When Ahmadinejad came to office, they (the university) began to clamp down.  Like, as 
soon as we would enter the university gate, they would nitpick at everything.  Like, ‘Why 
is your veil pushed back?’ or ‘Why are you wearing makeup?’ or ‘Why are your pants 
short?’  They would pick on everything.  Then they replaced a series of our faculty 
members with their own people.  I later learned that a number of these chadoris who 
were put on the faculty, had ties to the regime.  
 
Vashti described her experience beginning her undergraduate education at IUT in tandem with 
Ahmadinejad taking office.  She stated: 
We entered the university at the same time that Ahmadinejad took office.  The university 
stopped allowing students to go on mixed gender field trips.  They replaced the university 
presidents with people who were more religious and were closer to him (Ahmadinejad).  
Everything became unhinged.  We couldn’t even sit next to each other.  Like you could 
see the change perfectly in the second year, compared to the first.  The University herasāt 
acquired power; they would come up and ask why boys and girls were talking to one 
another.  This was during Ahmadinejad’s first term.  When I graduated with my 
bachelor’s degree, his first term ended.   
 
Vashti and Sepideh’s descriptions of the change in the university environment reflect the 
religious conservatism and stifled academic atmosphere that the Ahmadinejad administration 
engendered.  Vashti’s mention of the herāsat is particularly interesting because it demonstrates 
how the lower-class supporters of Ahmadinejad realized the benefit of his presidency, and 
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empowered them to exert their authority within the traditionally progressive and liberal realm of 
the university.  
The Khatami Era witnessed the inception of a steady rise of education among Iranian 
women.  As of 1998, more women have been admitted to and graduated from Iran’s universities 
than men.  In 2001, that percentage peaked at 61.4 percent but diminished during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency.180  As mentioned before, Ahmadinejad’s presidency coincided with 
Vashti’s tenure as a university student; she attended Isfahan University of Technology (IUT) for 
both her undergraduate and graduate degree from 2005-2012.  IUT is one of the most prestigious 
engineering universities in Iran.  I asked her whether she felt she had the potential to 
academically flourish within the Iranian University system during the Ahmadinejad 
administration.  She responded that the issue of patriarchy within the school system was a great 
hindrance due to the misogynist and patriarchal atmosphere it created in the university.  She 
stated: 
I was in the mining engineering school and like here, in the United States, the number of 
male students was higher than the number of female students in this field.  But they even 
tried to limit admittance to only men during the Ahmadinejad period.  I recently asked 
my friend about it and she said that this is no longer the case.  They did it for a year, but 
now, there are both boys and girls in the department.  
 
During Ahmadinejad’s second term, a new regulation was passed that banned women from 
seventy-seven academic fields at the graduate level in the country’s thirty-six universities.  The 
ban was partially repealed when Hassan Rouhani became president in 2014, at which point 
women once again constituted approximately sixty percent of the college admittances.  
Pooneh, who attended the University of Tehran for both her bachelor’s degree and 
master’s degree, recollected the sexism she encountered as a female university student during the 
Ahmadinejad era.  She commented that the effects of gender discrimination within the university 
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setting went beyond the academic realm.  Not only did it render female students less confident in 
the classroom, it also hindered their post graduation employment options, she said.  Despite the 
fact that there are twice as many Iranian women than men with university degrees, their rate of 
unemployment is also twice as high.181  
Pooneh claimed that in terms of hiring, the University of Tehran was oriented toward 
men, citing her own cohort as an example.  Of her peers who graduated with literature degrees 
from the University of Tehran, none of the women were hired as university faculty, while four of 
the men from her class are now professors at the University of Tehran.  This was despite the 
merits and academic achievements of her female classmates, which ranged from ranking first in 
the Konkur to winning gold medals in all three levels of the Olympiad.   
Systematic gender discrimination, specifically targeting single women, continues into the 
Rouhani era.  In October 2015, the Majlis passed a bill that required marriage as a requisite for 
employment as a university professor or schoolteacher, as well as for obtaining a passport and 
for receiving funding for doctoral programs abroad.  The bill was named “A Plan for Increasing 
the Population and Enhancement of the Family,” and included the following objectives: 
To prioritize the employment of married men with children, then married men without 
children, then married women with children, then married women without children.  To 
employ single applicants should not be any problem as long as there are not any married 
applicants. 
 
To forbid the employment of single persons in the scientific boards of public and private 
universities, research centers or as teachers at all levels in the education system … 
exceptions could be make for genius singles.182 
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State sanctioned gender discrimination within both the academic realm and labor market, 
therefore, provide yet another reason for the socio-political disillusionment of Iran’s  
Millenials.183  
 
Conclusion 
Ahmadinejad’s two-term presidency coincided with the inception of the Post-Network 
Era, the result of an ongoing technological revolution that has transformed the nature of 
television.  An onslaught of new media technologies and distribution methods provided viewers 
with unprecedented choice and control over their television watching experience, which in turn 
raised their expectations of entertainment, convenience and mobility.  The primary force behind 
the inauguration of this Post-Network Era is the generation born after 1980, which has grown up 
accustomed to using a multitude of communication technologies.  Iranian Millenials fall into this 
demographic of media agnostics, who despite experiencing the attributes of the Post-Network 
Era at a delayed pace, exhibit a technological savvy that rivals their western counterparts and are 
only hindered in this regard by the limitations imposed by the authoritarian theocracy.  New 
distribution methods of the Post-Network Era began with DVD sales and have since evolved to 
Internet-deliverable television.  This is not yet an option in contemporary Iran, and the sale of 
DVDs remains the primary means through which Iranians engage in post-network era behaviors. 
In this chapter, I examined Shūkhī Kardam as an example of nonlinear prized content.  
The DVD distribution of this show permitted a more trenchant criticism of Iranian society, as the 
issues raised in the series included: a general distrust of official state organs, the dire economic 
state of the country, rampant corruption extant in all sectors of society and the overall precarious 
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situation of young Iranians.  Throughout this chapter I have demonstrated how the societal 
ailments broached in the show were exacerbated throughout Ahmadinejad’s presidential tenure 
and have thus led to a prevailing sense of disillusionment among the Iranian Millenial 
Generation.  This disillusionment, in tandem with the increasing reliance on convenience 
technologies that became normalized during this period, precipitated the adaptation of Post-
Network participatory culture among Millenial Iranians, which ultimately resulted in the 
emergence of a new media environment. 
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Spreadable Sooriland: Millenial Generation Culture Creation 
 
 
Sooriland is an Iranian web animation production company founded by Soroush Rezaee.  
Rezaee uses satire to criticize Iranian society in a way that specifically appeals to the Third 
Generation.  On August 6, 2013, Sooriland posted “Postmodern Beggars” on Facebook. The 
animation targets one of the more prominent facets of Millenial Generation identity, its obsession 
with social media, with a specific jab at the “liking” culture that has developed within this 
demographic. “Postmodern Beggars” was Rezaee’s break-through piece; it received more “likes” 
than any other Sooriland production (49,548 likes as of January 2017), was shared over forty 
thousand times, and essentially went “viral.” 
In, Spreadable Media, Henry Jenkins pushes back against the idea of “viral” media, and 
instead posits what he has termed “spreadable” media.  Spreadable media refers to content that is 
more prone to deliberate circulation.  It counters the concept of something going “viral,” which 
Jenkins likens to the spread of an infection, by putting agency back into the act of circulating.  
Jenkins defines circulation as a hybrid system, partially shaped by corporate decisions, but 
increasingly determined by “unauthorized” acts of circulation by grassroots groups and 
individuals.   These unauthorized acts of circulation serve to expand our role (as a collective of 
non-corporate individuals) in dictating how media travels through culture.  If spreadable media 
has the power to transform culture, as Jenkins argues, the act of circulation then generates 
cultural value and meaning.  This participation gives shape to our media ecosystem, and by 
extension, to contemporary culture.  As mentioned above, “Post-Modern Beggars” was shared 
almost as many times as it was liked on Facebook, rendering Sooriland an apt example of 
spreadable media.  
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In this chapter, I argue that Sooriland cartoons reflect the anxieties, insecurities and self-
criticisms of the audience with which they most deeply resonate, Millenial Iranians.  Drawing on 
Jenkins’s theory of spreadability, I contend that young Iranians create cultural value through 
liking, posting and sharing these animations.  The circulation of Sooriland animations thus 
contributed to the creation of a new media environment, in which the collective disillusionment 
of the Millenial Generation combined with its adaptation of Post-Network participatory 
practices, resulted in the emergence and ultimately the prevalence of a commodity culture as a 
definitive feature of contemporary Iranian society. 
 
Participatory Culture, Sooriland and the Third Generation 
Cultural studies have traditionally defined media consumption as an act of meaning 
production.  Circulation is also a creative act, in that individuals make deliberate decisions 
regarding the content that they share, with whom they share it and for what purpose. 
Participation is the process through which individuals circulate, reshape and deliver content to 
specific audiences, utilizing new systems of production and distribution that are independent 
from broadcasting corporations.  Jenkins contends that the ascendency of participatory culture 
(of the Post-Network Era) has fostered a media environment in which there is greater diversity 
and democracy over the kinds of content that is circulated; he thus posits a new media model in 
which value is no longer commoditized. 
Participatory culture, therefore, represents a counter force to the preponderance of 
network culture, as it accords individuals with the capacity to produce and circulate meaningful 
content.  Content takes on a new meaning each time it travels through a different network, and 
has various meanings for various segments of the population.  The meaning of content depends 
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on the network within which it is circulating.  Audiences create cultural value by sharing a media 
product and attributing meaning to it within their social network. As Jenkins observes, when 
content creators demonstrate an understanding of the values and sensibilities of a particular 
community, their product resonates more deeply with that specific audience and therefore 
accrues more meaning. 
Soroush Rezaee is a particularly remarkable content creator in the realm of Iranian social 
media and among Iran’s Millenial Generation.  An article in Hamshahri magazine lauded 
Rezaee’s animations as “extremely popular on social media,” to such a degree that “within a few 
hours they receive tens of thousands of likes.”184 At the time of the article’s publication, 
Sooriland’s Facebook page had approximately 100,000 followers; today, that number has 
reached over 330,000.  As Iranians have shifted over from Facebook to Instagram, Sooriland’s 
Instagram page reflects a more accurate representation of the brand’s popularity; as of February 
2018, it boasts 1.7 million followers.   
Sohrab commented on the relevance of Sooriland to the everyday life of contemporary 
Iranians.  He recalled how the first time he saw Sooriland, he was most impressed by the 
juxtaposition of an extremely simple animation style with such insightful commentary on 
everyday life in Iran.  He stated: 
 I saw that it was a very simple animation, I mean really simple regarding its make.  But it 
was very clear-sighted.  The most important characteristic of Sooriland is that it presents 
good thoughts and ideas.  The performance itself is very simple, like I think he uses flash 
software.  But the ideas are good. 
 
Sohrab’s observation reflects why Sooriland enjoys such popularity among the Millenial 
Generation; the animations demonstrate Rezaee’s ability to empathize with his audience. 
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During the interview with Hamshahri, Rezaee asserted that the average age of Facebook 
users in Iran is nineteen years old.  He attributed Sooriland’s popularity to its appeal to this 
demographic, claiming that young Iranians are more prone to like, post and share content.  
Rezaee also acknowledged that this was the reason for his page having more “likes” than that of 
Abbas Kiarostami, the world-famous, Oscar-winning director.  He stated, “The world is traveling 
toward virtual communications.  For this reason, perhaps a filmmaker, who does not have the 
patience to upload his film onto Facebook or the Internet, will not be valued.  His work won’t 
even be seen.”185  Rezaee’s description of Iran’s current media environment exemplifies 
Jenkins’s model of a new media ecosystem, in which value is no longer merely commoditized.   
 
Spreadable Media and the Green Movement 
Jenkins asserts that the growth of networked communication, in tandem with 
participatory culture, has facilitated new resources for various publics to have their voices heard.  
Social media proved to be one such resource, as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were the most 
significant platforms for participation during the 2009 Green Movement.  In the days that 
followed the 2009 presidential election, Iranian activists organized protests using Twitter to 
announce the time and place of gatherings, sending out tweets which were then re-tweeted again 
and again. The one hundred and forty character limit of Tweets guaranteed the wide circulation 
of the message through mobile phones, which would otherwise be hindered by slow data 
transfers.186  Throughout the month of June, #iranelection was tweeted more than ten thousand 
times per hour. The hashtag remained the highest-ranking global hashtag on Twitter for two 
                                                
185 Ibid. 
186 Andrea Duranti, “The Green Screen: Neda and the Lost Voices,” International Journal of Communication 7 
(2013): 1355. 
 105 
weeks following the presidential election, dropping momentarily after the unexpected death of 
Michael Jackson.187 
According to the Communications News Agency, there were a reported fifty million cell 
phones in use during the 2009 presidential election in Iran.  The introduction of the smart phone 
to Iran coincided with Ahmadinejad’s first time election, and initiated the Post-Network, Post 
Reform Era, rendering young Iranians particularly prone to a culture of “content sharing.”  Smart 
phones thus enabled and encouraged users to take photographs and videos and upload them onto 
social networking sites such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube.  Andrea Duranti observes that 
this burgeoning culture of content sharing has resulted in the creation of an “acephalous and 
unstructured community of young people around or under the age of thirty, used to 
communicating through the Internet.”188  Duranti unwittingly describes Lotz’s concept of “media 
agnosticism” as it has manifested among the Iranian Millenial Generation.  Within a week of the 
uprising, hundreds of amateur videos were filmed by protestors and bystanders on their mobile 
devices and uploaded onto the aforementioned social networking sites, giving rise to the 
phenomenon of citizen journalism.  Sohrab recalled: 
Those who had a VPN, or had access to other ways, would quickly spread the news.  
They would take videos with their cellphones and put them up.  The one new 
phenomenon that occurred in this field is citizen journalism.  They say that the 
foundation for citizen journalism took place in Iran in ’88.   
 
Sohrab described how citizen journalists countered state news reports of a calm and 
peaceful election aftermath by sending videos that they took of street clashes between protestors 
and state agents to the BBC.  The BBC would then broadcast these videos, thus exposing the 
falsity of official Iranian news reports.  As the number of these cases increased, Sohrab recalled 
that the Iranian state adapted the technique of insisting that the video clips were fabricated.  
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“This is why the Internet and cellphones were so important,” Sohrab said.  By posting, sharing 
and circulating videos, Iranians created meaning, positing an alternative reality to the situation 
that was reported and circulated by the Iranian state. 
The 2009 Iranian presidential election and its aftermath thus inspired a great deal of 
celebratory rhetoric regarding the political use and benefits of social media technologies.189  
Indeed social networking sites were considered vital to publicizing and circulating the Iranian 
political crisis, both to and among, a global audience. Sean Aday, however, asserts that Twitter 
and new media platforms were mostly consequential in conveying information about the protests 
to the outside world, citing that less than a hundred people were behind the in-country Twitter 
traffic during the Green Movement.  Aday’s report not only reaffirms that the outside world’s 
perception of the protests were primarily shaped by Twitter and amateur videos uploaded onto 
YouTube and Facebook, it also demonstrates how their circulation abetted meaning 
production.190  As Nima Naghibi observes, social media facilitates a marriage between 
immediacy and intimacy, thus providing a medium through which people can emotionally 
connect with one another.  He suggests that social media has conditioned people to privilege 
emotion over reason and posits that emotion acts as the driving force behind global action.  
Naghibi also contends that emotionally inspired action, particularly online activism, may 
manifest as what has been pejoratively termed as “slacktivism.”   
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Slactivism: The Myth of Resistance 
“Slacktivism” is a portmanteau of slacker and activism.  While the origins of the term is 
debated, Frank Clark and Dwight Ozard take credit for coining it during a seminar series that 
they held together in 1995.  Initially “slacktivism” had a positive connotation; Clark and Ozard 
used the term to refer to bottom-up, small-scale activities undertaken by young people to benefit 
society on a more personal level. The term gained prominence as websites and news platforms 
began to integrate social media sites into their interface, to provide people with the option of 
“liking,” “sharing” or “tweeting” something that they considered of value to their social 
network.191  Now days, slacktivism refers to electronic forms of political participation, such as 
signing Internet petitions, joining community organizations (without contributing to the 
organization’s efforts) and copying/pasting social network statuses or messages.  Evgeny 
Morozov uses the term to refer to easily performed activities that are more affective in making 
the participant feel good about himself rather than achieving a particular political goal.192 Henry 
Brady defines political participation as an “action by ordinary citizens directed toward 
influencing some political outcome.”193 Robert Putnam contends that the Internet has had a 
detrimental effect on civic engagement, while Stuart Shulman posits that Internet activities must 
effectively further political interests if they are to be considered on par with off-line forms of 
civic engagement.194  The main criticism against slacktivism, therefore, is that the activities it 
encompasses are incapable of achieving their intended political goals.  Thus, while scholars 
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lauded the benefits of social media technologies in perpetuating the Green Movement, Iranians 
acknowledged and even ridiculed the correlation of the revolutionary uses of social media for 
political purposes with slacktivism.  Rezaee conveyed this sentiment in the Sooriland animation, 
“Myths of Resistance.” 
Almost four years after the 2009 election and the Green Movement, Sooriland published 
“Myths of Resistance” on March 28, 2013. In this animation, the main character, Khafan 
Pesar,195 desperately seeks a means to connect to Facebook, which in Iran involves finding a 
filter-buster (fīlter-shekan) to allow access to the government-blocked site. Based on his urgent 
assertion that he has “work to do” on Facebook, one assumes that Khafan Pesar’s desperation is 
warranted by his need to partake in Internet activism.  Instead, once Khafan Pesar is able to get 
online and log onto Facebook, he immediately sets out to troll a random celebrity.  After an 
extensive session of “trolling,” he breathes a sigh of relief and declares that his conscience is 
clear.196   
Despite Rezaee’s critique of slacktivism in this animation, unprecedented use of social 
media during the Green Movement ultimately transformed Iran’s media ecology, to one that 
fostered a participatory culture, as Jenkins proposed.  Social media thus became a platform for 
convergence, a means through which Millenial Iranians could engage in collective action and 
intelligence, through sharing and circulating content that they attributed meaning to. 
 
The Internet in Iran 
In the Middle East, Iran was second only to Israel in gaining access to the Internet.  It was 
launched in 1992, at Iran’s Institute of Theoretical Physics and Mathematics, and quickly spread 
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throughout the country’s university systems.197  By 1995, Western news media were already 
reporting that, “If the computer geeks are right, Iran is facing the biggest political revolution 
since the Ayatollah Khomeini.”198  Sreberny and Khiabany propose that the Millenial 
Generation’s use of the Internet demonstrates a trend in twentieth century technological 
revolutions that have engendered generational change and political revolution.199  Sohrabi-
Haghighat, on the other hand, argues that new media does not reshape social structures in the 
actual world, but rather reflects already extant social and political conditions.200  The Islamic 
state encouraged the development and expansion of the Internet from its inception, specifically 
for the purposes of promoting revolutionary ideology and state propaganda.201  Seminaries in 
Qom and Mashhad were among the first institutions in Iran to embrace the Internet for 
educational purposes; it functioned as a new medium through which clerics could offer spiritual 
guidance.  Even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei launched his own website in 2004. 
M. Hadi Sohrabi-Haghighat and Shohreh Mansouri observe that in the domestic 
environment, the Internet functions to weaken a state’s repressive capacity by providing 
protestors with a venue in which they can evade state regulation.   The Internet facilitates the 
means through which social movements are able to challenge top-down hierarchies and influence 
and encourage participation in said movements. It provides social movements with the capacity 
to circumvent established mass media organizations, which are the gatekeepers of news and 
events, and thus allows insurgents access to an independent venue to spread their messages.  In 
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doing so, social movements can contend with the narratives produced by the mass media.202  
Indeed communication among insurgents plays a vital role in the development of any social 
movement and without it the survival of the movement is highly unlikely.203  Echoing part of 
Aday’s assertion, Sohrabi-Haghighat and Mansouri argue that ICTs204 functioned to enhance 
political opportunities during the Green Movement by providing the means to reach international 
allies, however, they assert that this functions to simultaneously weaken the repressive capacity 
of the state.  
After China, Iran is said to boast the toughest Internet control and filtering system in the 
world, facilitated by its own scientific innovations in the field.  For example, the Iranian state has 
devised ways of manipulating new media for its own purposes, by constructing fronts, 
infiltrating anti-government networks for information gathering and spreading messages to its 
own advantage.  Furthermore, the Iranian state has made major purchases from technological 
behemoths, such as Nokia Siemens, which it later renamed Nokia Networks, to enhance its 
position within the cyber battlefront.205  
Control over the Internet in Iran greatly intensified after the first election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in 2005, and continues to the present day.206 While the state began a policy of 
blocking and filtering certain sites such as Facebook and YouTube, Millenial Iranians have 
developed a high level of technological literacy and apply it to circumventing government 
controls and restrictions, through such devices as filter breakers and VPNs.  Siamdoust observes 
that before the 2009 election, it had been possible to easily bypass filters by using VPN 
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connections.  Following the unrest in 2009, however, the Iranian state found ways to disable all 
VPN networks; at times of heightened turmoil, the government either shut down the Internet 
completely or brought it down to such a slow speed that it became virtually useless.207  Sepideh 
recalled that the Internet was down for three days during the Green Movement, hindering people 
from even making phone calls or sending text messages.  Despite this, the Iranian state will not 
shut down the most popular social media platforms because it reaps benefit from them.  
Khamenei has a Facebook profile, an Instagram Page (with 1.6 million followers) and a twitter 
account (with 452,800 followers), all of which are part of the Post-Network, Post-Reform media 
environment that has been created and maintained through Third Generation participation (i.e. 
liking, posting and sharing on social media). 
 
Iranian Facebook Culture 
The aforementioned “Postmodern Beggars” propelled Sooriland to its position of 
immense popularity among the Millenial Generation.  In the interview with Hamshahri 
magazine, Rezaee discussed how he had thought about the subject of this particular animation 
for over a year.  He stated, “This ‘culture of liking’ had been bothering me for some time.  I felt 
that it had really become like begging.  They always say, ‘How many likes does it have?’ 
(Chand-ta “like” dare?) or ‘Click that like!’ (Bezan like-o).208  In this animation, Rezaee 
critiques the Iranian social media environment, in which “likes” have become commoditized.  
The animation’s immense popularity and high level of circulation, however, exemplifies 
Jenkins’s theory of spreadability.  Third Generation Iranians deliberately shared and circulated 
the animation because it resonated with them.  In doing so, they attributed value and new 
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meaning to the content.  Rezaee’s critique of Iranian Facebook culture has thus become a part of 
Iranian youth identity.  As the animation’s targeted audience, the Millenial Generation’s 
participation in the spread and circulation of the animation reified the value of the content within 
contemporary Iranian culture.  A close reading of the animation reveals how. 
In Iran’s bigger cities, similar to many other third world countries, it is quite common for 
mendicants to approach vehicles waiting in traffic to beg for money.  In “Postmodern Beggars,” 
Rezaee parodies this very familiar scenario, but instead of asking for money, the beggars ask for 
“likes.”  The animation begins with the Driver sitting behind the wheel, singing the pop tune, 
“Nastaran” to himself, when he is approached by a beggar who asks for a “like.”  The Driver 
responds that he does not have any “likes” to give, with the same annoyance often exhibited by 
Iranian drivers approached by beggars while waiting behind the traffic light.  A number of 
beggars subsequently approach the Driver, all attempting to solicit likes for their respective 
Facebook pages.  Each beggar represents an exaggerated aspect of Iranian Facebook culture that 
Rezaee deems worthy of derision.  Beggar #2 claims to be the administrator of the “Chosnāleh209 
Page of Serīshtī” and flashes a photograph of an Iranian artist in her underwear.  This character 
epitomizes a belief that Iranian Facebook users are attracted to spectacle.  Beggar #3 approaches 
the car and introduces himself as a representative from the “Bald People Prohibited” page.  He 
says, “The boys should leave comments and the girls should like so that we can see who is more 
numerous.  Then, both genders should share so that our group’s membership increases and a 
greater number of people can make use of the educational information that we offer.  Now, will 
you like or will you comment?”210 This character ridicules the Facebook protocol that had 
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developed among Iranian Facebook users of including a stipulation regarding the actions that 
must be taken by each gender. The Driver agitatedly waves the beggar away and says, “Neither, 
I’m not interested.”  Beggar #4 says, “I have a beautiful sentence: A person can be missing a leg, 
as long as he’s not a grasshopper-eater.”211  The Driver angrily retorts, “Get lost, racist!” and 
rolls up his window, just as the Beggar protests, “No, but we had the first human rights 
charter!”212  This exchange not only mocks the racism that is still prominent in today’s Iran, but 
also the overzealous patriotism that appears in Iranian social networking culture.  A 
“grasshopper-eater” is a derogatory term for an Arab in today’s colloquial Persian.213  Beggar #5 
presents a picture (of Zinedine Zidane) and says, “This child suffers from Cholera.  Every night 
his father rapes him and every morning, his mother pours acid down his throat.  This child will 
die within two weeks.  I mean that I really want you guys to break the record of likes for this 
one!”214  The Driver responds with annoyance, “What like?  What part of this situation deserves 
a like?!”215  The Beggar answers, “No, each like is actually a dislike.”216  The Driver gets into an 
altercation with the Beggar, arguing that a “like” does not convey aversion and that “liking” a 
disdainful situation is counterintuitive, while the Beggar insists that a “like” actually indicates a 
“dislike.” 
Frustrated with all of the beggars, the Driver rolls up his window and angrily declares 
them all to be crazy.  A beggar suddenly appears in his backseat and tells the Driver to type the 
number “37” so that the light will turn green.  This character mocks the chain letter-type status 
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updates that suddenly became rampant on Facebook in 2013.  The Driver, fed up with the 
beggars, yells outs, “You’re all driving me crazy!” opens his car door and runs out into traffic.  
He is chased by all of the “beggars,” who continue to solicit likes from him, is hit by a car and 
dies.  One of the beggars says, “Oh no, poor thing deactivated!  Let’s leave,” and the beggars 
disperse.217  
The Postmodern Beggars equate death with Facebook deactivation, but even when the 
Driver is dead, he has no peace.  The representatives from both Heaven and Hell continue to 
pester the Driver for likes, implying that there is no escape from the absurdity of Facebook 
“liking” culture.  The animation ends with a eulogy for the “like-deprived” souls of Iran.  Rezaee 
further explained his view on the liking culture that has emerged in Iran.  In his interview with 
Hamshahri, he stated: 
This “like” is a worthless click.  But from the psychological perspective, a person 
believes that he receives validation.  He thinks to himself that within one hour, five 
hundred people have liked his post, which means that five hundred people have paid 
attention to him.218 
 
Due to the immense popularity of this particular animation, and drawing on Jenkins’s theory of 
spreadibility, we can conjecture that this cartoon resonated deeply with the Iranian Millenial 
Generation because it conveys a criticism of the demographic that the audience itself 
acknowledges. 
Arjun Appadurai describes social networking sites as technologies for imagination, which 
function to create communities of sentiment or groups that “imagine” and feel things together.219  
The Facebook culture that has evolved in Iran certainly correlates with Appadurai’s assertion, as 
the action of “liking” allows Facebook users to feel camaraderie with a larger community.  By 
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engaging in the same action (“liking”), Facebook users voice similar inclinations and 
sympathies, thus creating an imagined community of shared sentiment.  “Postmodern Beggars” 
demonstrates how Appadurai’s claim manifests in contemporary Iran. Indeed, Iranian Facebook 
users create and join imagined communities of shared sentiment, but these communities are often 
racist, chauvinist, voyeuristic, vulgar and often founded on inane ideas.  Hamrah expressed 
exasperation with the “liking” culture that has developed among his generation.  He stated: 
There really are some people who are actually after likes.  Like the guy, as soon as he 
wakes up, thinks about how many followers he has on Instagram.  Likes are bought and 
sold, I’ve heard.  Because you know, in Tehran, and big cities, but especially in Tehran, a 
generation has come into existence that is brainless.  I don’t like to generalize, but this 
has happened.  They are brainless.  All of their values are based on appearance.  The 
boys, they all go to the gym, have six-packs, biceps, etc.  They all have fake tans and lips 
like this (he pouts) … and these are the guys!  They inject fillers into their cheeks.  Their 
teeth are all veneers.  And all of them look the same.  The girls, on the other hand, all of 
them get breast augmentations and inject their cheeks and lips with fillers. Their makeup 
is all the same.  Their hairstyles are all the same.  Even the way they talk is all the same.  
Everyone is the same.  It’s like they’ve been cloned.  These people, they’re brainless, and 
they get along with one another.  They “like” each other.  In their own world, they lead 
very normal lives. 
 
Hamrah’s comment demonstrates how the acting of “liking” has not only become commoditized, 
but has also become the means of value production within Iranian Millenial culture.  Trends 
within this demographic are validated through likes and shares.  Jenkins observes that as people 
circulate texts more broadly, they also make assessments of the value of these texts as a resource 
for social exchange.220  People appraise the content that they encounter based on their own 
personal standard; they share material in conformance with its anticipated value within their 
social circle.221  Jenkins reminds us that the simple act of “liking” (a status, post, picture) 
determines what material gets spread and by extension, is a significant step in the production of 
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culture.  Hamrah’s quote demonstrates how Iranians reify their culture through the act of “liking” 
representations of it on social media.  
Jenkins contends that social media has facilitated audience behaviors that were once 
considered niche or fringe to become commonplace and mainstream.222  An example of this and 
the commodification of likes can be witnessed in Sooriland’s “The Truthful Shepherd,” which 
was published on Facebook on February 19, 2014.223  This parody of Aesop’s fable, “The Boy 
Who Cried Wolf,” again mocks Iranian social media culture, but its circulation points to the 
actual sense of disillusionment that pervades the Millenial Generation. As discussed earlier, the 
Green Movement provided the stage for a proliferation of activism and citizen journalism, as 
Iranians (primarily of the Millenial Generation) rushed to take photographs and upload them 
onto social media sites.  They did so, not only to expose the tyranny of the Iranian state, but also 
to maintain the momentum of the movement.  Scenes of state-sanctioned repression and violence 
were filmed and/or photographed and uploaded onto Twitter, YouTube and Facebook.  As 
Jenkins observes, a media text often enjoys a high degree of spreadability because it portrays a 
controversy that a community cares about at a particular instance.  The most famous example of 
this was the aforementioned capture of Neda Agha Soltan’s death.  The video of Neda’s death 
spread because it so aptly articulated the sentiment of Millenial Iranians at the height of Green 
Movement turmoil.  It became the rallying cry for this demographic because it conveyed the 
brutality of the Iranian state, and the Millenial Generation’s reason for protesting, within a matter 
of seconds.  As Jenkins observes, content spreads when it articulates a community’s stance on an 
issue at a precise time, better than what community members believe they themselves can 
convey. 
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In this animation, however, Rezaee echoes the main critique of slacktivism, depicting 
scenarios in which the videoing/photographing of an incident does little to help the victim/the 
cause, and is done so only for the sake of posting a picture that will yield the maximum number 
of “likes.”  In regards to this matter, Rezaee asserts that Iranian social media users are not even 
concerned with providing original content and are completely comfortable “stealing” and 
“sharing” someone else’s status or picture.  He says, “That is not even important to them.  What 
is important to them is the number of likes.  Even unethical acts such as putting up personal 
pictures are considered permissible as long as they receive likes.”224  A close reading of “The 
Truthful Shepherd” points to the evolution of the Iranian social media environment post Green 
Movement, in which likes became commoditized. 
In this animation, the townspeople gather to supposedly come to the aid of the Shepherd 
crying “wolf.” But instead of actually helping the Shepherd under attack, the townspeople take 
photographs of the spectacle. In the following scene, the townspeople upload and post pictures of 
the maimed Shepherd onto Facebook.  Rezaee’s first comedic jab comes in the form of the 
names of the townspeople.  Similar to “Myths of Resistance” in which the main 
character/supposed activist was called “Khafan Pesar” (Awesome Boy), the names of the 
townspeople in the “Truthful Shepherd” are meant to ridicule the vapidity of this social-media 
savvy generation.  The first name mentioned, Gholam Gherti, translates as “Gholam the Dandy.”  
Gholam Gherti’s picture post of the Shepherd being attacked by the wolf and its caption, “Who 
should be held accountable?” mocks Iranian Facebook activism, implying a lack of action on the 
part of Gholam Gherti and the demographic he represents.  Hassan Ghashang, whose name 
translates as “Pretty Hassan,” furthers this critique by mocking the Green Movement rallying 
cry, “Natarsīn! Natarsīn!  Mā hame bā ham hastīm!” (Do not fear!  Do not fear!  We are all 
                                                
224 Hamshahri, September 14, 2013. 
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together) by posting a photo of the wolf attacking the Shepherd with the caption, “Do not fear, 
man!  We are all behind you!”  Hākhān Mobārez-e Vatan225 ridicules those Facebook “activists” 
that use Facebook/social media as a platform to insult the hierarchical establishment.  His alias 
“Defender of the Nation” is also a jab at overzealously nationalist Iranians.  Khadkhodā 
Mavālpūr’s picture of the bare-bottomed Shepherd represents not only those Facebook users who 
share photos out of context, but also those who show little or no empathy for the situation 
pictured in the photo, and instead only seek “likes.” 
In the final scene of the animation, Rezaee depicts the immoral means and lengths to 
which Iranians will supposedly go in order to take the ultimate, like-inspiring picture.  In this 
scene, the Shepherd is shown as an invalid beggar who holds up a bear mask in order to hide his 
identity and avoid allowing people the opportunity to take his picture in such a pitiful state.  A 
passerby tricks the Shepherd into dropping his mask, by offering him money.  He quickly snaps a 
photograph in the brief moment that the Shepherd brings his hand down to collect the alms.  The 
Shepherd responds, “May your aunt get raped by an impotent bear!  Don’t take pictures!  Please, 
don’t take pictures!  Give me that camera!  Let me see it!  Wait!  I have dignity!”226  The 
Shepherd then knuckle-walks after the photographer and the narrator states, “And so it was.”227 
The Shepherd attempts to chase down the insolent passerby, but it is comically obvious that he 
will not succeed.  The Devil’s final commentary at the end of the animation, that it would have 
boded better for the shepherd had he lied, as in the original story, reiterates the sense of 
disillusionment that pervades Iranian society.  Indeed, had the shepherd lied, as in the original 
fable, perhaps he would not be in such a miserable condition.  Instead, despite his sincere plea 
for help, the Shepherd’s hardship only serves as fodder for a spectacle-hungry public. 
                                                
225 “Defender of the Nation” 
226 Rezaee, “Chūpān-e Rāstgū,” Sooriland. 
227 Ibid. 
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Vashti discussed how the animation reflected her generation’s propensity for gathering 
and capturing spectacle on photo or film, with the hope of snapping a “like-worthy” shot.  She 
referred to the Plasco Building fire, which occurred in Tehran, on January 19, 2017, stating: 
I agree that in Iran they have really let the stink out228 for taking pictures.  You can see it 
in the events like the terrorist attack229 that took place, or when Plasco burned down.  A 
lot of people gathered just to take pictures, despite the fact that it was dangerous.  I 
haven’t seen this anywhere else.  Like the fire in London. I didn’t see people gather like 
this to take pictures or film, for example.  Or it’s common in Iran that when there is a 
fight, people will gather and take pictures and videos.  From what I’ve seen in Iran, this 
happens a lot.   
 
Vashti’s comment demonstrates the preponderance of the “like” and more broadly, social media, 
as a significant force shaping contemporary Iranian culture.  Richard Senett discusses the power 
of the “like” using an economic framework.  He observes that historically, craftsmen were not 
only monetarily compensated for their work, but reaped intangible rewards such as recognition, 
appreciation, status, satisfaction and pride in a job well done.230  For this reason Sennett contends 
that various and multiple networks shape cultural production within a commercial economy, 
which cannot be reduced to mere economic rewards.  Thus, within peer and open exchange, 
status, prestige, esteem and relationship building replace remuneration as the primary force 
behind cultural production and social transaction.  “Likes” represent these alternative motives.  
Saba’s comment suggests that Iranian culture is prone to abide by Sennett’s model. 
 While Rezaee satirizes the Millenial Generation’s post-Green Movement fixation with 
capturing spectacles to post on social media, the circulation of this animation reifies the satirical 
critique that it offers.  It effectively became a metaphor for the disenchantment of young Iranians 
who had believed in the promise of change in Iranian society and had advocated for it within the 
theoretic framework of the velāyat-e faqīh.  They were not only disappointed with the failure of 
                                                
228 A colloquial expression that means  
229 The June 7, 2017 ISIS attack on Iran’s parliament building and the tomb of Khomeini. 
230 Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (New Have: Yale University Press, 2008). 
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the Reform Movement, but were then subjected to the Ahmadinejad administration.  Their hopes 
dashed, they came to realize that their utopian religious democracy was in fact an unattainable 
goal.  This disillusionment not only manifested in an apathetic complacency regarding the 
political state of the country, it also nurtured a new social media environment defined by the 
commodification of “likes” and abetted the burgeoning of a commodity culture. 
 
The Rich Kids of Tehran 
As Jenkins observes, commodity culture emphasizes personal expressions of freedom, 
upward social mobility, escape from constraint and the enabling of new possibilities.231  Within 
this commodity culture, brands are sustained by aspiration; they are assigned values based on the 
fantasies they inspire, which depend on whether one can afford to buy them.232  The social media 
environment that evolved during the Ahmadinejad era served to enhance a commodity-driven 
culture among Millenial Iranians, which in turn is reflected in the prominence of class identity in 
today’s Iran. 
A neoliberal mentality has become prevalent in contemporary Iran, as Millenial Iranian 
are quick to tell you that everything is available in Iran, one just needs to have the money for it.  
While Khosravi asserts that Iranian youth culture is dictated by generation rather than class, 
Olszewska observes that the wants and desires of upper-class Iranian youth are not the same as 
that of lower-class Iranian youth. Wealthy Millenial Iranians dictate many of the prevalent trends 
of today’s Iranian youth culture, as they are not restricted by monetary limitations.  Meanwhile, 
many young Iranians from the lower economic echelons aspire to partake in the socio-cultural 
trends set by the wealthy.  Class-consciousness is thus expressed through consumerism. 
                                                
231 Jenkins et al., Spreadable Media, 203. 
232 Ibid., 103. 
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On September 1, 2014, Sooriland published an animation entitled “ALS?!”233 The 
animation begins with a male figure with “six-pack” abs in a green speedo, standing next to a 
pool, a grand piano and a luxury SUV, holding a red bucket.  He states, “I am currently in my 
private villa, along with my SUV with a sunroof, royal grand piano and my dad’s pool.  I will 
participate in the ice bucket challenge and I challenge Kamran, Nooshin and Fereshteh to 
participate.”234  A voice (presumably of the cameraman) says, “My boy, you haven’t even 
mentioned the actual matter at hand!”235  The six-packed speedo character asks, “What is the 
actual matter?”  The voice responds, “ALS?!”  The boy then responds, “Ah-ha!  23/M/Tehran … 
and I’m recently single!”  He pours the ice water on his head, screams out “Vay! Vaaayyy! 
Vaaaaayyyyy!” in an exaggeratedly effeminate way, and dives into the pool, thus ending the 
animation.236 
In this media text, Rezaee criticizes the Tehran elite and the popularity of the viral ALS 
challenge among this demographic.  The green speedo-wearing participant of the challenge is 
identifiable as a member of the upper class, due to his accouterments (private villa, SUV with 
sunroof, royal grand piano and his father’s swimming pool).  When asked about the actual matter 
at hand, ALS, the participant responds in such a way that it is obvious he has no idea about the 
disease or the campaign to raise money and awareness for it.  He mistakes ALS for A/S/L, which 
stands for “age/sex/location,” a commonly used acronym in Internet chat rooms.  In this 
animation, Rezaee mocks the ignorance of the upper-class elite that engaged in the ice bucket 
                                                
233 This refers to the ALS ice bucket challenge.  The ALS ice bucket challenge involves the dumping of ice water 
onto one’s head in order to promote awareness of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) or what is known in the 
United States as Lou Gehrig’s disease.  The ice bucket challenge went viral on social media during July and August 
of 2014.  The challenge encouraged nominated participants to be filmed while pouring a bucket of ice water on their 
heads and nominating others to similarly perform the challenge.  Nominated participants were to either comply 
within twenty-four hours or forfeit by making a charitable financial donation. 
234 Rezaee, “A L S ?!” Sooriland, https://www.facebook.com/SooriLand/videos/815933785104423/, September, 1, 
2014. 
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challenge simply because it was trendy and not because they had any idea about what they were 
supporting.  Once the green-speedo character pours the ice water on his head, he lets out a very 
effeminate yell.  In this way, Rezaee criticizes the rich kids of Iran, pointing out the sheep-like 
tendency of this group, and while depicting the demographic as foppish and oblivious to any 
kind of actual hardship. 
The immense popularity of this cartoon indicates that Iranian Millenials can either relate 
to or agree with Rezaee’s portrayals of class discrepancies, while its circulation reified his 
criticism.  Less than two weeks after the publication of this animation, a new Instagram page 
entitled “The Rich Kids of Tehran” (RKOT) made its debut. RKOT launched on September 13, 
2014; within three weeks, the account had attracted almost one hundred thousand followers.  
Modeled after the Rich Kids of Instagram page, RKOT showcased the obscenely opulent 
lifestyle of the Tehran elite, by publishing photographs of mansions, expensive sports cars, 
private jets, designer watches, poolside lounging, scantily-clad women partying and the 
consumption of an exorbitant amount of alcohol.  This garish representation of the privileged 
Iranian elite went viral.  It was featured on many major Western media outlets, before the Iranian 
government shut it down for its “vulgar” content on October 9, 2014.237  The page was 
unblocked less than a week later with a disclaimer that the pictures of alcohol and women in 
bikinis were actually taken by Tehranis living outside of Iran and that “all the young people 
featured in this account respect the government rules.”238  Despite appeasement of the Islamic 
regime’s censure, the exhibition of the Tehrani elite lifestyle continues to have a particular allure 
                                                
237 “Iran Blocks Instagram Account of ‘Rich Kids’ Showing Off Wealth in Tehran,” The Guardian, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/09/iran-blocks-instagram-richkidsoftehran-young-elite, October 9, 
2014. 
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among Iranians, as the RKOT Instagram page (which is now private) has expanded to both 
Twitter and Snapchat, and is active in all three realms of social media. 
Pooneh believed that the behavior ridiculed by Rezaee in the ALS animation is also 
prevalent among the middle class.  Vashti, however, disagreed and was adamant that this was 
more a characteristic of The Rich Kids of Tehran, or the upper-class elite.  She countered 
Pooneh’s claim, retorting, “How many middle class homes have a pool in Iran?!”  Pooneh 
responded that it only requires one person “from above” to have a pool and invite the rest.  Her 
comment suggests the clout that wealthier Iranians boast among the Millenial Generation.  The 
ardent fervor for upward socio-economic mobility that Millenial Iranians are believed to harbor 
actually inspires critical reflection on the role of class within today’s Iranian society by the 
generation’s own members.  Hamrah expressed a such a sentiment, stating: 
In all the other countries that I’ve been to, if someone says, “I don’t have a job; all I do is 
sleep all day, go to the gym and tan,” or “I wear make up and this is how I spend my time 
and my daddy buys me a new car,” no one likes this person.  They’ll say that the guy is 
leeching off his dad.  But in Iran, it has become something bā-hāl (cool).  It’s of value.  
It’s a social value.  The guy has a rich father and he’s totally alāf (shiftless).  It’s like this 
in all of the cities in Iran.  It has a direct relationship with money.  The guy who is rich in 
Ahvaz lives the same way … does the same things … has the same pastimes and leisure 
activities. 
 
Hamrah’s comment suggests that he perceives his generation to understand indolence as an 
indication of wealth and thus exhibits a tendency to glorify it.  As he states, it is “cool” to be idle 
because it is perceived that the person is financially able to be so. 
 Based on the criticism conveyed in Sooriland’s satire and the accounts of my informants, 
I posit that class identity plays a definitive role, not only in Iran’s contemporary youth culture, 
but also in the greater scheme of Iranian society.  Today’s Iran reflects the amalgamation of the 
Islamic Republic’s sustained neoliberal economic policies, the sociopolitical disenchantment of 
the Millenial Generation and a Post-Network media environment that has encouraged the 
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propagation of a commodity culture.  The combination of these circumstances has ultimately 
resulted in a society dictated through class politics.  The vital role that social media has played in 
the emergence of this commodity culture and the reification of class identity as a prominent 
feature of Iranian society has been facilitated by the Post-Network, Post-Reform media 
agnosticism boasted by Iran’s Millenials, rendering this demoraphic a remarkably tech-savvy 
generation. 
 
Regarding the New Generation: Tech-Savvy Apathy 
As Thomas Friedman observes, the development of the Internet browser has effectively 
expanded the reach of transnational capitalism, by enabling goods and content to move across 
national borders more fluidly.  Jenkins draws on Friedman to assert that while spreadable media 
increases the power of people to shape their media environment, there can be no expectation of a 
specific outcome.  He contends that the evolution of media platforms and content creation is an 
inescapable consequence of technological development.  The kind of culture that people produce 
and spread through these technologies does not follow a pre-determined course.  In the case of 
Iran, increased participation in the post-Green Movement social media environment fostered the 
growth of a commodity-driven culture, which in turn has played a significant role in molding and 
shaping Iran’s Millenial Generation.  Sooriland’s “Regarding the New Generation” series 
demonstrates how Millenial Iranians criticize the sense of complacent apathy that Internet 
technology and social media has supposedly promoted among their generation, which coupled 
with the prevalence of commodity culture, has initiated a breakdown of the traditional patriarchal 
structures of Iranian culture and society. 
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On April 14, 2015 Sooriland published “Father’s Last Words.”  A close reading of this 
animation reveals how Millenial Iranians formulate spreadable content that will ensure the 
highest degree of circulation.  The animation begins with a father sitting on the floor, leaning 
against the wall with a blanket over his legs, in the traditional Iranian fashion.  His three sons (all 
dressed in yellow shirts, wearing round framed glasses, sporting clean-shaven faces and cropped 
hair cuts) are all holding their cellphones with selfie sticks and sitting in a row. There is a rug in 
the center of the room and a samovar in the corner between the boys and their father.  The father 
says, “Someone bring me a twig, stick, something … I want to give you my last piece of 
advice!”239  The boys hold out their selfie sticks.  The father continues, “Well done.  Now, I want 
each of you to break your stick in half!”240  The son closest to the father turns to his brother and 
says, “He’s starting to become delirious,” while the last one in the row turns to the others and 
says, “He’s completely lost it.”241  The father yells out, “Well, what are you doing?! Break your 
sticks!”242  At this point one of the sons comes over and sits next to his father.  He tells his father 
to smile and takes a selfie with his phone (that is mounted on the selfie stick) and says, “Me and 
my father, all of a sudden (yehoi).”243  Another son comes over to their father and tells him not to 
move, while his brother also smiles for the camera and says, “Our last picture with Dad at the 
end of his life.”244  The son who took the photograph walks away and the father dies.  The son 
still standing by his father says, “Father, why have you died?!”245  He then kneels down next to 
his dead father, takes a photograph (with his selfie stick) and says, “The first picture of our 
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dearly departed and I.”246  He then says, “Location: Zafarānīeh.  Hashtag mourning.  Hashtag 
sadness.  Hashtag we are now orphans.”247 
Instead of humoring their dying father, the boys are more concerned with the 
spreadability of their Instagram posts.  The first son to take a picture of himself and his father 
captions the photograph, “Me and my father all of a sudden (yehoī).”248  In 2015, the “yehoī”/“all 
of a sudden” hashtag rendered content extremely spreadable among Iranian social media users.  
The utilization of this particular hashtag evokes a sense of levity and amusement.  Originally the 
hashtag was used to describe or tag an instantaneous moment, but its popularity soon gave way 
to more creative interpretations and uses.  It began to be used with inanimate objects and in 
certain scenarios in which an impromptu description was absurd and therefore comical.  By 
depicting a character that utilizes the “all of a sudden” hashtag for a picture with his dying father, 
Rezaee mocks the aloofness of the Millenial Generation.  The second son to take a photograph 
with his father tells his dying father to smile for the camera, and captions the photograph, “Our 
last photo with Dad at the end of his dying days.”  The most critical (and comical) moment in 
this animation is when the last son takes a photograph of their dead father.  He quickly declares 
the picture as the first of the dearly departed, and ensures further spreadability by tagging his 
location and adding hashtags.  Zafaranie is one the richest neighborhoods in Tehran.  Its 
inclusion demonstrates how socio-economic class is a significant factor in the spreadability of a 
particular cultural text.   
Rezaee’s satire reflects Millenial criticisms of the Instagram culture that has evolved in 
Iran’s current media environment.  The inclusion of the hashtags #mourning and #saddness, 
when there are no actual displays of either, specifically serves to increase the post’s 
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spreadability.  Greater spreadability ensures higher circulation, which translates to cultural value.  
As the text is shared among Millenial Iranians, the hashtags and location pin reify the cultural 
capital of the Tehrani upper class elite.  While the animation mocks the culture that currently 
characterizes Iran’s media environment, its circulation among the very audience that it mocks 
demonstrates how content accrues value in the Iranian media environment. That death is 
trivialized and revamped as just another Instagram post, with a location and hashtags specifically 
tailored to garner likes and followers, reiterates the preponderance of commodity culture among 
the Millenial Generation of Iran.  
This animation also indicates the breakdown of the patriarchal structures that are so 
essential to upholding the theocratic framework of the Islamic Republic. A harsh patriarchal 
attitude prevails in contemporary Iranian society that glorifies the father figure and his 
superiority over his children.  Iranian civil law legitimizes a father’s complete authority over his 
child, by endorsing physical punishment, even if it results in the death of the child.249  Despite 
this, Rezaae’s cartoon demonstrates that a shift in hierarchal power between fathers and sons has 
taken place in contemporary Iran.  Siamdoust observes that the Islamic Republic uses grief to 
perform and assert its identity as a tool of subjugation.  By politically enforcing a culture of 
grief, particularly as a mode of discipline and authority, the state reifies the paternalistic 
relationship it has with its subjects.250  By mocking certain aspects of this culture of grief through 
trivializing it to mere hashtags, Rezaee posits that Iranian Millenials are chipping away at the 
patriarchal foundations of the Islamic State.  The circulation of this animation, then, not only 
contributes to the shaping of Iran’s media environment, but it also generates meaning; it 
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actualizes Rezaee’s satire into a legitimate collective self-criticism of Iran’s Millenial 
Generation.  
The Islamic Republic’s social order is based on Islamic family ethics and values, which 
advocate a patriarchal family structure.  In this structure, the father protects and rules over his 
household.  The Sooriland animation described and analyzed in this section indicates a shift in 
the Iranian family structure, in which the patriarch is losing his absolute control of the family.  
The spreadability of the animation supports this notion, which is further bolstered by reports 
from my informants regarding their own family structures and the others that they have 
witnessed.  
 
Conclusion 
 Scholars of social movements in modern Iran have lauded the revolutionary power of 
new media technologies, from the print press during the Constitutional Revolution, to cassette 
tapes in the Islamic Revolution to social media in the Green Movement.  In accordance with the 
resistance trend that dominates Iranian studies, new media technologies are championed as 
potential tools of democratization.  It is important, however, to look beyond media technology’s 
role in resistance movements, as new platforms create apertures for social, culture, economic, 
legal and political changes.  Social media is therefore significant, not just because it is the newest 
form of media technology to be utilized in the propagation of social movements, but also because 
it provides a new platform for the creation of cultural value and meaning.  In the realm of 
cultural studies, media consumption is an act of meaning production.  Content that is passed 
along accrues value within a social network.  Humans rarely engage in meaningless activities; 
thus, when people circulate content, they do so with purpose.  As media texts are passed along, 
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they generate both value and worth.  Material spreads when it most powerfully speaks to the 
desires and anxieties of a particular community.  In this chapter, Sooriland animations serve as 
an example of spreadable media in the context of contemporary Iran.  Sooriland’s breakthrough 
piece, “Postmodern Beggars” was shared almost as many times as it was liked when it first 
debuted on Facebook in 2013, rendering it an extremely spreadable media text, with a high rate 
of circulation.  After the publication of “Postmodern Beggars,” Sooriland became intensely 
popular among Iranian Millenials, particularly due to the animation’s relatable content.  As 
previously mentioned, successful content creators are able to endear themselves to their audience 
by evoking a sense of shared experience.  Sooriland was and continues to be popular among 
young Iranians because it cleverly conveys many of the observations and criticisms that 
Millenial Iranians have about themselves, their culture and their society.  Rezaee’s animations 
not only reveal the prevalence of a commodity-driven culture among Iran’s Millenial Generation, 
but their spread and circulation demonstrate the prominence of class politics in Iran, which 
became blatantly noticeable during the Ahmadinejad administration.  As Jenkins observed, the 
shift across media industries from networked communication to engagement-based models 
rendered visible the work of active audiences in creating cultural value.  Thus the prominence of 
class identity within Millenial Iranian society has in large part been facilitated by the adaptation 
of Post-Network media practices.  At the same time, Millenial Iranians’ media agnosticism has 
rendered the generation preponderant in Post-Network Iran, and has notably contributed to the 
erosion of the patriarchal pillars that have historically upheld Iranian society; this historical shift 
suggests the transformation of Iran’s dominant culture from a tradition-bound patriarchy to a 
consumer-driven, class-based filiarchy.  Millenial Iran has thus emerged as a society 
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characterized by a prevalent commodity culture and defined by the prominence of class 
identities, the implications of which will be examined in the following chapter. 
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Trending in Tehran: Commodity Culture and Class Identity 
 
 
My informants unanimously agree that more wealth translates as more options for leisure 
activity in today’s Iran.  If youthfulness is defined as the pursuance of fun, and fun is a variable 
of wealth in contemporary Iranian society, then socioeconomic class plays a significant role in 
the determination of cultural capital among Iranian Millenials.  In Iran’s highly centralized geo-
social structure, the “norm” is often dictated by the trends that emerge out of the capital, Tehran.   
Affluent young Tehranis, therefore, dictate many of the trends and fashions that prevail among 
contemporary Iranian youth.  These trends are then propagated through the Post-Network media 
practices of the Millenial Generation. 
The advent of Post-Network technologies, such as social media and handheld Internet 
devices, has unleashed an unprecedented wave of narcissism throughout the urban world.  
Christopher Lasch and Hans Blumenberg have described the “celebration of self” and “self 
assertion” as the primary features of modernity.251  However, I contend that in Iran, this focus on 
the self is a consequence of the continued imposition of social strictures on a disillusioned youth 
population, facilitated through the advent and adaptation of Post-Network technologies.  
Following the trauma of the Post-Reform Era, the Green Movement and the Ahmadinejad 
administration, the Iranian Millenial Generation experienced a sociopolitical disenchantment that 
resulted in a shift of attention inward.  The self became understood as the arena in which young 
Iranians could exert the greatest degree of control.  At the same time, the neoliberalism that has 
defined Iran’s economy since the Reconstruction Era, in tandem with the embrace of Post-
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Network practices by Iran’s Millenial Generation, has resulted in the emergence and prevalence 
of a commodity culture. 
Throughout this chapter I examine the commodity culture of Post-Reform, Post-Network 
Iran, by exploring the various self-focused behaviors that it has engendered among Iran’s 
Millenial Generation.  I apply Arjun Appadurai’s understanding of commodities, 
commoditization and fashion to examine the dimensions of this commodity culture as it has 
materialized in contemporary Iranian society.  Millenial Iran’s commodity culture manifests as 
fashion, leisure activities, body modification, courtship rituals and sexuality, which I explore in 
that order, following a path that begins on the “outside,” examining prevalent practices exhibited 
by Iranian youth in public, to the “inside” where the most intimate behaviors take place.  My 
findings reveal that these trends serve to reify and perpetuate class identity as the definitive 
feature of Millenial Iran.  In this context, trends function as markers of socioeconomic class, 
which Iranians use as a type of class currency to signify the class group with which they identify 
or aspire to.  Many of these trends draw inspiration from the “West” or kharej, which in today’s 
Iran refers to an imagined concept that embodies what Iranians perceive to be western, combined 
with the deeply rooted traditions of the region.  The result of this is a unique youth culture, 
dictated by class identity and perpetuated by the Post-Network media practices that have 
prevailed in Millenial Iran.   
 
Fashionably Rich Famous Kids 
 
Arjun Appadurai notes that “fashion” is created through the control and restriction of 
commodities.252  In The Social Life of Things Appadurai proposes a shift in perspective on the 
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circulation of commodities.  He argues that if economic exchange creates value and value is 
embodied in the commodities that are exchanged, then we should focus on the actual things 
being exchanged rather than the forms and functions of the transfer.  Consumption, Appadurai 
contends, is a social, relational and active process.253  Fashion is a derivative of consumption; it 
is the rapidly changing criteria of “appropriateness” within a given society, which regulates the 
consumption demands of its adherents.254  According to Jean Baudrillard, fashion is the cultural 
medium through which objects move.255 
Werner Sombart was the first to theorize how the notion of romantic love and the demand 
for luxury goods led to the expansion of the capitalist system throughout the Western world.256  
He contended that notions of romantic love, companionate marriage and the refinement of sexual 
rituals in Europe, from 1300-1800, gave way to a political economy of courtship, driven by the 
nouveau riche, aristocracy and court’s demand for luxury commodities.  This, in turn, inspired 
the expansion of trade, industry and finance capital, resulting in the birth of modern capitalism, 
and culminating in the preponderance of fashion as a social mechanism.  Jean Baudrillard and 
Pierre Bourdieu applied Sombart’s theory to demonstrate how the establishments that dictate 
fashion and “good taste” (appropriateness) effectively limit social mobility and create a situation 
in which social rank is determined by elite experts who reside at the upper echelons of society.257  
Sombart’s conclusions regarding demand, the politics of fashion and the propelling power of 
sexuality as an economic force, as well as his ratiocination of the relationship between luxury 
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and necessity, not only resonate in the works of Western cultural theorists, such as Baudrillard 
and Bourdieu, but may also be applied to this study of Post-Network Millenial culture in Iran. 
The function of commodities within prestige economies in the modern world are 
preserved and perpetuated through a criterion of authenticity.  Drawing on the works of 
Baudrillard and Bourdieu, which focused on the political economy of taste as it manifested in 
modern day France, Appadurai notes that the notion of authenticity is driven by a complex 
collaboration and competition between experts and consumers.258  Authenticity is guaranteed 
through a system of expertise, credentialism and intellectual aestheticism, which according to 
Bourdieu are the hallmarks of a complex capitalistic society, and have ultimately resulted in the 
commoditization of knowledge about commodities.  As Appadurai observes, commodities within 
a fashion system represent intricate social forms, as well as a bilateral distribution of knowledge.  
He asserts that the knowledge required to produce primary commodities (necessities) tends to be 
standardized, while that which is required for the production of secondary commodities (luxury 
items) is much more arbitrary, as it is typically shaped by individual taste, judgment and 
experience.259  In addition to the [technical, social, aesthetic, etc.] knowledge that is required to 
produce a commodity, Appadurai contends that there is also a knowledge required for the 
appropriate consumption of the commodity.260  This model is apparent in Khosravi’s study of 
Third Generation culture, in which he observes that knowledge about the latest fashions and the 
“correct way” to consume is spread through personal networks.  He contends that the trendsetters 
in Tehran boast a particular attitude that their peers recognize as “modern,” which distinguishes 
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them from traditionally minded Iranians and affords them with a distinctive subcultural capital.  
One must know the right people in order to fall into the category of “cool” Tehrani, he asserts.261   
I observed this phenomenon in the context of Iranian Millenial culture through the 
concept of the bache marūf or the “Famous Kid.”  Hamrah explained: 
There’s a term, bache marūf (Famous Kid), in Tehran.  Like the guy is the Famous Kid of 
his neighborhood. Sa’ādatābād or Eckbātān or wherever; everyone knows him.  I used to 
live in Eckbātān, where my cousin, Saeed, was the bache marūf.  Then, gradually, he 
became the bache marūf of Tehran.  So whatever he wears, a series of people will imitate 
him.  Then you see it becomes a trend.   
 
Hamrah described how the Famous Kid of each neighborhood makes a round at the local 
shopping center once a week.  His audience is a series of Millenial Iranians who do not enjoy the 
same level of popularity, but are at the shopping center and take note of what the Famous Kid is 
wearing and replicate it.  In addition to setting fashion trends, Famous Kids also make certain 
places popular, as Hamrah stated:  
Tehran has a series of pātogh (hangouts).  In Vali Asr, there are these two towers.  There 
are no cafes, no coffee shops, no restaurants.  It’s just a business center that closes down 
at night.  But it is always crowded there.  People from the ages of twenty to twenty-
six/twenty-seven go walking there.  They park their cars and go walk.  They look at each 
other.  They talk.  They meet each other. Anyway, after a while the place becomes well 
known, and the Famous Kids stop going there.  In Tehran we say khaz262 …the khaz 
people all start coming and it becomes too crowded.  The security forces notice the traffic 
there, and so they patrol it for a couple of weeks, deterring people from going there.  
Then, the following week, some random kabob shop becomes the paātogh, because one 
of the Famous Kids starts going there.  They make a particular place a pātogh, and then 
everybody goes there.  But it always changes.  I’ve never seen a fixed place, like one 
place that is a hang out where all the cool kids go. 
 
Much of Iranian vogue is based on the perception of being fashionable.  This is a distinct 
characteristic of Iranian culture; a person is deemed modish, as long as they boast a few key 
insignia that attest to their fashion savvy.  The following Shūkhī Kardam monologue enjoyed a 
high degree of circulation among Third Generation Iranians: 
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 To be fashionable, you don’t have to follow every single fashion trend to a tee.  Just a 
few indicators are enough to reach the apex of perfection.  I mean there have been cases 
in which it has snowed and the guy, sitting on top of a toyūp (tube) has come down on a 
three-centimeter hill.  Then he hits a stone and runs headfirst into a pine tree.  Then he 
goes to Shemshack for half a day, rents ski clothes and gear, takes a picture, puts it on 
Facebook and captions it, “Once again, me and the snowy mountains that beckon me.”  
Meaning, when you look at the picture, you think the guy was born with skis on, has 
spent a lifetime skiing the powdery snow of the Rocky Mountains and at the end of his 
life, they will bury him at the base of the Alps.  This is called creativity!263 
 
This monologue not only mocks the notion of what it means to be “fashionable” among a 
particular class group, but it also indicates the significant role that social media plays in 
perpetuating the image of what it means to be a “cool” Iranian.  While social media serves as a 
vehicle for people to project a perception of their perfect lives the world over, one assumes that 
due to the imposition of social restrictions in Iran, social media is a necessary component in the 
introduction, spread and sharing of trends.  Hamrah, however, claims that his cousin, Saeed 
Kolooch, was famous even before the advent of social media; People recognized him from his 
rounds at the shopping center, he said.  But social media has greatly abetted Saeed Kolooch’s 
social status, as his Instagram account boasts nearly fifty thousand followers.   
Saeed Kolooch, therefore, possesses what Pierre Bourdieu describes as “cultural 
capital.”264  Within the Iranian symbolic market, social and cultural goods have different degrees 
of honor and prestige.  A bache marūf is one who boasts a higher degree of cultural capital than 
the people around him, which is what distinguishes him from his followers and demonstrates 
how culture is used as a form of currency for the expression of Millenial identity.  While style is 
typically based on an individual’s personal taste and preferences, some people hold greater 
power in dictating what is stylish and what is uncouth.265  Echoing this notion, based on the 
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trends that prevail among Iranian youth, I contend that Famous Kids are among the most 
influential trendsetters in contemporary Iran. 
Furthermore, certain types of behaviors and attitudes are deemed more fashionable in 
contemporary Iran than others.  Khosravi argues that hierarchy in Iran is defined by practices that 
emphasize cultural distinctions as a means of maintaining social stratification.  One of the most 
notable trends among Millenial Iranians is to boast a wealthy lifestyle.  Hannah commented on 
how ostentatious displays of one’s wealth is a trend that many contemporary Iranians emulate.  
She stated: 
Right now in Iran, it has become fashionable to have lavish parties for a child’s first 
birthday or his first tooth falling out, that are as extravagant as wedding receptions.  They 
reserve gardens for the events.  All of this is cheshm o ham cheshmi.266   
 
Hannah insisted that this was not just a case unique to her friends, and pointed to a number of 
such instances of these parties on her Instagram.  She claimed that her generation justifies these 
types of lavish expenditures based on what they see their peers doing on social media; they 
emulate it so as to not fall behind, she said, and continued: 
Even though Iran is rife with financial and economic problems, no one is content and 
satisfied with what they have.  People here (in the United States) try to have normal lives 
and just live well.  But in Iran, it’s all berīz o bepāsh (splurging).  Like the kinds of 
parties that they have in Iran, I have never seen here! 
 
Mostafa contended that the social restrictions imposed by the Islamic state on Iranian youth are 
the reason behind such ostentatious posturing.  He stated, “It is because Iranian youth are unable 
to just go out however they want.”  He claimed that young Iranians post pictures of themselves 
as a means to show the world how they actually live and look like.  “We aren’t what you see on 
the streets,” he said.  But in addition to correcting the world’s perception of contemporary Iran 
                                                
266 Cheshm o ham cheshmi roughly translates as “Keeping up with the Joneses,” and refers to competitive 
emulation. 
 138 
and Iranians, Mostafa mentioned that many (upper class) Iranians are also compelled by the 
desire to show off.  He referred to his Instagram, stating: 
Notice how people take pictures in Iran.  Like, if they’re taking a video in their car, and 
they have a nice car, usually at the end of the film they make sure that the make and 
model of the car is visible in the shot.  As if to say, “We are luxury.”  They want to show 
that they are “luxury.” 
 
My informants repeatedly referred to the word “luxury” while describing the prevalent trends 
among their demographic. They specifically used the English word “luxury,” which has become 
part of contemporary Iran’s vernacular.  This propensity for luxury is a notable characteristic of 
Post-Network Iran, as it reoccurs throughout various manifestations of Iranian Millenial Culture. 
 
Luxury Coffee Shops and Insufferable Behaviors: 
Coffee has long been a part of Persian culture, predating even the development of the 
Western world.  First cultivated in Ethiopia and Yemen, coffee quickly spread to the countries in 
closest proximity, making its way to Iran through the Ottoman Empire.  It was first mentioned in 
sixteenth century Safavid medical treatises, as a beverage with medicinal properties, but soon 
after became the beverage of choice served at both royal and popular social settings.  During the 
late sixteenth century, Safavid Iran witnessed the establishment and spread of coffee houses, 
both within the capital (Esfahan) and beyond, thus pointing to the historical centrality of coffee 
within the Iranian public sphere.267  However, the demise of the Safavid Empire in the early 
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eighteenth century, and the retrenchment of public life that accompanied the subsequent period 
of political turmoil, resulted in a reduction in the overall consumption of the beverage.268  
The establishment of the Qajar dynasty in the early nineteenth century revived trade and 
social life in Iran, which materialized as an increased consumption of imported commodities.  As 
Iran integrated into the world economy in the 1800s, it developed a commercial relationship with 
the Russian empire, which facilitated the introduction of the samovar to the Qajar royal court and 
ultimately precipitated Iran’s conversion to a tea-drinking nation.269  By 1880, tea/coffeehouses 
had become a regular feature of Iran’s urban landscape.  Revelry once again entered the café 
space, as the social consumption of tea became associated with the accompaniment of itinerant 
entertainers.  In the early twentieth century, during the Constitutional Revolution, however, the 
tea/coffeehouse transformed to a place where people gathered to hear political news.  The 
emergence and proliferation of tea/coffeehouses, therefore, created a public sphere that posed a 
threat to the authority of the state.270  
Dissident café culture in Tehran goes back to the 1940s, when the modernization of 
Tehran’s urban landscape took off.  Back then, Café Naderi served as a bastion for Iran’s 
intellectual elite and was frequented by prominent literary figures such as Sadegh Hedayat, Jalal 
Al-e Ahmad, Simin Daneshvar and Nima Yooshij.271  After the 1979 revolution, the Iranian 
government closed down many coffee shops, allegedly to combat the Western cultural onslaught.  
In contemporary Iran, the coffee shop serves as a bulwark of leisure in an otherwise restricted 
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environment. It provides a place where young Iranians can feel free of inhibitions, and as a 
result, Millenial Iranians comprise the majority of the country’s coffee shop patronage. 
From 2006-2011 there was a five-fold increase in coffee imports into Iran, and coffee 
shops proliferated all over the country to accommodate the new practice of kāfeneshīnī.272  
Khosravi claims that coffee shops are among the sites in which young Iranians perform acts of 
defiance, contending that kāfeneshīnī is a new resistance practice of visibility. 273  He posits that 
while coffee shops are not “public spheres” in the Habermasian sense,274 they do function as sites 
of “everyday resistance,” in that they provide a space where the Third Generation can mingle 
with the opposite gender and exchange information about sex, khārej,275 technology, fashion, 
cars or general lifestyle matters that they have been exposed to through the Internet or satellite 
television.276   
According to my informants, however, coffee shops are considered an alternative place to 
socialize or use free wifi and thus have become trendy in contemporary Iran.  Vashti claimed that 
coffee shops have become an integral part of Iranian youth culture, but observed, “It’s still not 
really acceptable to take a laptop and sit in a coffee shop for an extended period of time.  Like 
the guy gets upset that you’ve only gotten a glacé and have been there for six hours.”277 Coffee 
shops in Iran are therefore considered more a space for socialization rather than work or study.  
Khosravi observes that young Iranians (according to themselves) do not discuss “political 
aspirations” (khāstehā-ye siāsi) in coffee shops, but rather they talk tirelessly about their “social 
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aspirations” (khāstehā-ye ejtemā’-i).  He claims that there is a distinction between “political” 
issues that deal with anti-regime activities and “social” ones that highlight the “unpretentious” 
anxieties and needs of young people.278 
A Shūkhī Kardam sketch satirizes the types of “unpretentious” discussions that focus on 
the social aspirations of the Third Generation.  In this sketch, a supposedly cool and fashionable 
couple meets in a dark, smoky coffee shop.  “A good place for a proposal,” the woman states, to 
which the man responds, “Of course!  My dear, did you think that, I, like these ommol-hā,279 
would take you to a well-lit, airy and cheerful place?!”280  The couple then initiates the “modern” 
khāstegāri ritual,281 which is humorously depicted as a bragging competition about the respective 
couples’ most “desirable” characteristics to one another. The woman begins by announcing that 
she studied psychology, owns a manteaux boutique and has two Facebook accounts.  The man 
laughs self assuredly and says he owns a body building gym, “is sees-pack”(has six-pack abs) 
and has his own film archive.  The woman responds that she does Feng Shui and that her energy 
is very positive, while the man tells her that he participates in both success and Konkur classes.  
The woman tells her potential mate that she never wants to have children, to which he responds, 
“No, no, no!  Just adopt!”282  She suggests an “almond-eye” (Asian) child and he, a black baby.  
The woman quickly follows up that she draws and does photography.  He interjects, “Oh my 
gosh!” (in English) and tells her that he is also a singer.283  He asks her what she eats and she 
replies that she is a raw vegetarian and only eats salads.  He responds that he is a hīchī-nakhor 
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(non-eater) and therefore does not eat anything at all.  At this point the woman asks the man to 
marry her, he accepts and the sketch ends. 
The insufferable behavior and attitude of the couple featured in this sketch humorously 
satirizes the very “unpretentious” conversations about social aspirations that Khosravi contends 
is the newest practice of resistance.  Dark and dingy coffee shops may be the preferred meeting 
place for young Iranian couples, because they provide an escape from the otherwise heavily 
surveilled public sphere of the Islamic Republic, but the couple in the sketch displays a disdain 
for light, airy and cheerful places because they associate them with the old fashioned mentality 
of the lower/working class.  Both parties mention hobbies that reflect the current trends in 
contemporary Iranian society, which tend toward the artistic aesthetic (however pretentious).  
Essentially everyone is a photographer, fashion designer, film aficionado, body builder, Feng 
Shui practitioner and participant of positive thinking courses.  (Ostentatiously) less is more 
among this demographic, as the man bests his raw-vegetarian mate by declaring that he is a 
hichi-nakhor (non-eater), and actually does not consume food.  While this sketch humorously 
ridicules the supposed pretention of the Millenial Generation, it also calls into question 
kāfeneshīnī as an act of resistance or even defiance. 
As sites of socialization, coffee shops have become increasingly popular in Iran 
throughout the twenty-first century.  Their popularity, however, has been countered by the state 
via raids, regulations and shutdowns by the morality police. A series of crackdowns took place 
on Iranian coffee shops in 2007 and again in 2012.284  In July of 2012, the morality police 
stormed eighty-seven coffee shops in a single district of Tehran, and shut them down for not 
following Islamic values.  The police also arrested a number of female customers for gender-
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specific violations, including smoking hookah, publicly socializing with men, and defying the 
Islamic dress code.285  Omid commented on how Millenial Iranians remain undeterred by 
government crackdowns on coffee shops.  “They always give problems (gīr mīdan),” he said, 
“They always harass you, but the people do what they want to do.”  He also described how 
remiss some coffee shops are to enforce the social restrictions dictated by the state: 
Some of the coffee shops and hookah lounges in Tehran are very open.  There were two 
that I remember, if you took your own alcohol, they would serve it to you.  That is if the 
owner knew you, he would serve you your alcohol. 
 
According to Omid, one of these BYOB286 coffee shops is in Shemshak, a ski resort located 
outside of Tehran.  
While bars and nightclubs are strictly outlawed in the Islamic Republic, smoking is still 
permissible.  Hookah lounges have thus become increasingly popular as a locale of leisure and 
have therefore proliferated throughout the country.  Omid described the range in variety of 
hookah lounges in Iran: 
There is the manly type [of hookah lounge], in which there are just two long rows and 
everyone there is a lāt.  Like a lāt in the old style, with the mustaches and fedora hats.  
There are also places that are very fancy from the decorative perspective.  Luxury, as 
they are called.  They use the word “luxury” a lot. 
 
Hamrah also mentioned the prominence of “luxury” establishments, as he described coffee shop 
and hookah lounge culture in contemporary Iran: 
There are some places in Tehran called “luxury bars.”  The word “luxury” is used a lot in 
Tehran.  And its pronunciation is very cute, like “luk-cherry.”  It’s like a coffee shop, but 
its décor is like that of a hotel lobby.  And they don’t have baristas; instead you see a 
woman who is dressed like a flight attendant, standing behind a desk, as if in a hotel.  
You either go and give her your order, or she comes to you.  Then they bring out 
hookahs.  If a hookah costs fifty thousand in a regular coffee shop, in a luxury bar, it will 
cost two hundred thousand.  These are VIP coffee shops.  The elite go there.  Rich 
Iranians go there. 
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This recent trend toward luxury coffee shops, as described by my informants, would 
indicate that “unpretentious social aspirations” do not necessarily translate to defiant resistance.  
Severely limited opportunities for fun and leisure, in addition to bleak employment possibilities, 
have created a situation in which a large portion of the population must find ways to occupy 
themselves.  However, while the issues that Khosravi claims are “at stake” (a more liberal dress 
code, more moderate policies toward youth, or unemployment) may be discussed in coffee 
shops, it is difficult to justify resistance in this context of luxury.  In fact, by partaking in trends 
that define their “social aspirations,” Iranian Millenials actually perpetuate commodity culture 
and reify the definitive role of class identity with their society.  
 
Dor-Dor: Luxury Driven Leisure 
Automobiles have played a significant role in the emergence of the commodity culture in 
Millenial Iran. More so than in the Western World, cars in Iran represent socioeconomic class, 
status and masculinity.287  Dor-dor is one of the primary leisure activities of today’s Iranian 
youth. Mostafa explained, “Dor-dor is when you drive around the boulevard, check out the cars 
next to you and start talking between cars.” Dor-Dor is an example of automobility, a term 
coined by John Urry.  Urry defines automobility as a worldwide, self-organizing, autopoietic, 
nonlinear system that includes cars, car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies, technologies and 
signs.288  In the context of contemporary Iran, automobility refers to the use of cars not just for 
transportation, but also for leisure, entertainment, socialization and dating.  Norma Claire 
Moruzzi contends that the post-Revolutionary Islamicization of Iranian society has resulted in 
the reversal of the public/private dichotomy, rendering public space the sphere of control and 
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private space the realm of freedom.289  The Millenial Generation’s practice of automobility is 
therefore a result of this reversal of the public/private dichotomy, as young Iranians have been 
conditioned to view and utilize their vehicles as a private space in which “fun” may be had. 
Dor-dor, however, also demonstrates the socio-economic disparities extant in today’s 
Iran, specifically among Millenial Iranians.  Khosravi observes that social inequalities generate 
stratified mobility and immobility reproduces social inequality.290  For this reason, cars have 
become a signifier of class in today’s Iran.  Mostafa commented on this, in his discussion of how 
the make and model of one’s car warranted access to particular neighborhoods in Tehran.  He 
stated, “Cruising in Iran is based on neighborhoods.  You have to have a certain type of car to be 
able to talk to a girl in Niāvarān.291  The middle class typically cruises around Tehran Pars.”  
Omid confirmed Mostafa’s observation, stating:  
There are a couple of famous streets that we would drive around on.  Everyone can go 
there, but you notice a difference (in experience) based on the type of car you drive.  In 
Iran, guys typically approach and initiate conversation with women.  The response that 
they get is entirely based on the price of their car.  You can see this perfectly.   
 
Omid’s description of dor-dor demonstrates how this particular youth trend lends to the role of 
class identity in Millenial Iran.  After the 1979 Revolution and through the mid 1990s, the cars in 
Iran were primarily domestic-made or older foreign-made cars that had been imported before the 
revolution.  Back then, the domestic-made Peykan did not function as a signifier of class because 
it served solely as a means of transportation.  Luminita Gatejel demonstrates how this was also 
the case in socialist countries.292  After the Iran-Iraq War, and the liberalization of the market, 
foreign cars began to be imported into Iran once again. Within the last decade, there has been an 
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increase in the number of cars in Iran that are worth fifty times that of the average car price. 
Omid describes how cars began to serve as markers of socioeconomic class in Iran, stating: 
Until around 1380 or Khatami’s second term, the economy of the country was not in 
good shape.  When I was in high school, a “good car” meant an older car of the better 
brands.  There were none of these khafan cars that you see today.  After ’80, it became 
normalized and automobiles became the main indication of wealth.  Like people were 
able to see that the guy is wealthy [because of his car].  Before that, society wasn’t rich 
enough to allow people to do this sort of thing; it was limited to a number of people.  
There wasn’t wealth to this degree. 
 
Omid’s statement refers to the influx of wealth to the country during the Ahmadinejad 
administration (see Chapter Two), which has resulted in the vast socio-economic disparity extant 
in contemporary Iran.  More significantly, it demonstrates how the neoliberal economic policies 
touted by the Islamic Republic since the Reconstruction Era have contributed to the emergence 
of a commodity culture and the creation of a society in which class identity plays a prominent 
role. 
 
Drugs in Iran: A Flower By Any Other Name 
Rampant drug addiction is a consequence of unemployment, impoverishment and limited 
options for recreation.  In 2013, when Ahmadinejad left office, the official youth unemployment 
rate was at twenty-eight percent, while inflation ran at forty-two percent.  This situation was 
exacerbated by U.S. and European economic sanctions and served to turn even more Iranians to 
hard drugs.  Nahid Siamdoust describes how the social ailments plaguing Iran, approximately a 
decade ago, had a particularly adverse affect on the youth, preparing the way for a country-wide 
drug epidemic. She stated: 
 I was working as a journalist in Iran during those years and vividly remember the sense 
of desperation and hopelessness about the future among many young people.  Not only 
was unemployment very high, even among the well educated, the state’s restrictions on 
the public sphere also meant that there were very few possibilities for leisure or 
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entertainment that appealed to the large youth bulge that was coming of age in those 
years of Iran’s opening to the world and the world’s opening onto itself, thanks to the 
Internet and process of globalization.  In the absence of unregulated concerts, cafes and 
bars in public spaces where young people would feel at ease, they often met in each 
other’s homes instead.  The downside of this privatization of social activity was that drug 
consumption could and would happen more easily.293 
 
Siamdoust thus arrives at the same conclusion as Moruzzi, that the reversal of the public/private 
dichotomy has had deleterious effects on contemporary Iranian youth culture; in this case it has 
precipitated and facilitated recreational drug abuse.  
Ahmadinejad’s populist policies, abetted by American and European sanctions, resulted 
in a flailing economy, which sent the rial tumbling, the inflation rate soaring, and the illegal 
drugs trade booming.  As Siamdoust observed, high rates of unemployment engendered a 
pervasive sense of hopelessness, and this desperation drove many young Iranians to seek comfort 
in the mollifying effects of drugs; state-imposed social restrictions generated tension, stress and 
depression among the youth, who used drugs as a temporary escape from their problems.  In 
2009, it was estimated that 130,000 Iranians become addicted to drugs per year, yet over a six-
year period, only half a million people received treatment in a drug program.294  
Drug addiction is thus a serious problem in contemporary Iran. In 2010 the United 
Nations World Drug Report listed Iran as having the highest number of opium addicts in the 
world.295  Afghanistan is the world’s biggest producer of opium and Iran lies directly in the path 
of the world’s largest flow of heroin.  Refined heroin, morphine and raw opium leave 
Afghanistan and enter Iran at an estimated rate of 140 metric tons per year, of which only thirty-
two tons are intercepted by state authorities.296  In 2014, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, Iran’s 
Interior Minister, announced that six million Iranians were affected by problems related to drug 
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addiction.  Analysts describe Iran’s heroin addiction problem as one of the worst in the world, 
and estimates vary from one million to more than three million habitual drug users. 
Drug addiction drastically increased in the 1990s.  Iran’s welfare organization and the 
United Nations Drug Control Program estimate that there are two million addicts in Iran, of 
which over sixty percent are between the ages of twenty and forty.  At the beginning of 
Ahmadinejad’s presidential tenure in 2005, there was a considerable increase in the amount of 
amphetamines seized by Iranian authorities.  At this time, the Islamic Republic also experienced 
a substantial growth in the demand for pseudoephedrine; wherever there is a supply of 
pseudoephedrine, amphetamine-type drugs can be manufactured.  By 2008, authorities had 
seized 1.4 tons of amphetamine-class drugs, a number which increased to 2.4 tons in 2009.297   
In Young and Defiant in Tehran, Khosravi describes Fandak Park, a park 150m away 
from the Golestan shopping center in Tehran.  He observed that despite the availability of all 
kinds of drugs, young Iranians usually sought out hashish, which he said was called bang or 
cīgārī.  He also noted that marijuana was available but very expensive.   The difference between 
choosing to smoke marijuana or hashish, Khosravi asserts, is not only a question of socio-
economic class, but also one of “global” versus “local.”  Hashish has been in Iran for centuries, 
the word is Persian and was derived from the medieval Hashashin movement; marijuana, on the 
other hand, is an emblem of Western youth styles.298 
Hamrah told me about the current drug culture in Iran, and the increasing popularity of 
marijuana, or gol as Iranians call it, in recent years.  He stated that marijuana has become trendy 
in Iran over the last couple of years.  “Now, when you go to Iran, it’s at all the parties.  In the 
streets you see that people are smoking weed in their cars.  It’s everywhere,” he said.  Hamrah 
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explained why marijuana has become the intoxicant of choice among Iran’s Millenial 
Generation, stating: 
Look, if they catch you with alcohol in Iran, or if you’re drunk, they’ll whip you.  If they 
catch you with weed, you go to jail and you can buy your way out of it.  If it’s a lot, then 
you go to prison and that’s that.  But if it’s a small amount, the penalty is jail time.  Like 
you’ll have to go to jail for three days.  The penalties are different.   
 
Hamrah explained that Millenial Iranians are beginning to prefer marijuana to alcohol because it 
is easier to use without detection.  He claims that the police are not yet familiar enough with the 
drug to recognize that someone is on it, and that a lot of young Iranians grow it in their own 
yards, stating: 
If the police colonel comes into their house, he won’t know that there’s gol in the guy’s 
yard.  Believe me, he wouldn’t know.  For this reason, the person who grows it and sells 
it can do it with greater ease.  It’s easier to hide.  The police have learned how to detect 
alcohol, but weed is harder for them.   
 
Omid also described the advantages of drugs over alcohol in today’s Iran.  He confirmed what 
Hamrah claimed, stating: 
Drugs are used because they are fun.  Now, in today’s Iran it has an advantage.  If you 
drink alcohol, it is obvious.  But a lot of drugs, at least when they first arrived on the 
scene, were not easily identifiable.  If someone saw you high on the street, they could not 
identify what it was.  Although now, it is so routine that everyone is at least familiar with 
it.   
 
Hamrah also asserted that drugs have become preferred over alcohol because they are easier to 
transport, stating: 
In Tehran, I have a weed guy.  You call him and he brings it for you.  Alcohol is the 
same, but the alcohol guys nāz mīkonan299 because when you call for alcohol, the guy 
insists that you buy two or three bottles; he wants to reap the most profit from his trip.  If 
they stop him somewhere along the way, hiding a couple of bottles of alcohol is very 
difficult.  But if the guy has two grams of weed … and they usually come on motorcycles 
… he can hide it anywhere.  There’s no risk.  So he drives his motorcycle here and there 
and hides it in the parks, in several locations all over Tehran.  There’s one guy who 
watches over the stuff, and there are a couple of guys cruising on their motorcycles with 
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their cellphones.  When they get a call, they go get the weed from the nearest park that 
they have stashed it at and deliver it to your door. 
 
Hamrah’s comment also points to the significant role that motorcycle couriers have played in 
providing contraband to the Iranian people after the establishment of the Islamic Republic.  
Initially providing videotapes and bootleg alcohol, the motorcycle couriers of today’s Iran have 
graduated to recreational drugs.   
During the Ahmadinejad era, shīshe (meth) exploded on the Iranian drug market.  While 
opium is still the most popular drug in Iran, for the first time meth overtook heroin as the 
country's second most popular drug. Meth production in the Islamic Republic expanded at an 
alarming rate during the Ahmadinejad era. According to a 2013 United Nations Office of Drugs 
and Crime study, the first incident of crystal meth manufacturing in Iran was reported in 2007, 
when four production facilities were seized. By 2012 Iran had become the world's fourth highest 
importer of pseudoephedrine, the main precursor chemical used in the production of crystal 
meth.  According to the State Welfare Organization, over half a million Tehranis between the 
ages of fifteen and forty-five have used crystal meth at least once in their lifetime.300  The rapid 
growth in shīshe use is partly due to the falsely held belief that it is less addictive than heroin. 
Because crystal meth is more expensive than heroin, young Iranians considered it a luxury drug 
for a while and it became the fashionable drug of choice for some time.  Hamrah spoke a little bit 
about how shīshe was viewed by his generation when it first hit the scene and how it is currently 
perceived.  He asserted that meth became popular among Millenial Iranians around 2009 
(coinciding with Ahmadinejad’s second term), because it was a new alternative.  He stated:  
Because what drugs were there before?  There was opium, which the old men smoke.  
Some people smoked hashish, but no one enjoyed being around them.  Then meth came 
out, and people went crazy; like they would smoke shīshe morning to night … the people 
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who used to do heroine, now do meth, although it used to be very expensive in Iran.  Like 
sugar, it looks like grains of sugar.  Sixty thousand tomans would buy only five grains.  I 
was student then, working, and my salary was 300,000 tomans (per month).  So it was 
very expensive.  And it was kind of bā-kelās (“classy”), but now I hear that it has become 
cheap.  So the injection addicts go after it.  They do shīshe instead of shooting heroine. 
 
As of 2017, marijuana use makes up twelve percent of Iran’s drug consumption, while 
methamphetamine use has dropped to eight percent.301  Hamrah asserted that young Iranians also 
use MDMA, usually at secret rave parties, but one has to know people in order to get in.  
“Usually it’s a garden outside of Tehran, where they have these rave parties and sell MDMA, but 
it’s not specific to any particular socio-economic sector,” he said. 
In the past, drug addiction was more prevalent among the poor, but in the contemporary 
period, drug addiction is not limited to a particular socio-economic class and can afflict any 
member of society, regardless of their financial status.  Cocaine is a regular feature at the parties 
held and attended by Tehran's upper-class elite.  Young people throughout the capital smoke 
marijuana and pop ecstasy pills, while heroin addicts typically gather together to shoot up in the 
street corners of south Tehran.  Despite having a reputation of being old-fashioned, opium is still 
the most popular recreational drug in Iran and using it is still widely considered to be a culturally 
acceptable pastime.   
In recent years, an increasing number of young Iranian women have turned to drugs as a 
means to lose weight, because they believe it is a cheaper alternative to liposuction.  Hannah 
confirmed this, stating that crystal meth was available in many beauty parlors because it was 
sought after so much by women seeking ways to become thinner.  She revealed that her own 
uncle’s wife owned a beauty salon in which the drug was sold, although she later discovered that 
her aunt had been hospitalized for drug addiction.  Meth was widely available at Iranian beauty 
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salons, until a member of parliament called for a clampdown.  Many beauty parlors stopped 
stocking it, but demand for it is still high.302  Body builders and athletes reportedly use the drug 
as a means of maintaining high levels of energy. 
 
Do You Even Lift, Bro? 
Throughout the Ahmadinejad period, as Millenial Iranians continued to endure a sense of 
disenchanted powerlessness, they turned their attentions inward.  Their physical selves proved to 
be the realm in which they could exert the greatest degree of control.  Various modes of body 
modification, therefore, have become the means through which young Iranians assert their 
autonomy and agency.  This, in tandem with the “selfie culture” that emerged with the Post-
Network Era worldwide, has resulted in an increased concern for physical fitness, or at least the 
appearance of, among the Millenial Generation, and has thus given rise to the “gym” trend in 
contemporary Iran.  Khosravi noted that Western forms of fitness had spread among Iran’s Third 
Generation in the first decade of the twenty-first century.303  The trend has continues to remain 
popular among the Millenial Generation, as can be witnessed in the following Shūkhī Kardam 
monologue.  In this sketch, Modiri claims that Iranians use the word bāshgā304 (gym) at least 
four hundred times a day.  He states: 
Gym.  Why don’t you come?  I’m going to the gym.  Well why don’t you go? I’m going 
to the gym.  Well what happened with that whole issue?  I’m at the gym.  Well why don’t 
you eat anything? Gym?!  Well hurry up and come, it’s getting late!  After the gym.  Well 
why didn’t you say—Before the gym.  I’m at the gym.  Come for a minute.  I’m going to 
the gym.  Well why don’t you say so?! Gym.  Why don’t you answer your phone?  I’m in 
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the middle of the gym.  Why don’t you eat your breakfast—my gym!  Why don’t you 
drop dead?! Gym!  Of course it’s good for a person to exercise, but—Gym!305 
Modiri’s monologue suggests that (going to) the gym has become an acceptable response to, and 
an excuse for, all requests and inquiries in today’s Iran.  Omid remarked on the acumen of the 
above satire and commented on the role that the gym plays in Iran’s Millenial culture.  He stated: 
My friends joke that as dokhtar bāzi and pesar bāzi has increased among our generation, 
at the very least it has resulted in everyone going to the gym.  In the past few years, it has 
become fashionable.  But the reason Iranians go to the gym is not for their health; they go 
to the gym so they can look good.   
 
He claimed that the gym trend is a very recent phenomenon, as up to the Ahmadinejad Era, 
exercise was not very commonplace among adults.  “Children might have exercised at school or 
attended after school programs,” he stated,  “But among adults, it wasn’t really practiced.”  
Omid’s statement also points to the prevalence of “gym culture” versus exercise culture in 
today’s Iran.  While exercise equipment exists in parks throughout the country, they are not 
typically utilized by Millenial Iranians.  Exercise, as a practice, has not become fashionable, but 
rather the act of going to the gym.  As Omid stated, “It was only in the last eight, nine, ten years 
that going to the gym became a standard part of the daily routine.” 
Hamrah had a similar take on the gym phenomenon as Omid, although he was much 
more critical of the trend and viewed it from the socioeconomic perspective.  He asserted that 
bodybuilders are not athletes, and claimed that many use steroids and even prosethetics (as in 
prosthetic “six-packs”) to enhance their appearance.  Hamrah contended that there are a series of 
classical Iranian sports, such as soccer and wrestling, whose national teams are typically 
comprised of athletes hailing from the lower to middle socio-economic classes.  “But there are 
some sports that belong to the rich kids,” he said, “Go-carting, for example.  Like the guy has a 
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go-cart that he’s shipped from Dubai.  Or snowboarding.  Snowboarding is for the upper class.  
And body building.”  Hamrah also discussed the recent spread of “luxury” gyms in Iran.  He 
reiterated the prevalence of the word “luxury” in Millenial Iranian vernacular, and claimed, “The 
word is used a lot in Tehran.”  He then referred back to his cousin, Saeed, who works at a 
“luxury gym” in the Niāvarān.  Membership to these luxury gyms costs around two million 
tomans a month, Hamrah reported, which goes up to around three million if the member has a 
personal trainer.  “Those gyms are specifically for rich people,” he said, because “who can pay 
three million toman a month for a gym membership?”  Hamrah’s commentary demonstrates how 
class identity is used to define the fitness and exercise trends of Iranian Millenial culture; the 
“Rich Kids of Tehran” partake in the types of sports and activities that define them as such. 
Hannah, who describes herself as member of the upper class, confirmed the increase of 
“luxury sports” among her peers, such as skiing, horse back riding and off-roading.  She also 
mentioned tennis, which while not exclusively a “rich kid” sport, does boast its own “luxury” 
facilities in Iran.  Hannah described an “underground” sports complex in Darakeh, where she and 
her husband would go play tennis.  The complex had the façade of a house and people had to be 
buzzed in, she said.  The owner of the complex was reputed to be a very powerful man, and 
rumor had it that it was for this reason that the complex had not yet been shut down.  “A property 
that large could easily be surveilled by helicopter,” Hannah mused.  She then described the 
somewhat illicit manner in which they played tennis within this sports complex, stating: 
It was a big complex, with eight or nine tennis courts.  And when we would go there, we 
would take off our manteaux and rūsarī and just wear tops and shorts.  We would play 
tennis and it was unrestricted.  You can do everything in Iran; you just have to know 
people.  You know how, like, whenever you do something secretly, it’s more fun?  It was 
like that.  
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The last part of Hannah’s comment subtly suggests that Iranian Millenials (of the class with 
which she identifies) partake in illicit activities, not as a means of resistance or even defiance, 
but rather because they think it is fun.  This questions the validity of claims that Iranian youth 
culture is characterized by a tendency to defy, but also brings to fore the issue of class identity.  
Hannah does not mention wealth as a necessary factor for engaging in fun/illicit activities; 
instead, she insists that it is a derivative of who you know.  This demonstrates how the trends that 
Iranian Millenials chose to partake in actually function as a type of class currency; an Iranian 
Millenial wanting to identify with Tehran’s urban elite can do so by following the trends that are 
popular among that group, regardless of his or her actual socioeconomic status. 
 
Iran: The Nose Job Capital of the World 
Assertion of the self through body modification takes its most blatant form as plastic 
surgery, although ironically, this practice is the most culturally accepted one in Iran.  Plastic 
surgery has been and continues to be rampant in the Islamic Republic; it is so commonplace that 
it has effectively become ritualized as part of the coming of age process in today’s Iran.  Modiri 
mocks this ritual in a sketch that features a woman on an operating table awaiting surgery.  When 
the doctor asks the patient to clarify what she wants done, she responds: 
 First of all, I want to do my nose, so that when viewed from the front it appears upturned 
and doll-like, and when viewed from my profile, it faces forward.  Then, my cheekbones.  
I want two different operations done on my cheekbones, so that when I laugh a one-and-
a-half-centimeter dimple appears on my right cheek, while my left cheek goes up.  Then, 
if possible, I want to pull the skin under my eyes so that my wrinkles disappear.  Now, 
for my left eyelid, pull it up, so that when you look at me from the front, I look very 
charismatic and when you look at my profile, I look very surprised.  Also, Mr. Doctor, I 
wanted to request that you to tear my jaw off and push it back, so that my face appears 
thinner and better.  But then you’ll have to operate on my chin to bring it up.  If possible, 
please do all of these operations today because I’m invited to a wedding the day after 
tomorrow.306 
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This sketch satirizes the plastic surgery obsession that characterizes contemporary Iranian 
society, ridiculing the nonchalant attitude Iranians boast regarding plastic surgery, as if it is as 
commonplace as a trip to the beauty salon before a wedding. 
Tehran currently hosts one of the largest rhinoplasty markets in the world and “nose jobs” 
are the most sought-after cosmetic surgery in Iran.  It is estimated that approximately seventy 
thousand procedures are carried out annually in Tehran, of which seventy-five percent of patients 
are female and between the ages of 18-25.  For this reason, Western media have dubbed Iran as 
the “nose job capital” of the world. While the practice and desired aesthetic of rhinoplasty may 
be interpreted as an indication of growing Western-style consumption and influence in Iran, Sara 
Lenehan argues that this trend of rampant cosmetic surgery should be understood in terms of 
social wealth and power, which are values that connect to local class insecurities and systems of 
prestige.307  On the other hand, Pardis Mahdavi claims that nose jobs (and increased use of 
makeup) can be considered acts of rebellion, positing that makeup, style and behavior are 
essential components of social movements.  She asserts that for young people, “the absence of an 
option to express dissent or unhappiness with the regime overtly results in concentrating their 
efforts on looking good as a way to speak back to the regime.”308  While the notion of an 
increased attentiveness to the self is apparent in Mahdavi’s contention, it is important to note that 
the Islamic Republic has not fettered the surge of cosmetic surgery sweeping Iran and has 
actually sanctioned the procedure since the early 1980s.  This is particularly interesting 
considering that the type of nose desired is based on a Western ideal.  Drawing on Featherstone’s 
contention that the aestheticization of the body is a cornerstone of consumer culture, the 
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countrywide practice and government sanction of plastic surgery invalidates the claim of it as an 
act of defiance, resistance or rebellion.309  Most of my informants said that it is simply a matter 
of aesthetics—Iranians want to achieve beauty as it has become locally understood. 
Hamrah discussed the most recent trends in plastic surgery in Millenial Iran. He observed 
that while in the past, it was very typical for women to get nose jobs, this trend has now become 
prevalent among Iranian men as well.  He also commented that both women and men inject their 
lips and cheekbones with fillers, while breast augmentations and butt implants have dramatically 
increased.  Omid confirmed the omnipresence of rhinoplasty among Millenial Iranians, although 
he disagreed with Hamrah regarding the prevalence of other cosmetic enhancement procedures 
among Iranian men, stating: 
Most of the girls that I know in Iran have gotten nose jobs. In Iran, rhinoplasty is very 
normal.  I mean four of my cousins have had nose jobs.  And this is among the youth.  
Among the older crowd, cheeks and skin and breasts.  Among men, noses, but other 
surgeries, as far as I know, not so much.  But cosmetic surgery is done very frequently, 
especially among women. 
 
Omid also discussed how the cosmetic surgery trend is beginning earlier and earlier among the 
Millenial Generation.  He claimed that during his adolescence, the norm was after high school 
graduation, but that today, many young Iranians are going under the knife even before finishing 
the twelfth grade. 
Sara also reiterated that rhinoplasty is the most common form of plastic surgery done in 
Iran, followed by breast augmentations and lip fillers.  “They all look like porn stars,” she said 
derisively, and then mentioned an incident in which a British adult film star had come to Iran for 
cosmetic surgery, to prove her point.  This porn star, aware of the country’s reputation for 
specializing in rhinoplasty, had come to Iran to undergo the procedure.  She had then posted on 
her Facebook page that Iranian girls all seemed to look like her.  This was followed by a public 
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outcry, as many (conservative) Iranians reproached the Islamic state for issuing a visa to an adult 
film star, but the authorities pleaded ignorance, claiming that they had been unable to recognize 
the woman because they were unfamiliar with her “work.”  
Vashti commented that the most prevalent trend in Iranian plastic surgery is to make 
oneself look more “Caucasian.”  “They say, ‘My nose is big, fat and points down; make it small.  
Make it upturned’,” she said, “and eventually it falls off the other side of the roof.”310  She 
continued that a “surgery nose” is a commodity in itself and that Iranians often flaunt their 
procedures by keeping on their post-operation bandages for months longer than necessary.  In 
doing so, young Iranians tacitly demonstrate their advocacy for consumer culture.  As plastic 
surgery is not considered immoral or detrimental to the maintenance of an Islamic society, the 
Millenial Generation’s eager willingness to go under the knife is neither resistance nor rebellion; 
instead it is an assumption of consumerism through the appropriation of [imagined] Western 
standards of beauty.  The ubiquity of plastic surgery, specifically rhinoplasty, across 
socioeconomic lines not only indicates the prevalence of commodity culture in Iranian society, 
but it also exemplifies how trends function as class currency in Millenial Iran.  By modifying 
their body in accordance to the preferred aesthetic that predominates contemporary Iranian 
beauty ideals, Millenial Iranians are able to present themselves with a particular class identity, 
thus demonstrating how trends serve as class markers in today’s Iran, and how the Millenial 
Generation manipulates these trends to navigate and assert themselves within a class-stratified, 
Post-Network society. 
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For the Love of Money 
The commodity-driven consumer culture that defines today’s Iran emerged from the 
neoliberal economic policy that has been espoused by the Islamic state, beginning with 
Rafsanjani’s reconstruction efforts.  Since then, there has been an increasing flow of wealth into 
the country (as discussed in Chapter Two), which began to materialize during the Ahmadinejad 
administration.  As the accouterments of wealth and opulence gained more visibility in Iranian 
society, the phenomenon of cheshm o ham cheshmi311 intensified.  This, combined with the 
disillusionment of Iranian youth, which was brought about from an increasing sense of 
powerlessness within the repressive environment of an imposed theocracy, resulted in the 
emergence of a society in which class identity plays a predominant role.  While monetary 
resources not always necessary for the projection of a particular class identity (as has been 
described above), there is no denying that wealth translates to more opportunities for the 
pursuance of fun, leisure and fashion.  Furthermore, it also has significant implications for the 
perpetuation of patriarchy and the determination of gender roles in Millenial Iranian society.  An 
example of this is how Mehran Modiri began the “Economy” episode of Shūkhī Kardam with the 
following monologue: 
Men, altogether, fall into three categories. The first category of men are those who throw 
an SUV under their wife’s foot and cover her with jewelry, head to toe.  All of the lady’s 
clothes are brand name. Her bank account is vā-vaylā, and he does not allow her to step 
one foot away from the digital satellite television. They call these men “Real Men.”  The 
second category of men dredge away their lives, pay rent, the water bill, electric bill and 
phone bill, and for the children’s educational expenses, as well as all of the wife’s 
expenses.  Then when you ask his wife, “Farhad is a really good guy.  Poor thing works 
so hard, doesn’t he?”  The wife spitefully smiles and says, “Dandesh narm.”312  This 
group of men are called Dandesh Narm men.  The third category consists of men who 
had factories, who had villas, who had property.  They had all the good things.  The 
difference between these men and the men of the first category is that these men all 
passed away two years ago and everything remained for their wives and children.  They 
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call these men “Dream Men.”  All other men basically fall into the category of nā-
mard313.314 
 
In this monologue, husbands are categorized by their ability to financially provide for their 
wives. “Real men” are defined as men who lavish a multitude of extravagances upon their wives.  
Men who break their backs toiling to provide for their wives and family are presented as 
contemptible, and “Dream Men” are those men who no longer burden their wives with their 
existence, but posthumously continue to care for them via their grand estates.  All other men are 
considered nā-mard (non-men) or essentially inconsequential, for an Iranian man’s worth is 
supposedly measured by his ability to display his financial prowess through lavish expenditures 
upon his wife.  While the monologue satirically mocks the avaricious tendencies of 
contemporary Iranian women, it also points to how notions of masculinity are increasingly tied 
to representations of wealth in contemporary Iranian society. 
I asked Hannah what makes an ideal husband and she responded, “To be able to pay for 
living expenses … To be in a good financial situation … It’s mostly how rich a person is that 
matters in Iran.”  As a follow-up, I asked her husband, Mostafa, what masculinity meant in 
Iranian culture and he responded, “Being able to make enough money to pay for a house and 
living expenses.  Everyone thinks this.”  I asked Pooneh what is considered an ideal man in 
contemporary Iranian society.  She responded, “For me, an ideal man is someone who has a 
suitable occupation, so that he’s not helpless in the event of an unfortunate situation.  Now if I 
want to describe the minimal requirements in Iran, he must have a house and make enough 
money to cover living expenses.”  Vashti, on the other hand, asserted that this is not a case 
specific to Iran.  She stated: 
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It’s not Iran versus the rest of the world.  It’s like this everywhere.  The wealthier a man 
is, the more superior he is considered.  I don’t think there is much of a difference in Iran, 
in this regard.  If a man has money or a house, they call him an “ideal man,” as far as 
finances are concerned anyway.   
 
Hadi reflected that the pre-defined gender roles in Iran have resulted in an expectation of men to 
be the primary breadwinners of their domicile.  He stated, “A man must have a job and be able to 
provide.  An Iranian man has this expectation from himself, even if society does not directly tell 
him to go get married and work to create an independent life.”  As the above monologue 
suggests, however, an Iranian man’s worth is determined by his ability to provide financially, 
even still today.  This cultural expectation of gender roles thus reifies masculine pre-eminence, 
while simultaneously encouraging the commodity culture that prevails in Millenial Iran. 
 
Surfeit Sexuality: Modern Romance in Today’s Iran 
Conceptions of masculinity tied to the circulation of commodities, the prevalence of Post-
Network technologies and practices, an omnipresent sense of sociopolitical disenchantment and a 
resultant shift of attention toward the self, have all contributed to the emergence of a new sexual 
culture in Millenial Iran.  Sara, one of my informants, asserted that her generation’s attitude 
toward sex is one of insatiable greed (tama’).  Indeed there is a marked enthusiasm for sexual 
exploration among Millenial Iranians, as Moruzzi observes that “widespread public displays of 
heterosexual affection, including kissing, flirting and horseplay, and even religious girls and 
boys ‘hanging out’ together, mark the new generation as pleasure seekers.”315  Similar to 
Siamdoust’s reasoning for the rampant drug addiction epidemic that is sweeping Iran, Moruzzi 
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asserts that the transition of heterosexual social activity to the private sphere of the home has 
resulted in an “increased sexual precocity and promiscuity among the new generation.”316 
Despite the fact that expressions of sexuality have become less taboo and more 
commonplace in today’s Iran, the practice of sexuality, as undertaken by Iranian Millenials, 
continues to be a male dominated experience.  Moruzzi notes that there are three prevalent 
discourses on sexuality in today’s Iran: the government’s citation of Islamic law and Shi’i 
jurisprudence, the conventions of social practice, and the attitudes and behaviors of the Third 
Generation.317  The common factor in all three discourses is the binary relation of female 
passivity to male activity.  Virginity, in the parental generation’s mentality, was the emblem of 
female modesty; this notion continues to persist among Millenial Iranians, although it no longer 
serves as a detriment to premarital sexual activity.  In addition to physical alternatives to vaginal 
intercourse, doctors in Iran have increasingly capitalized on the demand for hymen repair 
surgery.  Hannah confirmed that Iranian women often medically restore their “virginity” before 
marriage, and noted that this phenomenon exists within all socioeconomic classes.  At the same 
time her husband reiterated, “Virginity, for girls, is still considered important.”  
The domesticization of heterosexual social relations has therefore been detrimental to 
Iranian women.  This is because the private sphere remains largely under the control of men, 
while women continue to be financially and socially less privileged than their male counterparts 
within the theocracy.  Young Iranian women have sacrificed the security that their chastity 
afforded them within both marriage and the family home in order to negotiate more open sexual 
relations, but they pursue this without a fully developed conception of feminism.  This, Moruzzi 
claims, has resulted in a double standard for today’s Iranian women, whose expression of 
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sexuality continues to takes place within a masculinist oriented society.  Pooneh described the 
double standard held for Iranian girlfriends and Iranian wives.  She stated, “Just as they want a 
submissive wife in marriage, if you’re going to be someone’s girlfriend, you have to be sheytūn.”  
I asked her what sheytūn meant, and she responded, “Be sharp-tongued.  Be a tease.  Be elusive.  
Be attentive to your womanhood.  Wear pretty and colorful clothes.  Be bourgeoisie and high 
class.  These are all desired traits for girlfriends in Iran.”   
In situations of unequal but relatively free gender relations, women must utilize whatever 
resources they have at hand to assert their agency.  Moruzzi claims that this typically takes the 
form of the refinement of traditional feminine charms: fashion, make-up and sex appeal, or 
essentially what Pooneh describes above.  However, my other informants talked about Millenial 
Iranian women taking on a more proactive role in their negotiation of acceptable sexual mores 
within today’s Iranian society.  For example, Sepideh recounted going through security at the 
Ahvaz airport.  The security agent had asked for her cellphone and she placed it on the conveyor 
belt.  The security agent asked her how many cellphones she had, and she answered, “How many 
should I have?  I just have one. How many do people have?”  The security agent’s response was 
that women today have three to four cellphones, one for each boyfriend.  Sepideh’s anecdote 
points to how Millenial Iranian women can assert their class identity through adherence to a 
particular trend, in this case, participating in polyamory. 
Rather than resistance in the form of sexual revolution, as posited by Mahdavi, Moruzzi 
claims that the Millenial Generation’s practice of sexuality “retains a deeply conventional 
romanticism.”318  However, she asserts that the feminism espoused by Iran’s Millenial 
Generation lacks a critical perspective on the expression of sexuality.  This underdeveloped 
conception of feminism that currently prevails in Iranian society has had a significant impact on 
                                                
318 Ibid. 
 164 
the way that Millenial Iranians approach romantic relationships, which is largely influenced by a 
perceived norm that supposedly exists in the Western World, as Pooneh described: 
There is this mentality that undergirds Iranian society, in which they imagine that the 
ultimate freedom exists in the West.  So they (Third Generation Iranians) do whatever 
they want to do, in the name of this freedom.  They say that it is the same abroad 
(khārej).  The last time I was in Iran, I could really notice this trend among those around 
me.  Like the typical Iranian guy has three girlfriends! 
 
Sohrab and Sepideh also commented on the Millenial Generation’s unbridled enthusiasm to 
engage in sexual activity, striving to achieve the same degree or surpass that which is done in 
khārej (the “West”).  Sohrab asserted that polyamory has become an “epidemic” in the last four 
years or so.  When I asked why, Sepideh responded that it was considered fashionable.  She 
stated, “It has become trendy.  Like the more boyfriends you have, the higher your level of 
class.” Sepideh’s comment demonstrates how engagement in sexual activity is actually another 
trend that is used by Iranian Millenials to signify class identity and move between class groups.   
Sara discussed the sexual freedoms that her generation is currently experiencing in Iran.  
She was critical, however, of her generation’s embrace of this sexual culture, stating: 
Group sex has become very common.  The atmosphere has become incredibly absurd, but 
this is because there is an insatiable greed among people.  Until now, they have never had 
this type of sexual freedom … there was no room for it in their culture.  But now that 
they have been exposed to it, they don’t have any boundaries.  Morals no longer exist.  I 
agree with white marriages,319 but it’s not something that is readily accepted in current 
[Iranian] society.  Everyone sleeps with everyone.  Men have who have wives, go get 
girlfriends.  They sleep around.  Women cheat on their husbands.  Infidelity has shot up 
in Iran. 
 
Sara’s stated disapproval and criticism of her generation’s behavior and attitude toward sex and 
sexuality demonstrates that not all Millenial Iranians subscribe to or partake in the relatively new 
sexual culture that has emerged in today’s Iran; it exemplifies how trends are utilized by the 
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Millenial Generation to present their identity and move among various social groups in today’s 
Iran. 
Increased interest in sexual exploration has, however, contributed to the “opening up” of 
Iranian society, according to my informants.  Sara stated that what was taboo before is no longer 
taboo, like having a boyfriend or a girlfriend.  “Everyone displays their relationship on Facebook 
and Instagram.  They post pictures together,” she said, pointing to the role that social media has 
played in liberalizing the more traditional aspects of Iranian society.  Hamid agreed with Sara, 
and reiterated that his generation has broken the taboos on romantic relationships and sexuality.  
He stated: 
Compared to ten years ago, there is more freedom, from all perspectives.  Ten years ago, 
if a guy sat in the park with his girlfriend, there was reason to worry, because someone 
would always come and ask, “What’s your relationship to one another?  Why is your arm 
around her?”  Now, it’s not like that anymore.  Society has become much more open.  
But people are also unfamiliar with this openness and are excited to try it out.  Like white 
marriages have become fashionable in Iran.  Swingers have also become ala mode.   
 
Hannah echoed Sara and Hamid’s claim that white marriages have increased among 
Iranian Millenials, but she asserted that it is not yet commonplace. Omid was less critical of the 
“immorality” exhibited by Iranian Millenials regarding their sexual exploration, but he also 
reiterated that certain concepts, such as white marriages, are still very much taboo in Iranian 
culture.  He claimed that whatever expression of sexuality is undertaken in Iran today, is done so 
behind closed doors, stating: 
A while ago I heard on the Iranian television that white marriages are increasing, but I 
don’t know anyone personally who has done that.  I don’t think it is looked upon 
favorably.  I think a very small percentage of society accepts this, especially for girls, 
because there is more pressure on girls in this society.  I think most girls wouldn’t even 
accept this themselves … In Iran, a lot of things happen, but none of them are out in the 
open.  Like perhaps a guy has a house and the girl will be with him most of the time, but 
officially, in name, they don’t live together.  They have to adhere to a particular external 
code of conduct, always.  Part of this is because it is illegal in Iran.  But it is mostly 
cultural.   
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Omid’s comment exemplifies Moruzzi’s contention regarding the effects of the reversal of the 
public/private dichotomy, while reaffirming her claim regarding male dominance within the 
realm of sexuality, as perpetuated by the continued control of private spaces by Iranian men.  
Vashti also confirmed that white marriages have increased in today’s Iran, but also reiterated that 
it has not yet become a socially accepted practice, stating, “It is still taboo.  Still, among the 
majority of the people, it is taboo.”   
Sepideh speculated that the tendency to engage in sexual activity outside of the 
traditional “norms” of Iranian culture is more common among the lower socioeconomic classes, 
because they endure more social restrictions and limitations. Mostafa, however, disagreed, while 
commenting on how various socioeconomic sectors of contemporary Iranian society view the 
phenomenon of white marriage.  He claimed that the lower classes were less accepting of white 
marriages, while the upper class and elite are more open to the idea because it represented an 
emulation of the western way of life.  He stated: 
It’s different on the south side of the city.  The neighbor finds everything out.  But if 
you’re part of the upper class, no one cares.  And it’s actually considered an honor, to be 
in white marriage.  Like, “Oh, oh, well done, just like the khārejī320!”  But among the 
working class, your neighbor is part of your life, they will find out everything!   
 
Omid also commented on the socioeconomic dimension of the more relaxed attitude toward pre-
marital romantic relationships.  He stated: 
When I was in high school, a girl who had a boyfriend was a very bad thing.  A very 
small percentage of society was able to accept this.  A very small percentage of the upper 
class could openly talk about it.  Or accept that their daughter had a boyfriend.  This has 
changed considerably … Iran is charging toward westernization at great speed. 
 
The existence and increase of “white marriages” is the result of a burgeoning interest in sexuality 
and sexual exploration, which has been facilitated through Post-Network technologies and 
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practices.  As Sara stated, “My generation is one in which everyone is constantly on Instagram, 
night to day, and looking to hook up.”   
Within Millenial culture, Iranians distinguish between the 1360s generation and the 
1370s generation, particularly with regards to attitudes toward courtship and sexuality.  Sara 
claimed that the 1370s generation is much more open regarding sexuality, and stated that within 
her demographic, it is considered far more normal to have sex outside the confines of marriage.  
She attributed this to her generation’s greater exposure to the Western world, facilitated through 
Post-Network conventions.  The 1360s generation, on the other hand, was much too entangled 
with the turmoil wrought by 1979 Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War to freely explore their 
sexuality, she said.  Hamrah shared an anecdote that confirmed Sara’s pronouncement, claiming 
that the 1360s generation (his own generation) had endured the most hardship regarding their 
experience with pre-marital romantic affairs. He stated: 
I think, and many people would agree, that the people who are my age, from the ’60s 
generation, had the worst situation in Iran.  Like when we came of age, it was the worst.  
First of all, we didn’t have cell phones.  Just imagine, a teenager without a cellphone!  Of 
course we didn’t know what cellphones were back then.  But just imagine … when you 
got a girlfriend, it’s not like it was easy to just pick up the phone and call, let alone go 
over to her house.  Her father wouldn’t just open the door and say, “Sweetheart your 
boyfriend is here!”  He couldn’t know!  There was one telephone in the house that 
everyone used.  It was hard for us; it was hard for them (the parental generation)!   
 
He described having a girlfriend (or rather a girl he “talked to”) in 1997, when he was thirteen 
years old. They would talk over the phone, unless they were fortunate enough to see each other 
on the way to and from school.  Hamrah recalled the difficulties he endured attempting to 
maintain this relationship as an Iranian teenager during the late 1990s, which coincided with the 
early Khatami era. He stated: 
I could only call her if no one was home.  Or I’d go out and use a payphone to call her.  
Then, you had to hope that the girl actually picked up the phone.  Like if her dad picked 
up the phone, you’d hang up.  Then suppose the girl picked up, but then she might not be 
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able to talk.  It was such a headache!  Unless she was alone in the house and then she 
could call.  But even then, whoever was closest to the phone at your house would pick it 
up!  You were fourteen years old at the time.  You didn’t have to permission to say, “Oh 
wait, that’s for me!”  Someone else would pick up the phone and they would say that the 
caller didn’t speak and had hung up.  So you would wonder whether it was for you or 
not!  This was my generation’s teenage experience with romantic relationships. 
 
Hamrah continued to describe how dating in Iran has changed since the Khatami period, stating: 
Once you turned twenty, you started actually dating the girl, but you would go grey 
before getting to kiss her!  You would be sobbing tears [of frustration] before it 
happened!  First of all, where would you do it?  You had to be in a situation in which she 
could leave her house and come to your house, and no one could be home, etc.  Now, it’s 
not like this at all!  Now, it’s perfectly fine for a girl in the family to have a boyfriend! 
 
Hamrah’s story demonstrates that one of the more visible changes in Iranian society, as 
perceived by the Millenial Generation, has been a cultural adaption of a more open attitude 
toward young people experiencing romantic love.  He attributed this to the advances in 
technology, and in doing so, described one of the effects that emerged with the advent of the 
Post-Network Era in Iran, a loosening of social stigmas surrounding romance and sexuality 
outside the confines of marriage. 
Structural transformations, such as more education, urbanization, increased mobility and 
the aggrandizement of women in public life, along with enhanced media consumption, have led 
to the evolution of Iranian Millenials’ expectations.321  This generation now aspires toward 
individualism, independence, personal freedom, unrestricted mobility and conjugal unions based 
on romantic love, which has ultimately contributed to the transformation of cultural ideals 
regarding family structure and life.  These ideational shifts have resulted in a Millenial 
Generation that harbors a much more relaxed attitude regarding sexuality, love and marriage than 
its parental generation. 
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Conclusion 
As Omid stated, “Iranian society seems to be running toward Westernization at full 
speed.”  However, much of what young Iranians perceive to be “western,” is actually an 
exaggerated version of what they are exposed to on various media sources, amplified by their 
own sense of deprivation that they feel living within a socially restricted theocracy.  The 
Islamicization of public space has resulted in the reversal of the public/private dichotomy, 
rendering the public sphere as the realm of authoritarian control, and the private sphere as the 
arena in which “fun” is had.  This shift has significantly influenced the trends that prevail among 
Millenial Iranians, promoting participation in (sometimes illicit), often self-focused activities that 
predominantly take place within the private sphere.  Meanwhile, the influx of technology that 
characterizes the Post-Network Era, has highlighted the financial chasm between the “haves” and 
the “have-nots,” particularly through the mechanism of social media, and has served to render 
class identity as the definitive feature of contemporary Iranian society.  The trends that prevail 
among the Millenial Generation thus function as markers of various class groups and serve as a 
type of class currency.  Iranians are able to reflect the class identity of their choice (to a degree), 
based on the trends to which they adhere, and then use these trends to maneuver between various 
groups within society. At the same time, this investigation yields that class identity is not entirely 
a variable of wealth in Millenial Iran, based on the accounts of my informants regarding the 
trends that signify class groups.   These trends do, however, exist within a commodity culture 
that has emerged as a result of the prevalence of Post-Network practices and technologies, 
combined with the Neoliberalism that the Islamic Republic has quietly touted since Rafsanjani’s 
presidency.  Within this commodity culture, the trends that prevail among young Iranians not 
only serve as a means to navigate a class stratified society, but have materialized to counteract 
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the sociopolitical disillusionment and disenchantment that has accompanied coming to age in 
Millenial Iran. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Less than a decade after the Green Movement, beginning on December 27, 2017, protests 
once again erupted in Iran, this time spreading to far-flung corners of the country.  Unlike the 
Green Movement, which was a direct response to the perceived manipulation of the 2009 
presidential election, and the 1999 Student Uprising, which was tied to the rights of political 
prisoners, students and freedom of speech, this newest series of protests is most accurately 
categorized as “Bread Riots.”  They are a manifestation of grievances against the economic 
inequalities, political decision-making and the state’s lack of accountability in today’s Iran. 
The neoliberal restructuring of Iran’s economy began in the 1990s, in the aftermath of the 
Iran-Iraq War.  The increased privatization and the downsizing of the economic role of the state 
profited, specifically, the educated, urban consumer.  This demographic was well positioned to 
seize government assets and turn them into a concentration of wealth in Tehran and other large 
centers of commerce in Iran.  As Arang Keshavarzian observes, those who have benefitted from 
this neoliberalism have also been increasingly comfortable displaying their wealth and 
accouterments, be it through large homes, luxurious apartments, sports cars, etc.322 Conspicuous 
consumption and display of wealth has thus been associated with the economic reconstruction 
that began during Rafsanjani’s presidency and continued throughout the Ahmadinejad period, 
and has been a significant factor in the emergence of the commodity culture that prevails in 
Millenial Iran. 
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Rouhani the Savior 
 
If you lived through those eight years, you would look to be saved.  Rouhani was our 
savior.  Maybe he wasn’t at the same level as Khatami, from the intellectual perspective, 
but regardless, after four years of utter plight and a downward spiraling economy and 
everything just crashing down, everything, he became our savior. 
 
Sohrab and Sepideh were in Iran during the 2013 presidential election.  They had participated in 
the election, had voted for Hassan Rouhani and had rejoiced with his victory.  They claimed that 
Rouhani, the moderate cleric and choice candidate of Iran’s progressives, was basically unknown 
until a few weeks before the election.  “No one had even heard of him,” Sohrab said, “But 
because he presented the key to solving the country’s problems, the people got excited.” 
 If Khatami had laid down the groundwork for a theocratic democracy, then Rouhani was 
hoped to be the figure that would implement such a system.  Khatami’s election was 
unprecedented.  For the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic, twenty million Iranians 
went out and voted for the Reform that he represented.  Khatami’s downfall, however, as was 
discussed in chapter one, was that he would not champion his constituency over the velāyat-e 
faqīh.  “He had the power of twenty million votes behind him to push past Khamenei’s redlines,” 
Sohrab lamented, “but he didn’t do this.”  Instead, he said, Khatami laid down the groundwork 
for what democracy could look like within the theocracy; his idea of civil society introduced the 
concept of tolerance to the Islamic Republic’s governance. 
 After eight years of what many of my informants described as regression under the 
Ahmadinejad administration, the Reformists re-emerged, throwing their weight behind Rouhani 
in both the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections.  While Rouhani does not represent the 
intellectual reform that Khatami did, and has yet to deliver all of his campaign promises, to many 
Iranian Millenials, he represented salvation.  In this way, Rouhani revived hope among the 
disillusioned Millenial Generation.  What was significant about his candidacy, therefore, was 
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that he inspired action through voting.  Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, there has 
been a constant trend of boycotting presidential elections.  Many adherents of this mindset are 
from the First and Second Generations, ironically, some of the very people who were responsible 
for the 1979 Revolution.  My own parents, as well as a number of my informants’ parents fall 
into this category of Iranians who believe that a vote for any Iranian presidential candidate is a 
vote in favor of the theocratic government, and therefore abstain.  As Sohrab stated, “A series of 
people think that if we vote for them, we prove the legitimacy of the system and they (the 
clerical regime) will remain in power.”  This trend of boycotting the act of voting has continued 
even in the most recent presidential election of 2017.   During the 2017 election, both hashtags 
#Iwillvote and #Iwillnotvote trended among the Millenial Generation.  Sepideh expressed her 
frustration with those Iranians who boycott elections, claiming that they exacerbate the condition 
of the country, and feared that it will ultimately result in a situation in which there will be no 
room for reform.  Sohrab also commented on the dangers of not participating in elections, 
stating, “What happens when you don’t vote?  Like if instead of fifty percent of people 
participating, only twenty percent vote?  Ultimately someone has to become president.”  He then 
pointed to Ahmadinejad’s presidency to prove his point and continued: 
 Many think that, for example, you can take away the Islamic Republic and you can put an 
alternative in its place, but what is that alternative?  Who is it even?  Nothing can flourish 
in society in which intellectuals are not nurtured.  The opposition groups … which one of 
them has support among the [Iranian] people?  This is wishful thinking … our problem is 
that we compare these things with Europe and America.  But look at America now, with 
Trump as president.  People have the right and freedom to say anything about him, even 
curse at him.  In Iran, this sort of thing is not possible, that the universities and political 
groups be active and free.  When we say we need to vote, it’s because we don’t want 
society to regress, so that the social intellect of the newer generations increases. 
 
Hannah reiterated that Rouhani’s candidacy inspired many young Iranians to vote.  She referred 
to it as a “wave,” and stated, “We realized that not voting wouldn’t solve anything.  So we said, 
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‘Let’s go vote,’ so that at least the candidate whose perspective is most like ours will be elected.”  
Hannah contended that it was Ahmadinejad’s two-term presidency that inspired such a wave 
among her generation.  Mostafa conferred with his wife and speculated that the 2017 election 
would be the most important election in the history of the Islamic Republic.  He based this claim 
on the assumption that Khamenei will not likely live, or at the very least, not continue his role as 
the Supreme Leader to the end of Rouhani’s second term.  He reflected, “They say that after 
Agha (Khamenei), there is no one as learned or qualified to take on the role of the valī-e faqīh, to 
have the knowledge to act in place of the Imām Zamān.”  Mostafa then mentioned rumors of a 
possible formation of a shorāyeh rahbarī (a leadership council), in which a number of qualified 
clerics would serve in place of an omnipotent valī-e faqīh.  In this way, Mostafa ruminated, 
power would be in the hands of several people instead of just one.  I asked Vashti what she felt 
when Rouhani was first elected president in 2013.  She responded with one word: hope.  She 
claimed that a Saeed Jalili (Rouhani’s main rival in the 2013 election) presidency would have 
indicated an extension of Ahmadinejad’s regressive politics, and that Rouhani’s victory had 
signaled the defeat of conservatism.  “It was very much like we got our revenge … well, not so 
much revenge, but rather our right,” she said.   
In both elections, Rouhani’s campaign color was purple.  However, Vashti recalled how 
green insignia was sprinkled throughout the celebratory purple regalia of Rouhani’s victory, 
“like the dormant hope of four years prior.” I asked why the color green was still prominent in 
contemporary Iranian politics.  Vashti responded that it was an indication that the spirit of the 
Green Movement has survived.  The 2017 presidential election continued to witness an 
amalgamation of Reformist, Green Movement and Rouhani insignia.  Pooneh claimed that she 
had even seen Mousavi’s picture on the cellphone screens that were caught in the frames of 
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Rouhani’s campaign photos.  Vashti corrected her and said she meant Khatami, but Pooneh 
reiterated that she had seen Mousavi’s visage as well.  She claimed that the green bracelet (an 
emblem of the Green Movement) was still visible among the crowds that had campaigned for 
and later celebrated Rouhani’s victory.  However, Pooneh also mentioned a particular slogan that 
had gained prominence during this last election, which said, “mā hame sabze sabzīm, bātom 
banafshemūn kard” (We are all the greenest of green, but the baton has turned us purple).  This 
slogan indicates the reluctance of some Millenial Generation Green Movement supporters to 
wholeheartedly endorse Rouhani.  It was included in @mostafatajzade’s tweet regarding the 
noteworthy slogans of the 2017 election.  Sari Pishik (@arezo_shz) had responded to his tweet 
with a photograph of wall graffiti that stated: “sabz o banafsh nadāre, jonbesh edāme dāre” 
(Neither green nor purple, the movement continues).  
My own informants unanimously agreed that they do not want to see the overthrow of the 
regime.  Pooneh reiterated this, stating, “I don’t believe that we are choosing between bad and 
worse.  I really think that we have chosen good.”  Vashti agreed, stating, “You could easily 
criticize Rouhani, but he did a lot of good things.”  She then referred to Rouhani’s healthcare 
initiative as evidence, claiming that medical procedures that had cost millions of tomans during 
the Ahmadinejad administration were now down to the ten thousands.  This was done through 
the reallocation of subsidies, she said, stating “Of course they still give out subsidies, but the 
money that they would steal … he took that money and put it into healthcare.  He created an 
insurance plan that Americans can only dream of!”  Vashti then echoed the critique of IRIB 
made in chapter two, stating that Iranian state news never reports on Rouhani’s achievements 
and pointed to the improved condition of the country’s economy.  She also compared Rouhani’s 
cabinet to that of Ahmadinejad, stating:  
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His team is good.  He’s not holy, but his team, for the most part, are qualified [people].  
That’s the difference between Rouhani and Ahmadinejad.  [The former president] would 
explicitly say, “I don’t care if they don’t have a university education, as long as they are 
able to work well.”    
 
Vashti was specifically referring to Rouhani’s finance minister, Ali Tayebnia, who was formerly 
a professor at Sharif University. 
  
The “Rouhani Effect” 
Six months after Rouhani’s re-election, protests mushroomed across Iran.  At the time of 
their inception, the protests were leaderless and un-unified regarding their demands, which 
ranged from dismantling the mandatory hijab, to economic equality, to the freedom of political 
prisoners, to the overthrow of Khamenei and the entire regime.  The most prevalent of all of 
these grievances, however, was the economy.  As was discussed thoroughly in chapter two, 
international sanctions and economic mismanagement have resulted in a dire economic situation, 
in which the cost of living is extremely high and unemployment remains rampant.  Narges 
Bajoghli observes, “Economic inequality is not only widening, but also being flaunted by the 
rich,” pointing to the increasing prominence of class identity in Millenial Iran.323 
Economist Djavad Salehi-Isfahani contends that Rouhani was re-elected by selling the 
nuclear deal (JCPOA) as the only recourse to improve the dire condition of Iran’s economy.  
Despite the fact that Iran’s economy bounced back after the nuclear deal, Salehi-Isfahani asserts 
that the current protests should be attributed to joblessness and unfulfilled economic 
expectations.  He posits that the noticeable contrast between the wealth of Tehranis and that of 
the rest of the country demonstrates the role of economic grievances in the current protests, 
explaining why the recent unrest has occurred primarily in peripheral cities rather than the 
                                                
323 Narges Bajoghli, “Behind the Iran Protests,” Jacobin, January 4, 2018, Accessed January 11, 2018, 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/01/iran-protests-hasan-rouhani-green-movement. 
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capital.  Using information from Iran’s Household Expenditures and Income Survey (HEIS), 
which has been collected by the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) every year since 1960, Salehi-
Isfahani shows that smaller, provincial cities experienced a sharp increase in poverty during 
Rouhani’s first year as president, which has continued to remain high ever since; the 11% GDP 
growth that resulted from the JCPOA has yet to trickle down to these oft-neglected sectors of 
Iranian society.  The figures show how Ahmadinejad’s subsidy program, which he initiated in 
2011, specifically the cash transfers, had actually served to reduce poverty in these areas.  This 
subsidy program, the yārāneh system, allowed recipients to retrieve ATM funds every two 
months.  A 2016 national survey found that nearly all lower-income households in Iran were 
dependent on the yārāneh system.  However, in December of 2017, Rouhani proposed a new 
budget bill to the Parliament that slashed the subsidy program in order to free up money for 
investment in Iran’s dilapidated infrastructure, to reduce government borrowing from banks, to 
lend more to the private sector and to encourage energy efficiency.  Salehi-Isfahani has coined 
the term the “Rouhani effect” to describe the situation, in which austerity measures have brought 
down inflation, but at the expense of job growth and raising energy prices.  These neoliberal 
policies favor businesses and the middle class of Tehran, while simultaneously permitting the 
value of cash transfers to decline.324  Thus, Rouhani’s economic plan, which privileges growth 
over redistribution, it is not popular among the poor.  
As of January 2018, Iran’s rate of inflation stands at 17%, but it has fluctuated 
tremendously throughout the past decade.  The embezzlement of millions of dollars at the hands 
of corrupt politicians and businesses has piqued the ire of ordinary Iranians who live paycheck to 
paycheck.  Rouhani had campaigned on the platform of an improved economy, based on the 
                                                
324 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, “Rouhani’s new budget aims to eliminate cash transfers,” Tyranny of Numbers, 
December 31, 2017, Accessed January 11, 2018, https://djavadsalehi.com/2017/12/31/rouhanis-new-budget-aims-to-
eliminate-cash-transfers/. 
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supposition of sanction relief and European investment following the nuclear deal.  Six months 
into Rouhani’s second term, these economic expectations remain unfulfilled, in part due to 
American president Donald Trump’s threat to nullify the nuclear deal, thereby discouraging 
foreign banks from funding investment in Iran and European companies from making any sort of 
foray into a market that may soon be subject to more American sanctions. By eliminating the 
program for cash transfers, Rouhani effectively positioned himself as the target of the provincial, 
subsidy-dependent, working class’s frustrations.  As Bajoghli observes, Rouhani’s neoliberal 
economic policies have tapped into the anxieties of Iranians and have manifested in the 
nationwide protests.325   
In his address to the parliament, Rouhani also spoke out against the “financial mafia,” 
calling out a number of conservative clerical and cultural institutions that have, until now, reaped 
large endowments with little oversight. Rumor had it that the protests were actually incited by 
hardliner conservative opponents of Rouhani in Mashhad.  These reactionary elements had 
allegedly provoked anti-Rouhani protests, with the assumption that the annual regime-sponsored 
rally held on the ninth of the Iranian month of Dey (commemorating the suppression of the 
Green Movement) would reinforce the uprising.   
 In November of 2017, Ahmadinejad had begun making provocative statements against 
the rampant corruption in Iran, using social media as his primary tool of communication.  He 
asked why, if Iran’s wealth belongs to its people, did the government want to cut funds for social 
welfare.  He also made threats against the judiciary and challenged Khamenei, refusing to back 
down when threatened and once again revived his populist tactic of attacking the rich and the 
corrupt.  On January 3, 2018, the commander of the IRGC accused Ahmadinejad of fomenting 
protest.  A week later, Ahmadinejad was arrested and imprisoned.  Keeping with tradition, the 
                                                
325 Bajoghli, “Behind the Iran Protests.” 
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Islamic Republic responded to the spreading protests by slowing down internet speeds to disrupt 
communications, specifically targeting Telegram and Instagram, which, as mentioned, have 
become the social media apps of choice in Millenial Iran.  As discussed thoroughly in chapter 
one, this has become the regime’s go-to tactic in the event of social uprising.   
 
Who Will Lead Iran’s Next Revolution? 
These most recent protests, however, differ from the 2009 Green Movement in a number 
of ways.  The Green Movement was the materialization of the Millenial Generation’s anger and 
frustration with the Islamic state’s infringement upon their civic and political rights, inspiring up 
to a million Iranians to rally and demonstrate in the streets.  It boasted a charismatic leader 
(Mousavi), had specific demands and was a movement that largely manifested in Tehran and 
other major urban centers in Iran.  The 2009 Green Movement was an urban secular uprising of 
affluent citizens demanding social and cultural change, freedom of expression and political 
participation.  This most recent series of protests, however, is not driven by the middle class nor 
the Millenial Generation.  Many Millenial Iranians have, in fact, voiced concern rather than 
support (either to me, or as Facebook and Instagram posts) for the disparate movement, fearing 
that the protests will incite a harsh response from the state and result in baseless bloodshed.  As 
one informant told me, “Obviously people have the right to protest and they should be protected, 
but what they are doing is not in their own interest, like a small child hurting himself when he is 
hungry.”  Most Millenial Iranians with whom I spoke to conveyed similar sentiments, 
particularly emphasizing the “confusing” nature of the situation.  While these informants are all 
residents of the United States, their confusion stemmed from suspicions of foreign meddling.   
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There is no denying, however, that the majority of the protests that took place in late 
2017 and early 2018 in Iran have been perpetuated by the middle class poor, most likely people 
who had reaped the benefits of Ahmadinejad’s populist programs.  As Vali Nasr observes, these 
protests are “bread riots” that reflect deep-seated frustration with economic stagnation, 
corruption, growing income inequality and a blatant concentration of wealth at the top echelons 
of Iranian society.326  The upper middle class and urban intelligentsia were, in fact, taken off 
guard by the eruption of the protests.  These urban elements have noticeably been absent from 
the protests, largely because they are the demographic that has been the primary beneficiary of 
what Salehi-Isfahani has dubbed “Rouhaninomics.”  Rouhaninomics is a combination of 
liberalizing economic reform and restructuring that involves curtailing the power and influence 
of religious foundations, state institutions and the Revolutionary Guard, while simultaneously 
creating a business climate that attracts foreign investment.327  Moderate urbanites actually 
feared that the protests would cultivate an environment that would allow Ahmadinejad to re-
emerge as the charismatic leader of the new revolution.  I observed this in the reactions of my 
informants to the protests; they either remained silent on the matter or voiced concern that the 
uprising might unwittingly derail Rouhani’s progressive agenda. As one informant said, the 
people should have the right to protest, but the way they are going about it, they are putting 
themselves in danger.  This informant essentially parroted Rouhani’s public statement that 
acknowledged Iranians’ right to protest, but reiterated that violence and destruction of property 
will not be tolerated.   
My informants represent the educated, urban, Millenial Generation of Iran.  They are the 
same students whose energy, enthusiasm and participation fueled the Reform Movement of 
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1997.  Twenty years after the inception of this movement, Rouhani was elected president, not in 
small part due to his alliance with the Reformists.  Participation of this demographic is therefore 
vital to the success of any social movement; without their involvement, no protest can sustain a 
legitimate threat to the ruling regime.  As Nasr contended, “Without Tehran, these small fires 
will burn themselves out.”. 
In a talk that he gave at the University of Arizona on February 23, 2018, Abbas Milani 
asserted that the age of Messianism has ended in Iran.  Iranians no longer need a savior and the 
new generation is not looking for someone to love or hate, he said.  Milani claimed that Iran’s 
greatest hope for substantive reform lies within the potential of the women’s movement, for it 
has relentlessly fought against forced hijab, misogynist laws and interference in their private 
lives for the past thirty-seven years.  Not only have Iranian women not accepted the role that the 
regime has assigned to them, Milani said, but they become increasingly more ambitious with 
each passing year, as has been demonstrated by the most recent uprising in Iran.  Thus, we 
cannot ignore the fact that the protests conveying general discontent with the state of the 
country’s economy, have also given Iranian women a platform to call for an end to compulsory 
veiling.  On December 27, 2017, a woman stood on a utility box on Enghelāb (Revolution) Street 
in Tehran.  She tied her white headscarf to a stick and brandished it as a flag toward the crowd.  
The woman was later identified as thirty-one year old Vida Movahed; she was arrested on that 
same day but was released a month later on temporary bail.   
On December 28, 2017, it was announced that Iranian women would no longer face jail 
time for bad-hijabi (improper veiling).  The Reformist newspaper, Sharq, quoted police chief 
General Hossein Rahimi, who said that Iranian women who do not comply with the mandatory 
hijab law, “will no longer be taken to detention centers, nor will judicial claims be filed against 
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them.”  Instead, according to the semi-official news agency, Tasnim, Iranian women found guilty 
of improper veiling will have to attend classes, similar to the concept of American traffic school.  
Rahimi was appointed as Tehran’s chief of police at the beginning of Rouhani’s second term.  
The general was considered more in line with Rouhani’s moderate stance on the imposition of 
Islam on Iranian society, particularly after his announcement of the new hijab law protocol.  
The video of Movahed, however, went viral and inspired a series of copycat protests 
against the mandatory hijab law in Iran.  Women of all ages and from all socioeconomic groups 
have participated in this movement, which has been referred to as “The Girls of Enghelab 
Street.” Some people have claimed that Movahed’s initial action was inspired by calls of protest 
by expatriate journalist, Masih Alinejad.328  In May 2017, Alinejad launched White Wednesdays, 
a social movement that encouraged Iranian women to remove their veils or wear white scarves 
on Wednesdays as a sign of protest.  Movahed had used a white scarf in her protest, which 
incidentally took place on a Wednesday.  Yet many of the women who have participated in the 
2018 protests against mandatory veiling have claimed that they do not adhere to Alinejad’s call.  
As more women have staged individual protests, General Rahimi has reversed his moderate 
stance, and in February 2018, he stated that his forces would not tolerate any acts of protest.   
As of March 2018, Amnesty International has reported that over thirty-five women have 
been violently attacked and arrested in Iran for protesting against compulsory hijab.  On March 
8, 2018, a video featuring three women who unveiled and sang “Sorūd-e Barābarī” (“The 
Anthem of Equality) went viral on various social media platforms.  On that same day, outside the 
Labor Ministry building, fourteen women were arrested for attempting to rally for International 
                                                
328 Alinejad founded My Stealthy Freedom (Āzādīhāye Yavāshakī) on May 3, 2014.328  My Stealthy Freedom was 
a movement that began as a Facebook page; it encouraged Iranian women to discard their hijabs in public and 
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Women’s Day. These arrests came a day after Iranian news media reported that Narges Hosseini 
had been sentenced to two years in prison for participating in the hijab protests.  Hosseini is a 
client of one of the most prominent human rights lawyers in Iran, Nasrin Sotoudeh.  Iranian state 
media did not report the Women’s Day arrests and instead touted celebration of the Islamic 
Republic’s independently declared Women’s Day, observed on March 9, in commemoration of 
the birth of Fatimah, the daughter of the prophet Muhammad.  Meanwhile, Sotoudeh declared 
that sentences like the one against her client only serve to increase solidarity among Iranian 
women in their fight against mandatory veiling and their struggle for equal rights in Iran. 
Whether it will be Iranian women, or Tehran’s urban middle class that leads the next 
revolution in Iran, remains a fact unknown.  What is certain, however, is that Iran is now at a 
critical juncture.  The generation of clerics that founded the Islamic Republic is on its way out.  
Rafsanjani, who in his final years became the champion of Iran’s progressive movement, died in 
2017.  Khamenei, while still alive, is nearly an octogenarian, and will likely abdicate his position 
sooner rather than later, some even speculating during Rouhani’s final term.  Meanwhile, it has 
become increasingly evident that the neoliberal capitalist model touted by the Islamic Republic, 
has failed to provide Iranians with a just and democratic state.  The commodity culture that has 
emerged as a result of the Islamic Republic’s embrace of this neoliberalism, the advent of the 
Post-Network Era and a disillusioned demographic of Iranian youth, only reifies the failure of 
this scheme.  At the same time, the theocracy’s endurance for nearly forty years demonstrates the 
success of the velāyat-e faqīh.  The product of this theocracy, the Millenial Generation, will 
likely never strive to overtly topple the Islamic Republic.  This generation’s revolution comes in 
the form of cultural production, which young Iranians engender through their Post-Network 
practices and class-defining trends.  In doing so, Iran’s Millenial Generation gradually chips 
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away at the traditional patriarchy that has historically defined Iran.  And thus, Iranian Millenials 
will carve out the space necessary, not only to assert themselves, but to redefine Iran, within the 
context of an increasingly transnational, globalized and technology-driven world. 
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